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General Introduction 
This PhD thesis contributes to the growing economic literature which studies effects 
of social and cultural variables on economic behavior of older adults in Europe. Landes, 
cited in Guiso et al. (2006), states that "if we learn anything from the history of economic 
development, it is that culture makes all the difference” (p. 29). Indeed, in the recent 
years economists put an effort to apply their analytical frameworks and empirical tools to 
study the role of culture on economic outcomes (Guiso et al., 2006). Many studies have 
already linked economic outcomes directly to cultural differences. In my papers I use 
culture as it is defined by Guiso et al. (2006). This definition is focused only on such 
aspects of culture (beliefs, values or skills) that are inherited by an individual from the 
previous generations (“transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation”) of 
his or her social group (p. 23). The persistence of these “slow-moving” components of 
culture allows us to use such variables as ethnic origin or culture inherited from the 
family of origin as exogenous predictors of economic outcomes, thus avoiding the issue 
of reverse causality. In my study I rely in particular on the assumption of Bisin and 
Verdier (2000), who maintain that parents have a natural tendency to teach their children 
what they have learned from their own parents, usually without an appropriate 
assessment of adequacy of this education. 
Referring to Cunha and Heckman, Mazzonna (2011) states that a vast body of 
theoretical and empirical literature already showed that the formation of cognitive and 
socio-emotional skills is a function of the transfers from the family of origin (e.g. 
cognitive ability, physical appearance, attitudes, and family connections as well as 
cultural traits). In the next step it has been already shown that these transfers are a key 
determinant of the economic success of children at an adult age (Mazzonna 2014: 26). 
The three current papers take this claim one step further and show that the effect of these 
transfers go far beyond the adult outcomes to influence the older adults’ economic 
performance. These papers, therefore, might be regarded as a contribution to the life 
course approach studies, where controlling for the current social and economic variables, 
one looks at the effects of the inherited culture on older adult’s economic behavior. 
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To study this process I use the Survey on Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE). SHARE is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database, which 
collects detailed micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family 
networks of more than 85,000 individuals (approximately 150,000 
interviews) from 20 European countries (+Israel) aged 50 or over. At the time of writing 
this thesis, 4 waves of this longitudinal study became available. These waves extend from 
2004 to 2012 and are supplemented by the life histories that were collected in Wave 3 
(SHARELIFE) and which provide background information as far back in time as 
childhood health and socio-economic status. Together, SHARE and SHARELIFE 
provide a wealth of data to address relevant for my study questions (see Börsch-Supan et 
al., 2013). For example, I examine whether disparities in early-life endowments correlate 
with older people’s proclivity to engage in unpaid ‘productive activities’ (such as 
volunteering or informal help). Whether norms, transmitted inside families, help older 
parents (who make monetary transfers to their grown-up children) to estimate the risk 
with which the child will renege on created “nonguaranteed debt?” Finally, I study, 
whether belonging to a linguistic community in Europe matters in determining the 
participation of older adults in the financial market. Regarding the last question, I rely on 
the assumption that “language and culture constitute one another, with language being the 
stable factor that constrains the development of cultural norms” (Licht et al., 2007: 661). 
The first paper is entitled Early-Life Conditions and Unpaid Productive Involvement 
at the Age 65 and Older in European Countries. It studies relationships between 
disparities in early-life conditions and extent and intensity of unpaid productive 
involvement among people aged 65 and older. The suggested measures of early-life 
conditions are “cultural capital” of the family of origin, mathematical ability and 
historical and institutional circumstances, such as experiencing an institutionally caused 
traumatic event during childhood. The paper uses data from SHARE wave 2 and 
SHARELIFE. The results confirm that, even after accounting for many other individual-
level variables, there exist long-lasting correlations between some of the early-life 
conditions and involvement in the unpaid productive activities in the old age. 
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The second paper, Uncertainty in Private Inter-Generational Transfers of Money and 
Time, contributes to the burgeoning literature on private downward intergenerational 
transfers of money and time in the Western countries. Building on the research, which 
finds support for the exchange motive of such transfers, this study further investigates 
determinants of the parental decision to transfer money. The empirical analysis is based 
on variables from three waves of SHARE, 14,889 parent-child dyads from 12 European 
countries. After discussing the risky nature of the exchange, I find that this decision to 
transfer money is dependent on the measures of current and childhood social status of the 
parents. This is congruent with the findings in the literature on trust that people from 
higher social status are less likely to be cheated; and that the people, who expect less to 
be cheated, are more willing to participate in risky transactions. This finding suggests that 
the parental decision to transfer money is determined by estimated uncertainty regarding 
the likelihood that the financial transfer will be reciprocated by children, who are 
expected to provide services later in life. Moreover, the study supplies an empirical 
support for the idea that this decision is informed by parental knowledge about the 
cultural norms characterizing their family. 
Finally, the third paper, Linguistic Communities and Financial Behavior of Older 
Adults in Europe, compares financial behavior (holding stocks, bonds, mutual funds 
and/or individual retirement accounts (IRA)) of older adults, belonging to 10 different 
European linguistic communities: German-speakers in South Germany, German-speakers 
in Austria and in Switzerland; Italian-speakers in Northern Italy and those in Switzerland; 
French-speakers in East France, in Belgium and in Switzerland; and finally Dutch in the 
Netherlands and Flemish in Belgium. Previous research found profound differences in 
financial behavior among older adults across European countries. However, belonging to 
different linguistic groups in a country; or to the same linguistic group across different 
countries was usually neglected as a possible predictor of financial behavior. Recently 
many other noneconomic factors were found as important determinants of the household 
financial behavior of older adults, such as effects of social institutions and culture. 
However, the literature has missed the fact that belonging to different linguistic 
communities in Europe might serve as a proxy for a latent construct of having/lacking 
skills and values that are necessary for holding stocks, bonds, mutual funds and/or 
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individual retirement accounts. Using the fourth wave of SHARE, I find first that for 
three kinds of financial instruments (holding stocks, risky assets and risky assets plus 
IRA) – after controlling for all possible determinants of private financial market 
participation – the behavior of the three linguistic communities in Switzerland and of the 
two communities in Belgium isn't the same, despite they face identical institutions. 
Second, in some cases (especially, concerning the French-speakers), the financial 
behavior of a language speaker can be identical, even when facing heterogeneous 
financial environment (i.e. the behavior is identical across countries). Thus, it is evident 
that language matters for private financial decisions – at least for some of the major 
European linguistic groups – even after controlling for a wide range of adequate 
variables. 
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Introduzione  
(La traduzione non è perfetta perché non parlo l’italiano) 
Questa tesi di dottorato offre un contributo alla sempre più crescente letteratura 
economica che studia gli effetti delle variabili di tipo sociale e culturale sul 
comportamento economico degli adulti anziani in Europa. Landes, citato in Guiso et al. 
(2006), afferma che “se possiamo apprendere qualcosa dalla storia dello sviluppo 
economico, è che la cultura fa tutta la differenza” (pag. 29). In effetti, in questi ultimi 
anni gli economisti stanno cercando di applicare i loro quadri teorici di analisi e i 
rispettivi strumenti empirici per studiare il ruolo della cultura sugli effetti economici 
(Guiso et al., 2006). Molti studi hanno già direttamente collegato gli effetti economici 
alle differenze culturali. Nei miei paper utilizzo il termine cultura così come viene 
definito da Guiso et al. (2006). Questa definizione si sofferma solo su quegli aspetti della 
cultura (credenze, valori o capacità) che vengono ereditati da un individuo dalle 
generazioni precedenti (“trasmessi in modo relativamente immutato di generazione in 
generazione”) del proprio gruppo sociale (pag. 23). La persistenza di queste componenti 
“rallentate” della cultura ci permette di utilizzare variabili come l'origine etnica o la 
cultura ereditata dalla famiglia di origine come elementi predittori di natura esogena degli 
effetti economici, evitando così la questione della causalità inversa. Nel mio studio mi 
affido in particolare all’ipotesi di Bisin e Verdier (2000), che sostengono che i genitori 
hanno una naturale tendenza ad insegnare ai loro figli ciò che hanno imparato dai propri 
genitori, di solito senza un’adeguata valutazione dell’adeguatezza di questa educazione.  
Riferendosi a Cunha e Heckman, Mazzonna (2011) afferma che una vasta letteratura 
teoretica ed empirica ha già dimostrato che la formazione di abilità cognitive e socio-
emotive dipende dalle eredità della famiglia di origine (ad esempio, le abilità cognitive, 
l’aspetto fisico, le abitudini, i legami familiari, nonché i tratti culturali e genetici). Nel 
successivo sviluppo di queste tesi, è stato già dimostrato che queste eredità sono un 
fattore determinante del successo economico e sociale dei bambini quando arrivano 
all’età adulta (Mazzonna 2014: 26). Questi tre paper fanno fare a questa affermazione un 
ulteriore passo avanti, poiché dimostrano che il risultato di queste eredità va ben oltre 
l’effetto sull’età adulta, arrivando ad influenzare il comportamento economico degli 
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adulti anziani. Questi paper, quindi, potrebbero essere considerati come un contributo agli 
studi che utilizzano un approccio mirato all’intero ciclo di vita, in cui attraverso il 
controllo delle variabili sociali ed economiche contemporanee, si guarda agli effetti della 
cultura ereditata sul comportamento economico degli adulti più anziani. 
Per studiare questo processo, utilizzo l’Indagine su Salute, Invecchiamento e Pensioni 
in Europa (SHARE - Survey on Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe). SHARE è una 
banca dati multidisciplinare e multipaese che raccoglie dati individuali su salute, status 
socio-economico e relazioni sociali e familiari di più di 85.000 individui 
ultracinquantenni (raccolti approssimativamente attraverso 150.000 interviste) di 20 paesi 
europei (più Israele). Al momento di scrivere la mia tesi, 4 serie di questa ricerca 
longitudinale erano disponibili. Queste serie vanno ora dal 2004 al 2012 e sono integrate 
dalle storie di vita che sono state raccolte durante la terza rilevazione (denominata 
SHARELIFE), che forniscono informazioni retrospettive che risalgono alla salute e allo 
status economico nel periodo dell'infanzia. Insieme, SHARE e SHARELIFE 
rappresentano un importante patrimonio di dati per poter affrontare le mie questioni di 
ricerca (vedi Börsch-Supan et al., 2013). Ad esempio, è per me possibile studiare se le 
disparità nei mezzi a disposizione nei primi anni di vita siano correlate con la 
propensione degli anziani di impegnarsi in “attività produttive” (come, ad esempio, il 
volontariato o l’aiuto di natura informale). Se le norme trasmesse all’interno delle 
famiglie aiutino i genitori anziani (che procurano un reddito ai propri figli ormai adulti) a 
stimare il rischio che il figlio si sottrarrà alla restituzione di questo “debito non 
garantito”. In ultima analisi, se l’appartenenza ad una comunità linguistica in Europa sia 
importante nel determinare la partecipazione degli adulti anziani al mercato finanziario. 
Relativamente a quest’ultima domanda, mi baso sul presupposto che “la lingua e la 
cultura si compongono l’una dell’altra, poiché la lingua è il fattore costante che vincola lo 
sviluppo di norme culturali” (Licht et al, 2007: 661). 
“Condizioni personali nelle fasi iniziali della vita e la partecipazione in attività 
produttive non remunerate dai 65 anni in poi”. Il primo articolo studia le relazioni tra 
le disparità esistenti nelle fasi iniziali della vita di una persona e l'entità e l'intensità di 
un suo successivo coinvolgimento in attività produttive non remunerate dai 65 anni in 
8 
 
poi. Si suggeriscono le seguenti misure delle condizioni personali di vita durante le 
sue prime fasi: il “capitale culturale” della famiglia di origine, le capacità matematiche 
dell'individuo e le circostanze storiche e istituzionali in cui egli si trova a vivere , 
come ad esempio la sua reazione ad un evento traumatico istituzionalmente causato 
durante l'infanzia. Questo articolo utilizza i dati del "Survey on Health, Aging and 
Retirement" per l'Europa (SHARE) e la sua indagine retrospettiva (SHARELIFE) in 
cui si raccolgono informazioni sul "background" familiare degli intervistati durante la 
loro infanzia in 13 paesi europei. I risultati confermano che, anche dopo aver 
considerato molte altre variabili a livello individuale, esistono correlazioni di lunga 
durata tra alcune delle condizioni delle prime fasi di vita di una persona e il suo 
coinvolgimento in attività produttive non retribuite durante vecchiaia. 
“Incertezza nei trasferimenti intergenerazionali privati di tempo e denaro”. Il 
secondo articolo intende offrire un contributo alla fiorente letteratura sui trasferimenti 
intergenerazionali "verso il basso" di tempo e denaro, ossia dagli adulti ai giovani, nei 
paesi occidentali. Sulla base della ricerca preesistente che supporta motivazioni di 
scambio tra le vecchie e le nuove generazioni, questo studio intende indagare 
ulteriormente sulle determinanti della decisione dei genitori di trasferire denaro ai 
propri figli. L'analisi empirica si basa sulle variabili delle tre ondate di indagine del 
"Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe" (SHARE, 14.889 diadi di 
genitori-figli di 12 paesi europei). Dopo aver discusso la natura rischiosa dello 
scambio intergenerazionale, si trova evidenza empirica che questa decisione dipende 
dalle misure dello status sociale corrente e dell'infanzia dei genitori. Questo risultato è 
congruente con i risultati della letteratura esistente secondo cui la gente di alto status 
sociale ha fiducia di avere meno probabilità di essere truffata e secondo cui la gente 
che si aspetta meno di essere truffata è più disposta a partecipare a operazioni 
rischiose. Tale scoperta suggerisce che la decisione dei genitori di trasferire denaro ai 
figli sia determinata dalla stima dell'incertezza circa la possibilità che il trasferimento 
finanziario sia da loro ricambiato, in quanto ci si aspetta che siano i figli a dover 
fornire dei servizi ai propri genitori durante la vecchiaia. Inoltre questo studio fornisce 
supporto empirico all'idea che tale decisione dei genitori è consapevolmente 
determinata dalle norme culturali che caratterizzano la propria famiglia. 
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“Comunità linguistiche e comportamento finanziario degli adulti più anziani in Europa”. 
Infine il terzo articolo confronta il comportamento finanziario (possesso di azioni, 
obbligazioni, fondi comuni di investimento e / o conti pensionistici individuali (IRA, 
ossia "Individual Retirement Accounts")) degli adulti più anziani appartenenti a 10 
diverse comunità linguistiche europee. Si prendono in considerazione le comunità di 
lingua tedesca in Germania meridionale, in Austria e in Svizzera; quelle Italofone nel 
Nord Italia e in Svizzera; quelle Francofone nella Francia orientale, in Belgio e in 
Svizzera; ed infine quelle di lingua olandese nei Paesi Bassi e di lingua fiamminga in 
Belgio. Le ricerche precedenti hanno evidenziato profonde differenze nel comportamento 
finanziario degli adulti più anziani nei diversi paesi europei. Tuttavia tali studi hanno 
trascurato di considerare l'appartenenza a diversi gruppi linguistici in uno stesso paese; o 
allo stesso gruppo linguistico in diversi paesi, come possibile variabile previsiva del 
comportamento finanziario degli individui. Recentemente altre ricerche hanno 
individuato molti altri fattori non economici rilevanti nel determinare il comportamento 
finanziario familiare degli adulti più anziani, come l'influenza che su di loro hanno le 
istituzioni sociali e la cultura. Tuttavia in letteratura non si è considerato il fatto che 
l'appartenenza a diverse comunità linguistiche in Europa potrebbe essere assunta come 
variabile "proxy" di un fattore latente, quale potrebbe essere il possedere o meno le 
capacità e le competenze per detenere azioni, obbligazioni, fondi comuni di investimento 
e / o conti pensionistici individuali. In questo lavoro si trova, dopo aver effettuato un 
controllo per tutte le possibili determinanti della partecipazione privata nei mercati 
finanziari, che per tre tipi di strumenti finanziari (azioni, attività rischiose e attività 
rischiose aggiunte agli "IRA"), il comportamento delle tre comunità linguistiche in 
Svizzera e delle due comunità in Belgio non è lo stesso, nonostante ciascuna di esse abbia 
a che fare con istituzioni identiche. In secondo luogo, in alcuni casi (specialmente per 
quanto riguarda i francofoni), le modalità della partecipazione ai mercati finanziari di chi 
parla la stessa lingua possono essere identiche anche quando il contesto finanziario è 
eterogeneo, in altri termini si ha un comportamento finanziario identico da parte di chi 
appartiene alla stessa comunità linguistica ma vive in paesi diversi. Risulta quindi 
evidente da questa analisi empirica che la lingua parlata, anche dopo aver controllato per 
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una vasta gamma di variabili adeguate, è rilevante per le decisioni finanziarie private 
almeno per alcuni dei principali gruppi linguistici europei. 
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ABSTRACT: This paper studies relationships between disparities in early-life 
conditions and extent and intensity of unpaid productive involvement among people aged 65 
and older. The suggested measures of early-life conditions are “cultural capital” of the family 
of origin, mathematical ability and historical and institutional circumstances, such as 
experiencing an institutionally caused traumatic event during childhood. The paper uses data 
from SHARE wave 2 and SHARELIFE. The results confirm that, even after accounting for 
many other individual-level variables, there exist long-lasting correlations between some of 
the early-life conditions and involvement in the unpaid productive activities in the old age.  
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1. Introduction 
The population ageing is recognized as perhaps the most important demographic, and 
thus also social, megatrend of our century. In recent decades, the notion of productive 
involvement among older adults has engendered much interest, especially in relation to the 
well-being of this age group (e.g. Butrica and Schaner 2005; Lum and Lightfoot 2005). The 
topic has also emerged in response to concern about the growing extent of possible risks that 
face social security systems, as a result of rising dependency ratios (e.g. Gruber and Wise 
2001; Castles 2002). 
The concept of ‘productive aging’ has been explored since by several scholars (e.g. Burr 
et al. 2007; Caro and Bass 1997; Erlinghagen and Hank 2006; Herzog and Morgan 1992). 
According to these authors, the perceived panic regarding the ‘burden of aging’ is somewhat 
overstated. That is, “a considerable amount of productivity occurs in the post-retirement 
years, albeit largely unpaid in nature” (Burr et al. 2007: S267). Retirement allows individuals 
to engage more in non-market production that can take various forms, such as volunteerism 
or informal caregiving. Moreover, it has been maintained that, “unlike labor force indicators, 
the unpaid productive activities… show much less decrease by age” (Erlinghagen and Hank 
2006:568).  
In order to clarify whether aging indeed poses potential threats to society as for example 
Gruber and Wise (2001 and 2005) claim, one needs to account for a broader range of 
productive activities performed by older citizens, and not only for  their workforce 
participation (Baker et al. 2005; Van Der Meer 2006). This explains the attempts to quantify 
and to consider the human activities that previously remained outside the traditional market 
sphere (Herzog and Morgan 1992). 
One aspect of productive activity in late life that has received little attention thus far is 
the relationship between different capitals (or resources) available to older individuals early 
in life and the extent, as well as the intensity (i.e. hours spent) of performing these activities 
in late life. Few studies have addressed whether disparities in accessibility to capitals over 
the life course correlates with older people’s capability of engaging in ‘productive activity,’ 
or answer the question, why some older people are more ‘productive’ than others. I address 
these questions by means of an empirical investigation. To the best of my knowledge, the 
current inquiry is the first to examine the extent to which the early-life social environment of 
older adults correlate with their overall engagement in a wide range of activities considered 
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to be productive, as well as with the intensity thereof. In particular, it sheds light on the 
importance of cultural transfers from the family of origin and other endowments, as well on 
the early-life influence of institutional environment. 
It should be mentioned that Youssim et al. (2015) considered early-life conditions as 
determinants of volunteering among the older adults only in Israel and didn’t use variables 
available for the European countries. They found that inheritance of work-relevant economic 
and cultural capitals from the family of origin is an important determinant of voluntarism 
(i.e. only one kind of productive activities) among adults aged 50 and older. In addition, 
Mazzonna (2014) looked at their influence on such economic outcomes as income, cognition 
and health. However, as follows from the discussion above, the question of considerable 
economic importance is identifying determinants of such outcomes as the wide range of 
productive involvement and intensity thereof. The current paper addresses this gap in the 
literature. Unlike Youssim et al. (2015), I study a wide range of productive activities (not 
only volunteering), as well as the time dedicated to them (Youssim et al. (2015) did not 
address the latter outcome and stated that this is a limitation of their study that must be 
addressed in further research). In addition, I look at the European countries (rather than 
Israel). Next, I use SHARELIFE database (again, Youssim et al. (2015) stated that another 
limitation of their study – that must be addressed in further research – is that wave 1 of 
SHARE provides only very limited information on respondents’ parents and there is no 
information on a more refined measure of inherited cultural capital). Finally I restrict my 
sample to retirees (65 and older), rather than looking at the population aged 50 and older. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I present the concept of productive 
aging and discuss its measures. Then I elaborate on the theoretical framework and provide 
literature review. Next I describe the data and how the variables were constructed. This is 
followed by descriptive statistics and bivariate associations. I also show some graphical 
evidence about bivariate associations between the outcome and number of books at home, 
when 10. Subsequently, I perform multivariate analyses. The last chapter provides a 
discussion. 
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2. The Concept of Productive Aging and its Measures 
Although there exists no commonly accepted definition of the phenomenon of 
‘productive aging’ (Baker et al. 2005), there are four concepts that generally appear in the 
literature. The first includes only market activities (paid work). The second – and broader – 
definition includes activities performed outside the market, yet having economic value, such 
as formal social and civic contributions (volunteering, informal helping behavior or social 
assistance). The third parameter includes capacity-building (education, training). The fourth 
definition is the most inclusive, labeling self-directed action (maintaining oneself as 
independently as possible) as a kind of productivity (Baker et al. 2005; Hinterlong et al. 
2001; Sherraden et al. 2001). 
Baker et al. (2005) studied the consequences of involvement in productive activities on 
the personal well being of older people. They claim that there is a need to address both the 
range of activities and the time that people commit to them. Correspondingly, they used two 
separate indices. One represented the total number of productive activities in which 
respondents were involved, and the other estimated the amount of time commitment that 
respondents gave to all activities combined. The specific activities included in their measures 
were: paid work (regular/ irregular employment); volunteering (religious/ political/ 
educational/ senior group/ other); care-giving (acute or chronic care for friend/ relative/ 
neighbor); informal assistance (errands/ housework/ childcare/ other), and do-it-yourself 
activities (home improvement/ canning/ yard work/ car repair). In another attempt to 
quantify elderly people’s productivity, Glass et al. (1999) built an index which represents the 
sum of responses regarding subjects’ performance of the following activities in the preceding 
month: gardening, preparing meals, shopping, unpaid community work, paid community 
work and other paid employment.  
In contrast, Herzog and Morgan (1992) question the approaches that simply count hours 
spent on such activities to measure a person’s productivity outside the marketplace. In their 
opinion, such approaches overlook the activity differentials that prevail among people. Thus, 
they maintain that study of productive behavior should include not only activities that 
produce valued goods and services, even if unpaid, but also the fact that not all productive 
activities are equally productive. In their paper, they propose methods to ascribe or to 
‘impute’ fiscal values to behaviors that were traditionally outside the marketplace. In the 
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current paper I use measures of productive involvement similar to those, suggested by Baker 
et al. (2005). 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
This study relies on an approach that became known as the life-course perspective (the 
LCP) (O'Rand 1996). According to this perspective, actors' attitudes and actions are a result 
not only of current social forces and individual resources but also of all the preceding life 
stages (Wong and DeGraff 2009). For LCP the increasing inequality of cohort members over 
time along significant life-course trajectories (e.g. health, work, or wealth) has become an 
important concern. Its theoretical and methodological concerns are especially focused on 
identifying the long-term interactions between institutional and life-course processes 
producing this outcome. Institutional mechanisms incorporated in opportunity structures 
such as labor markets and pensions stratify the availability of resources and rewards, and 
they interact with life-course processes related to labor force history and job mobility to 
produce complex patterns of cumulative advantage and cumulative disadvantage (O'Rand 
1996: 230). 
For example, in his investigation of the association between childhood socio-economic 
status and old age health, income and cognition, Mazzonna (2014) used a model (Figure 1), 
in which childhood circumstances may have both direct and indirect effects on old-age 
outcomes. Based on the idea of four stages of life (childhood, schooling, adulthood and the 
old age), there are a few possible pathways from childhood circumstances to old-age 
outcomes.  
 
Figure 1. Life-Course. Four Stages of Life 
 
In the current paper, I look at significance of the childhood variables, after accounting 
for the current life-chances. Unlike Mazzonna, I am interested only in the long-lasting effects 
of family background on the late-life productive involvement, rather than in its effect on 
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earlier outcomes. However, I introduce the earlier outcomes into my model, to identify 
whether measures of individuals’ different socio-economic backgrounds are still strong and 
significant, even after controlling for proxies of school performance and adult outcomes. 
In addition to taking the LCP approach, I also use a general model to explain older 
adults’ productive involvement. Productive activities require resources (or ‘‘capital’’) to 
perform them. Therefore, a common finding is that older adults with a higher socioeconomic 
status, for example, exhibit a higher likelihood to engage in both paid and unpaid work 
(Youssim et al., 2015). I use a tripartite conceptual model of capitals needed to perform 
productive activities developed by Wilson and Musick (1997) to explain involvement in the 
volunteer activities. This model seems to be especially well suited to the sample of the 
population that I review (65 and older). As will be shown below, the vast majority of them 
does not participate in the labor market and are retired. For that reason, their productivity, as 
defined in this study, includes unpaid and optional activities and, therefore, may be treated as 
volunteerism. Wilson and Musick’s model assumes that in order to engage in productive 
activities individuals require the following necessary resources: human and social capitals, as 
well as cultural tools. Although human and social capitals are commonly used determinants 
of economic outcomes, the third component requires an additional explanation. The 
following section explains its relevance as a resource for such an economic outcome as late-
life productive involvement, as well as suggests a necessary modification of Wilson and 
Musick’s (1997) model. 
 
3.1 Early-Life Determinants of Economic Behavior 
Already in 1977 Vinson, Scott, and Lamont suggested that in every consumption taste 
matters and personal values affect consumption decisions. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2006) state in general that in making many economic decisions (e.g. which college to 
attend, choice of a profession, saving for retirement) people’s choices must be based on prior 
beliefs, which are determined by culture (e.g. by religion and ethnicity). Social and cultural 
variables reflect ways in which individuals are clustered into groups different with respect to 
owning of knowledge, skills and values, but also such as ethnicity or gender. In their book 
Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2005) claim that 
individuals have different tastes for the time preference in consumption and different degrees 
of risk aversion. Social sciences, such as anthropology or sociology address these problems. 
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One well known example is Max Weber’s book The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1958), which establishes that belonging to religious denominations matters for 
economic behavior. The capitalist ethic is informed by the Calvinist idea (as opposed to 
Catholic) about one’s election (salvation), which is a function of such behaviors as hard 
labor, avoiding enjoyment of wealth, as well as idleness. 
Wilson and Musick (1997) develop the idea posited by Bourdieu (1990), of cultural 
capital as a resource that is necessary for participation in volunteer activities. This form of 
capital consists of attitudes, knowledge and preferences. In their view the aspects of culture 
that are relevant for involvement in optional productive activities are values, such as being 
truthful, fair and responsible. 
Yet, it is not undemanding for an empirical study to grasp the cultural resources or 
“the moral components” that are necessary for being a successful player in the field of 
‘productive aging.’ According to Wilson (2000), children inherit their parents’ volunteering 
habits, because the parents supply them with resources indispensable for volunteering. To 
assess the resources that a person owns at this cultural level, Wilson and Musick employ two 
measures: one directly measures how much the respondent values helping others; the second 
measures religiosity according to frequency of church attendance and of prayer (pp. 699, 
703).  
However do these measures adequately grasp habits, inherited from parents, which 
constitute the resources indispensable for the productive activities? Referring to Cunha and 
Heckman (2008), Mazzonna (2011) states that a vast body of theoretical and empirical 
literature suggests that cognitive and non-cognitive skills are formed by the interplay of the 
early childhood environment and genes. I claim that it is necessary to disentangle the 
resources inherited from the early-life milieu into three components: innate or genetic ability; 
the tools acquired from the environment, given by different native social milieus (e.g. 
family); and experiences, induced by the social structures, such as social norms or 
institutions. Hence I suggest modifying the last component in the Wilson and Musick (1997) 
model (i.e. the cultural capital). That is, the “cultural capital” (or the moral component of 
culture, inherited from parents) in Wilson and Musick (1997) model is supplemented with 2 
more components, the genetic endowment and institutional circumstances. 
The current study conjectures that the questions about number of books in the house, 
as well as relative proficiency in the language when 10 capture in a finer manner 
availability of a native milieu-specific “tool-kit,” which guarantees the permanence of their 
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socio-economic performances over time (Bourdieu 1990). These are better measures of the 
intergenerational transferred elite status, endowing with the superb moral qualities than 
those, proposed by Wilson and Musick. As to the number of books at home at the age of 10, 
it has been already used in the literature as a proxy for the cultural background” (Mazzonna, 
2014:28; Brunello et al., 2012). As to the language, Bourdieu viewed it as one of the main 
components of the cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986).  
Finally, I suggest using the relative position in mathematics at 10 as a proxy for initial 
(or genetic) endowment. Unlike verbal abilities (which are mainly transferred from the early 
environment through education), the capability to compute and process numbers might be 
treated as reflecting personal genetic or biological idiosyncrasy. The historical and 
institutional circumstances are conceptualized as experiencing a traumatic event during 
childhood – which is arguably uncorrelated with the early familial milieu – such as “lived in 
a children's home,” “evacuated or relocated during a war,” “lived in a prisoner of war camp”. 
The institutional circumstances is also a function of the country of birth, under the 
assumption that in the data (to be described below) the country of interview is the same as 
the country of birth. Analyses in the appendix provide some empirical support for these 
assumptions.  
 
 
3.2 Other Predictors of Older Adult’s Productivity already Identified in the 
Literature 
In this section I review other resources (or capitals) that Wilson and Musick (1997) or 
other authors identified as important determinants of engaging in productive activities. At the 
individual level, the resources necessary are work-relevant skills and other means that a 
person brings to the job. This first set of resources is termed human capital, usually defined 
as educational achievements, occupational status, economic, and (sometimes) health 
indicators. Level of education is the most consistent predictor of engagement in volunteering 
activity (Wilson 2000).  
According to Wilson (2000), economic status is also a predictor of involvement in 
productive activities, paid or unpaid. Volunteer hours are sometimes inversely related to 
wages because, as pay rises, people invest more resources in their paid job, leaving fewer 
resources for volunteering. However, he notes that other studies refute this contention, 
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showing that the effect of income on volunteering varies according to the method by which 
both are measured, and by the variables included in the model. Although in our case 
(respondents aged 65+) wage variable might be irrelevant, it seems to be reasonable to use 
some other indicator of the economic status. I use the disposable net-worth variable. 
Health status also predicts productive involvement. First, it is well documented that poor 
health leads to an earlier exit from paid employment (Karpansalo et al. 2004; Lee 2005; Radl 
2007; Schuring et al. 2007). Second, health status is also related to involvement in other 
forms of productive activity. According to Wilson and Musick (1997: 698), “The ability to 
do volunteer work, or to assist those in need of help, depends on one’s physical capabilities.” 
In addition to the health status itself, I amend the model by introducing variables about 
individual life-style and health behavior, such as smoking or performing physical activities. 
Health-related behavior may or may be not a consequence of early life conditions, but if it is 
conceptualized as a health maintaining intervention, it should be taken into account, as a 
possible correlate of the old age productivity outcome. For example, the so called “model of 
additive exposure” (Berkman, Ertel, & Glymour, 2011) suggests that although early-life 
developmental phases are highly important throughout life, later circumstances may modify 
the effect of early-life conditions on the active aging. According to Tesch-Roemer (2012) 
abundant empirical evidence confirms positive effects on active aging of physical activity, as 
well as the negative effects of smoking, sedentary behavior and alcohol abuse.  
While human capital, health and individual life-styles are “located in individuals,” social 
capital comes from the relations between individuals, such as the number of friends and 
marital or parental status. Social networks provide information, trust, support and other 
inputs (Wilson and Musick 1997). Studies have shown that knowing more people and being 
a member in more organizations increase the chances of volunteering. However, social ties 
may also have a negative impact on volunteering, depending on the nature of the ties and of 
the volunteer work, respectively. As for the effects of marital status and/or children in the 
household on volunteering, the findings are not consistent (Wilson 2000).  
Wilson’s (2000) comprehensive study shows that different theories of volunteering still 
leave unexplained the differences between people from different socio-demographic 
backgrounds. These variables, such as gender or age groups, also have been found to have an 
effect on volunteering, all else considered. It is necessary, therefore, to enter them into the 
analytic model as well. 
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As to the macro-level factors that might affect the life-course trajectory, which is the 
topic of the current study, cross-country differences in older adults’ productivity are already 
well-investigated, with ample evidence for an important role of the institutional set-up of 
pension systems (e.g. Gruber and Wise 2004). In general, the existing empirical research has 
demonstrated considerable cross-country variation in the productive involvement of older 
adults, both paid (e.g. Brugiavini et al. 2005) and different unpaid work (e.g. Erlinghagen 
and Hank 2006; Hank and Stuck 2008). Hank (2011) conducted a multilevel study of macro-
social factors that explain participation in non-market productive activities. He found a 
significant role played by society’s cultural traditions (civil liberties), as well as by welfare 
state interventions (government social spending). 
Following the review above, the current study examines the relationship between the 
resources (or life chances) with which older adults are equipped at the micro-social level 
(especially the early-life conditions) and the extent, as well as intensity (time of contribution) 
of their productive involvement in the late life. Specifically, I hypothesize that older adults, 
who had better early-life conditions are also more productive. In particular, people are more 
productive if they: 1. Have inherited higher “cultural capital” from their family of origin, 2. 
Have a better mathematical ability and 3. Lived through favorable historical and institutional 
circumstances. The ultimate test will be if after accounting for other relevant individual-level 
variables, there still exist long-lasting correlations between the early-life conditions and 
extent, as well as intensity of involvement in the unpaid productive activities in the old age. 
 
4. Data and Variables  
I use the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which is a 
multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database of micro data on health, socio-economic 
status and social and family networks of more than 55,000 individuals aged 50 or over from 
20 European countries (Börsch-Supan et al., 2008). The second wave of SHARE is a 
prospective wave that provides a detailed picture about respondents in 2006. In addition, 
SHARELIFE (2010) is a retrospective view across the entire life course in Europe over the 
past century, which relates in particular to such areas as childhood living conditions, or 
family history (Schröder, 2010). Combining SHARE wave 2 and SHARELIFE enables me to 
study the relationships between disparities in early-life conditions and extent and intensity of 
unpaid productive involvement among older adults. 
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The wave 2 sample contains 34,415 respondents from 14 European countries (Austria, 
Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland). Since I need information about respondents’ 
early-life conditions, I merge the wave 2 data with the SHARELIFE (or wave 3) sample, 
which contains 26,836 respondents from 13 countries (without Ireland). After merging, the 
resulting database consists of 23,688 respondents. 
In this study I suggest focusing on the subsample of 65 or older. This is the most 
interesting subsample. The whole sample also includes persons aged 50 – 64. Half of this 
latter sub-group is still working. Thus, our study would be not so much about unpaid 
productivity of older citizens, but rather a study of labor market participation. However, the 
point of interest of the current paper is the modern welfare states in which groups of people 
continue pursuing productive goals and engage in frequently unpaid productive activities in 
old age, such as different kinds of volunteerism encouraged by the state. Thus, finally, the 
relevant subsample of 65 years old and older contains 10,923 individuals. 
 
4.1 Dependent Variables 
Number of Activities Outcome. The main dependent variable is the number of 
productive activities in which respondents were involved, based upon participation in up to 
six realms of unpaid activity. These included helping someone within the household with 
personal care tasks in the previous twelve months, helping someone outside the household in 
any of several tasks in the previous twelve months, and caring for grandchildren without the 
presence of the parents. Three additional activities in which the respondent might have been 
engaged in the preceding month were also considered: performing voluntary or charity work, 
attending an educational or training course and taking part in a political or community 
organization. The number of areas of activity in which respondents were involved was then 
counted (0-6). 
Intensity of Productive Activities. In addition to the number of productive activities, I 
also computed time that people devote to them. Helping outside the household. In the wave 
2 questionnaire the respondents were asked if during the last twelve months they have 
personally given any help to a family member from outside the household, a friend or 
neighbor with personal care tasks. Those, who answered confirmatively, were asked about 
frequency of delivering the help in the last twelve months: 1. Almost daily; 2. Almost every 
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week; 3. Almost every month or 4. Less often. They were then asked about the number of 
hours devoted, while the maximum was set by the software to 3000 hours. This number may 
be interpreted as about 8 working hours each day during the year (8*365 = 2920). This 
inquiry was repeated in a loop for up to 3 different persons. Following Bolin et al. (2008), in 
order to make the answers comparable between respondents, I used the following approach. 
For each respondent I computed an approximate number of weekly hours, devoted to these 
activities, as follows: for those, answered that they provided help outside the household 
almost every day, I multiplied the number of reported hours by 7. For the respondents, who 
answered “almost every week,” I did not change the number of hours. For those, answered 
“almost every month,” the number of hours was divided by 4.28. Finally, for the 
respondents, who helped “less often,” than each month, the estimated number of hours was 
divided by 52. In cases of errors, such that a number of weekly hours exceeded 168, it was 
changed to 60 ( 8*7). Unlike the case of looking after grandchildren (as described below), I 
did not allow more than 8 hours per day, since, as was mentioned above, the software 
allowed working only about 8 hours each day during the year. Because SHARE asks about 
this kind of help tree times (for three different persons), I summed the 3 computed values of 
hours. Again, for a few respondents the number of weekly hours exceeded 84. In this case I 
changed this number to 84. 
Helping inside the household. Next, the respondents were asked about help within 
their household. Namely, is there someone living in this household whom they have helped 
regularly during the last twelve months with personal care? Since the survey does not want 
to capture help during short-term sickness, “regularly” means daily or almost daily during at 
least three months. Although, the respondents were not asked any direct question about 
intensity of this productive activity, it may be assumed that the people, who do so, are 
working at least 8 hours 7 days a week, so they were hypothesized to work 60 weekly hours. 
Looking after grandchildren. People, who have grandchildren, were asked if during 
the last twelve months they regularly or occasionally looked after their grandchildren without 
the presence of the parents. As with help to someone outside the household, also 
grandparents, who answered confirmatively to the previous question, were asked about 
frequency of this productive activity, using the same scale, namely: 1. Almost daily; 2. 
Almost every week; 3. Almost every month or 4. Less often. They were then asked about the 
number of hours devoted to this on a typical day/in a typical week/in a typical month/in the 
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last twelve months, when the maximum was set to 9000 hours. This number can be 
interpreted as looking after grandchildren 24 hours daily during the year (24*365 = 8760).  
The present SHARE release contains these data separately about 14 grandchildren. As 
before, following Bolin et al. (2008), in order to make the answers comparable between 
respondents, I used the following approach. Using loop from 1 to 14, for each respondent I 
computed an approximate number of weekly hours, devoted to each grandchild, as follows: 
for those, answered that they looked after a grandchild almost every day, I multiplied the 
number of reported hours by 7. For the respondents, who answered “almost every week,” I 
did not change the number of hours. For those, answered “almost every month,” the number 
of hours was divided by 4.28. Finally, for the respondents, who helped “less often,” than 
each month, the estimated number of hours was divided by 52. The errors were corrected so 
that the people were allowed to look after the grandchildren at most 12 hours a day or 84 per 
week. Finally, all 14 possible time values were summed to receive the total number of hours 
devoted to this kind of activity. Again, for a few respondents the number of weekly hours 
exceeded 84. In this case I changed this number to 84. 
Volunteering, Attending Training Course or Taking Part in Political Organization. 
For the three remaining productive activities, namely did Voluntary or charity work; 
attended an educational or training course; or taken part in a political or community-related 
organization, people were asked if in the last four weeks they did so 1. Almost daily; 2. 
Almost every week; or 3. Less often. To compute the intensity of those activities, I used the 
following approach. I assumed that those, who do at least one of these almost daily, work at 
least half-time, i.e. 20 hours per week. Those, who work almost every week, devote at least 
one full day a week, 8 hours. Those, who report working “Less often,” devote at least 8 
hours once during the 4 weeks a month, i.e. 8/4= 2 hours a week. Finally, I summed up all 
the 6 intensities into one variable.  
 
4.2 Independent Variables 
 
Early Life Conditions 
Books. As was already mentioned, I introduce into the regression equation, a variable 
from SHARELIFE, based on a question asking the respondent to estimate how many books 
were there in the place s/he lived at the age 10 (not counting magazines, newspapers, or 
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school books). The question had 5 categories of answer: 1. None or very few (0-10 books); 
2. Enough to fill one shelf (11-25 books); 3. Enough to fill one bookcase (26-100 books); 4. 
Enough to fill two bookcases (101-200 books); and 5. Enough to fill two or more bookcases 
(more than 200 books). 
Relative Math and Language Performance at 10. SHARELIFE also provides user 
with the knowledge about subjectively rated relative position to others in mathematics and 
language. The respondents were asked if compared to other children in the class they 
performed in math: 1. Much better, 2. Better, 3. About the same, 4. Worse or 5. Much worse 
than the average. The same scale was used to assess the relative performance in the country’s 
language. I recoded these variables to run in the opposite direction from 1 “much worse” to 5 
“much better” (Math and Verb respectively). 
Area of Residence When 10. This variables and its offshoot, Rural_age10, were 
computed, using the SHARELIFE wave of the data. In SHARELIFE, the respondents were 
asked repeatedly about the different places, where they have lived during life since birth. If a 
respondent told that his/her family moved, s/he was repeatedly asked in loop from 0 to 50 
when they started and finished living in the residence, while answers ranged from 1900 to 
2009 (code 9997 refers to the case, when respondent still lives in the same residence). They 
were asked a series of questions about each accommodation, including the question about the 
area where this residence was located: 1. A big city 2. The suburbs or outskirts of a big city 
3. A large town 4. A small town 5. A rural area or village. To compute, the variable, which 
answers the question, where the respondent has lived at age 10 or older, I subtracted the year 
of birth from the year of leaving a residence. If this difference was greater than 10, I recorded 
the area of residence. Otherwise, I proceeded with loop computing the age of leaving the 
residence, and updating both the year of leaving and the area. I repeated these operations 
while the variable, containing the age of leaving the residence, was receiving new values, 
different from missing. In fact, after examining years of leaving of 10 residences, no new 
values were generated. Next, I computed the dummy Rural_age10, which is a dummy, 
assuming the value of “0,” if the original variable ranges from 1 to 4, i.e. City, outskirts of a 
big city, Big Town or Small town, and “1,” if the original variable has the value 5 “Village.” 
Early-Life Trauma. This variable, based on a question from SHARELIFE, and is a 
count of the following events during the life: lived in a children’s home; been fostered with 
another family; evacuated or relocated during a war; lived in a prisoner of war camp; lived in 
prison; lived in a labor camp; lived in a concentration camp; been an inpatient in a TB 
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institution; stayed in a psychiatric hospital; been homeless for 1 month or more. An 
additional variable entered into this block was country of interview, under the assumption 
that this is the same country as the one of the birth. 
 
Human capital and Health 
Individual net-worth (Wealth). To derive equivalent disposable wealth, household 
net-worth variable, provided by the wave 2 was standardized by the household-size square 
root, and then recoded into quintiles. Years of Education is a question, asked in SHARE 
wave 2 questionnaire: how many years the respondent spent in full time education. The 
software allowed values from 0 to 25. Self-Perceived Health variable was recoded to run 
from 1, “Poor” to 5, “Excellent.” Activities of Daily Living (ADL) or Instrumental 
Activities of Daily Living (IADL). The variable of own limitations was computed in such a 
way that it received a value of 0 in case of no ADL or IADL, and the value “1” in case when 
one of own ADL or IADL is greater than 0. Finally, “depressive symptoms” is a dummy 
variable, telling if a respondent had suffered from 3 or more depressive symptoms in the last 
month. This variable is computed, using the Mental Health module of the SHARE wave 2 
questionnaire. 
 
Health-Related Behavior 
Smoking. In the wave 2 of SHARE, only the respondents, who did not respond to the 
wave 1, were asked if they have ever smoked daily for a period of at least one year. Those, 
who answered confirmatively, or those, who also participated in the wave 1, were then 
asked, if they smoke at the present time. This latter question, therefore, had 5,252 missing 
values. Most of these values were set to “no,” consistently with the answers to the former 
question. Thus, we receive a full picture about smoking at the present time, the dummy 
current smoking. In addition, to fill the missing values in the dummy variable “ever 
smoked” for the people, who participated in the both waves, and therefore were not asked 
this question in the wave 2, the behavioral risk data from SHARE wave 1 were merged with 
the wave 2.  
 Drinking Alcohol. The respondents were asked how often during the last 3 months, 
have they drunk any alcoholic beverages. The answers followed the scale: 1. Almost every 
day; 2. Five or six days a week; 3. Three or four days a week;  4. Once or twice a week;  5. 
Once or twice a month;  6. Less than once a month; and 7. Not at all in the last 3 months.  
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Those, who reported an answer 1 to 6, were then asked how many drinks they drink per day: 
“on the days you drink, about how many drinks do you have?” The software allowed 
entering an estimated number of drinks, ranging from 1 to 70. This variable was used as a 
measure of alcohol consumption. Those, who answered to the first question was “Not at all 
in the last 3 months,” were given the value of 0 drinks. While, for those, who cited a number 
higher than 30, the value was set to 30. 
Making Sports. I used 2 variables to grasp the physical activity of the respondents. 
These variables were computed, using the following questions. First, how often do you 
engage in vigorous physical activity, such as sports, heavy housework, or a job that involves 
physical labor? The answers were: 1. More than once a week 2. Once a week 3. One to three 
times a month 4. Hardly ever, or never. The second question was: How often do you engage 
in activities that require a moderate level of energy such as gardening, cleaning the car, or 
doing a walk? This question used the same scale of answers as the previous one. I recoded 
them into the dummies as follows: vigorous sport is 1 if the original variable has values 1 to 
3 and 0, if the original is 4. The moderate sport was computed in the same manner. 
 
Social capital 
The social capital variables included the presence of a partner (recoded as 1 for 
respondents living with a partner and 0 for all others); household size and the number of 
living children. Additional variables in this block included 1) going to a sport, social or other 
kind of club, and 2) taking part in a religious organization. It should be noted that these last 
two variables are not part of the domain of productive activity as conceptualized in this 
investigation. I use them as measures of social capital because, as was noted earlier, knowing 
more people and being a member of more organizations were found to be predictors of 
productive involvement. 
 
Demographic and Other Factors 
Area of Present Residence. I created a dummy, called Rural_d, which assumes value 
of 0 if the original variable ranges from 1 to 4, i.e. City, outskirts of a big city, Big Town or 
Small town, and Rural_d=1, if the original variable has the value 5 “Village.”Additional 
demographic variables entered into the analysis were age and gender. Finally, this block also 
included the variable about Spouses’ ADL and IADL. To compute it, I used the variable 
cvidp (the partner’s identifier inside the household) to create a new file, where mergeid (the 
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respondent’s identifier in the SHARE database) is not of the respondent, but that of his or her 
spouse. This new file, containing Resp_mergeid, as well as the mergeid (the one of the 
spouse), was merged with the original file. This operation gave me the necessary file, in 
which I have all the data about the respondent’s spouse. Then, this was merged again, using 
Resp_mergeid with the original file, thus adding to the respondents’ data the variables about 
their spouses. This was done to create a file of spouses’ ADL and IADL limitations. For 
individuals, who don’t have spouses I set the value of the target variable to zero. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
This study aims at estimation of the influence of the Early-Life Conditions on 
productive performance of the older adults in Europe. Taking all the above into account, and 
applying the reasoning, proposed by Mazzonna (2014), I characterize the early familial 
milieu by estimated number of books at home, relative language proficiency at 10 and area 
of residence (urban or rural). In addition, I also considered such measures as the occupation 
of the main breadwinner and the number of facilities in the accommodation at 10 (fixed bath, 
cold and hot running water supply, inside toilet and central heating). However, due to high 
correlations between books, facilities and occupation level (as described in the Appendix and 
also reported in Mazzona (2014:29)), I dropped the two latter variables from the final 
analysis. Relative performance in Math at 10 serves as a proxy for initial (or genetic) 
endowment. Finally, the historical and institutional circumstances are conceptualized as 
experiencing a traumatic event during childhood. In addition to the variables of the main 
interest I also use controls, which were found as important predictors of productive aging, as 
was described in the literature review.  
Since the first outcome variable is categorical, I apply the Ordered Probit model to 
estimate the equation for the number of productive activities. I run the same model 3 times. 
First, I look at the whole subsample of 65+, then I run the same model for the subsample of 
males, 65+ and finally for the one of females. Then I use the Tobit regression to estimate the 
intensity equation. Also Tobit is run for the three subsamples, as in the case of the 1
st
 
equation. Finally, after each of the estimations, I run F-Test for joint significance of 
categories for key categorical independent variables. 
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5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The univariate statistics for all study variables are summarized in Table 2. First, it 
should be noted that only 5.5% of this sample are employed. The vast majority (81%) define 
themselves as retired; and 13% said that they are homemakers. The average number of the 
unpaid productive activities among respondents aged 65 or older is slightly less than one. 
Table 1 (and Chart 1) show that a little bit less than one-half (47%) of the sample are not 
involved in any kind of productive activity. One-third (32%) of the respondents are 
performing one productive activity; 15% are performing 2 activities; only less than 6% of the 
respondents reported performing 3 and more activities (the “highly productive people”). 
Thus, it is evident that the half of the sample of 65+ is “productive.”  
 
Table 1. Distribution of the Number of Productive Activities, Respondents 65+ 
Number of Productive 
Activities 
Freq. Percent Cum. Percent 
0 5,155 47.19 47.19 
1 3,538 32.39 79.58 
2 1,602 14.67 94.25 
3 512 4.69 98.94 
4 95 0.87 99.81 
5 21 0.19 100.00 
Total 10,923 100.00 100.00 
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As to the second measure of productivity, the intensity (i.e. the number of weakly hours, 
devoted to the 6 productive activities), on average the respondents work 11 hours per week. 
However, the standard deviation shows high variation from the mean, i.e. the productive 
hours are spread out over a large range of values. Chart 2 below provides the graphical 
evidence about the distribution. 
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Chart2. Distribution of the hours invested in Productive activities by the Respondents 
65+ 
 
 
On average, people reported having 11-25 books at home when they were 10. A little 
more than two-fifth of the respondents (44%) said that they had “none or very few (0-10 
books);” a little more than fifth (22%) said that they had “enough to fill one shelf (11-25 
books);” fifth had “enough to fill one bookcase (26-100 books).” Finally, 6% had “enough to 
fill two bookcases (101-200 books)” and the same percentage had as many as 200 books and 
more. Some 14% of the sample reported that they have experienced at least one of the 
events, such as living in a children's home or in a prisoner of war camp (Early-Life Trauma). 
Average performance in mathematics compared to other children was 3 “about the same” on 
the scale 1 to 5. The same average score was found for the relative performance in country’s 
language. The average of years of education in the sample is 9. The average self-perceived 
health is almost 3 (“good”). A bit more than one-quarter of the sample (26%) reported 
having 3 or more depressive symptoms, and thus are depressed according to the EURO-D 
definition. Some 12% are currently smoking, while 41% reported that they have smoked 
during their life-course. Almost third (29%) of the respondents reported that they do not 
drink any alcohol; a bit more than one-fourth (27%) reported drinking 1 drink a day; and 
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almost one-fourth (23%) is drinking 2; the remaining fifth is distributed between 3 and 30 
drinks. 
Almost half of the sample (48%) reported that they engage in vigorous sportive 
activities more often than “hardly ever or never;” while a vast majority (85%) said that they 
engage also in moderate sportive activities. A little more than one-quarter of the sample 
(26%) reported that they personally have at least one ADL or IADL limitation. As to the 
spouses, 7% reported that they have ADL limitations and 11% that they have IADL 
limitations. The average age was 73.5 years old. Males constitute a little less than half of the 
sample (46%). On average the respondents reported to belong to the 3 quintile vis-à-vis their 
disposable net-worth. The average expectation to receive a bequest was very low: 5% on the 
scale 0 – 100. As to the social capital, the majority of the sample - 67% - has a spouse or a 
partner; the average size of the household in the sample is 2 persons, and the average number 
of children is 2.3. Eighteen percent reported attending a social club and 14% attended a 
religious organization. Almost one-third (29%) are living in rural area. In comparison, one-
half (49%) were living in the rural area at the age 10. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statics, Subsample of 65 and older 
Variable Obs Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Number of productive activities 10923 0.802 1 0.936 0 5 
Intensity 10923 10.408 0.06 20.273 0 84 
Books 10737 1.850 1 1.121 1 5 
Early-Life Trauma 10923 0.155 0 0.419 0 4 
Math 10288 3.278 3 0.890 1 5 
Verb 10269 3.308 3 0.865 1 5 
Edu 10723 9.341 9 4.391 0 25 
Self-Perceived Health 10923 2.713 3 1.053 1 5 
Depressive symptoms 10656 0.264 
 
0.441 0 1 
Current smoking 10823 0.115 
 
0.319 0 1 
Ever smoked 10861 0.406 
 
0.491 0 1 
Alcohol 10776 1.829 1 4.208 0 30 
Vigorous Sport 10818 2.878 4 1.286 1 4 
Vigorous Sport Dummy 10818 0.484 
 
0.500 0 1 
Moderate Sport 10819 1.718 1 1.119 1 4 
Moderate Sport Dummy 10819 0.845 
 
0.362 0 1 
ADL or IADL 10923 0.260 
 
0.439 0 1 
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Variable Obs Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
ADL Spouse 10045 0.162 0 0.715 0 6 
IADL Spouse 10045 0.269 0 0.935 0 7 
Age 10923 73.522 72 6.425 65 99 
Age2 10923 5446.713 5184 975.458 4225 9801 
Male 10923 0.456 
 
0.498 0 1 
Wealth 10923 2.898 3 1.416 1 5 
Expectation to receive bequest 10642 4.933 0 17.787 0 100 
Spouse 10922 0.673 
 
0.469 0 1 
hhsize 10923 1.942 2 0.908 1 11 
nchild 10923 2.297 2 1.491 0 16 
Social Club 10923 0.184 
 
0.387 0 1 
Religious Organization 10923 0.135 
 
0.342 0 1 
Urban 10923 3.410 4 1.383 1 5 
Rural_d 10923 0.289 
 
0.453 0 1 
Rural_age10 10851 0.485 
 
0.500 0 1 
 
Finally, one issue should be addressed. It may be claimed that having a sick spouse at 
home may force the other spouse, especially a healthy one, to deliver help. Therefore, 
perhaps it does not make sense to count the help inside the household as a kind of voluntary 
unpaid productive activity. First, the question about helping someone inside the household 
may relate to another member, not necessarily the spouse. Second, our data do not confirm 
this view, i.e. there are many spouses, who don’t report helping inside the household, even 
when having a spouse with an ADL limitation. Table 3 shows that among healthy people 
aged 65 or older (with no own ADL or IADL limitations), who have a spouse with ADL 
limitations, only 38.5% report helping inside the household. Among people 65+, who 
themselves suffer from ADL or IADL limitations and also have a spouse with ADL 
limitations, 28% give such help. This means that providing help inside the household is not a 
direct function of having a sick spouse (e.g. ADL limitations), and thus constitutes a 
voluntary productive activity. 
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Table 3. Giving Help inside the Household, by Own Health Status and by the Health Status 
of the Spouse 
Own ADL or 
IADL 
 Having a spouse with ADL Total 
Given help to 
someone inside 
the household 
No Limitations 1+ Limitations  
No no 96.72 61.52 94.83 
yes 3.28 38.48 5.17 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1+ Limitations no 93.41 71.91 90.55 
yes 6.59 28.09 9.45 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
 
5.2 Bivariate Associations 
The next stage of the analysis was examination of bivariate associations (Spearman's 
rho) between the independent variables and the 2 measures of productive involvement (Table 
5). The correlations reveal that all of the study variables have significant associations with 
the number of productive activities. The most salient finding was that the number of books 
at age 10 is highly significant and belongs to a group of correlates with rho greater than 0.10; 
other variables, describing the early-life circumstances, namely relative performance in math 
and language are also highly significant and belong to the same group of the correlates (with 
rho greater than 0.10). It should be noted that other early-life variables: Early-Life Trauma 
and living in the rural area showed less strong association. The correlates with the highest 
rho (greater or equal 0.20) are: age, age2 (both negative), engagement in moderate sportive 
activities, years of education, self-perceived health, drinking alcohol and participation in 
social club. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that 30% of the respondents aged 80+ reported being 
involved in one of the unpaid productive activities; and almost 8% of them are doing 2 or 
more such activities. The same is true for those in poor health: some 35% of them are 
nevertheless performing unpaid productive activities, while some 8.5% are involved in 2 or 
more (see Table 4 below). 
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Table 4. Number of Productive Activities, by Age Group and Self-Reported Health, 
Respondents 65+ (in percentage) 
 
Number of Productive Activities 
 Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
65-69 34.27 35.61 21.26 7.16 1.32 0.38 100 
70-79 47.39 33.65 13.61 4.44 0.78 0.13 100 
80+ 69.65 23.48 5.65 0.93 0.93 0.00 100 
Total 47.19 32.39 14.67 4.69 0.87 0.19 100 
        Self-Perceived Health 
       Poor 64.34 27.06 6.91 1.32 0.29 0.07 100 
Fair 51.71 33.07 11.84 2.81 0.45 0.12 100 
Good 44.89 32.9 15.56 5.24 1.21 0.2 100 
Very good 35.48 34.36 20.85 7.87 1.11 0.33 100 
Excellent 30.99 32.31 24.71 10.09 1.46 0.44 100 
Total 47.19 32.39 14.67 4.69 0.87 0.19 100 
 
 
As to the intensity of productive activities, its correlation with three study variables is 
found to be statistically not significant: gender and living in the rural area at age 10, as well 
as living in the rural area today. At the same time, the number of books at age 10 is highly 
significant and has rho equal to 0.10. In a similar vein, the relative performances in math and 
language both have rho of 0.08 and are highly statistically significant correlates. The other 
variable, describing the early-life condition, i.e. Early-Life Trauma is only moderately 
correlated with the intensity of productive activities (rho of 0.03). The highest rho 
characterizes (perhaps not surprisingly) the negative association between the intensity of 
unpaid productive activities and the age. The group of variables that are especially highly 
correlated with the intensity of unpaid productive activities (rho between 0.10 and 0.20) are 
engagement in moderate and vigorous physical activities, having a spouse, years of 
education, drinking alcohol, having a spouse with ADL limitation/s, attending a social club, 
household size, self-perceived health, having own ADL or IADL limitation/s (negative), 
attending a religious organization, wealth, and the number of children.  
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Table 5. Bivariate Associations between the Two Productive Outcomes and the Study 
Variables: Spearman's rho, Respondents 65+ 
 
Number of Productive 
Activities  
 
Intensity 
Books  0.16***  0.10*** 
Early-Life Trauma  0.04***  0.03** 
Math  0.11***  0.08*** 
Verb  0.11***  0.08*** 
Rural_age10 -0.02* -0.01 
Edu  0.20***  0.14*** 
Wealth  0.18***  0.11*** 
Expectation to receive bequest  0.08***  0.05*** 
Self-Perceived Health  0.20***  0.13*** 
depressive symptoms -0.09*** -0.05*** 
ADL or IADL -0.15*** -0.11*** 
male  0.03**  0.01 
Age -0.26*** -0.22*** 
Age2 -0.26*** -0.22*** 
Spouse  0.13***  0.15*** 
hhsize  0.07***  0.13*** 
nchild  0.11***  0.10*** 
Social Club  0.20***  0.13*** 
Religious Organization  0.14***  0.11*** 
ADL Spouse  0.07***  0.13*** 
IADL Spouse  0.03**  0.09*** 
Ever smoked  0.05***  0.03** 
Alcohol  0.20***  0.13*** 
Vigorous Sport Dummy  0.19***  0.16*** 
Moderate Sport Dummy  0.21***  0.16*** 
Rural_d -0.03* -0.01 
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
 
 
The Charts 3 – 5 below reveal a clear gradient in the mean number of activities by the 
number of books at home at the age of 10: for the whole 65+ subsample, as well as for the 
male and female subsamples. 
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Mean of Number of Productive Activities at 65+, by number of Books at home at age 
10 
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5.3 Multivariate Analyses 
Since the first outcome variable is categorical, I apply ordered probit regression. This 
method allows us to interpret the sign and significance of the regression parameters ( ). The 
sign determines whether the outcome variable increases with the regressors: if  is positive, 
then an increase in xij necessarily decreases the probability of being in the lowest category 
(yi=1) and increases the probability of being in the highest category (yi=m). Significance of 
the regressors is also an important feature that might be inferred from the output. The 
marginal effect of the regressors can be obtained, using the margins command (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2010, 527-528). 
My second outcome is hours, spent on performing productive activities. Therefore I use 
the Tobit model to estimate the equation. Tobit is a statistical model proposed to describe the 
relationship between a non-negative dependent variable  and an independent vector . 
The model supposes that there is a latent (i.e. unobservable) variable . This variable 
linearly depends on  via a vector of parameters  which determines the relationship 
between the independent vector  and the latent variable . The observable variable  is 
defined to be equal to the latent variable whenever the latent variable is above zero and zero 
otherwise. 
 
 
where  is a latent variable:  
 
The  coefficient should be interpreted as the combination of (1) the change in  of 
those above the limit, weighted by the probability of being above the limit; and (2) the 
change in the probability of being above the limit, weighted by the expected value of  if 
above (McDonald and Moffit, 1980). 
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5.4 Estimation Results 
 
5.4.1 Ordered Probit for the Number of Unpaid Productive Activities, performed 
by the Citizens aged 65 and Older 
 
Table 6 (below) shows results for ordered probit regression used for the specification 
described above. It is evident that running the same regression in 2 different subsamples: 
males and females aged 65 and older helps to uncover important differences between the 
two.  
In the entire subsample of respondents aged 65 and older all but one category of the 
“books” variable are significantly positively correlated with the outcome (the number of the 
unpaid productive activities); none of these categories is significant in the subsample of 
males 65+; finally, for females 65+ all of the categories of this study variable are 
significantly positively correlated with the outcome. The F-test for joint significance, at the 
bottom of the table, shows that the categories of the “books” variable are jointly significantly 
correlated with the outcome for both the entire 65+ subsample, and the one of females 65+; it 
is not jointly significant for the subsample of males 65+. Concerning the Early-Life Trauma, 
only experiencing one such event (in comparison to none) is a significant positive correlate 
of the outcome in all the subsamples. However, it is more significant for males than for 
females. The F-test for joint significance shows that the categories of this variable are jointly 
significantly positively correlated with the outcome for both the entire 65+ subsample, and 
the one of males; it is correlated with the outcome in the subsample of females 65+ only at 
10% level. Next, regarding the relative math performance – which was selected as a proxy 
for genetic endowment – it was found that one of its categories “better than the average” is 
significant only in the male subsample. The F-test for joint significance shows that the 
categories of this variable are jointly insignificant for any of the subsamples. It is interesting 
that although no language performance’s category is separately significant in all the 3 
subsamples, the F-test reveals a more appealing finding. This variable is a jointly significant 
correlate of the number of unpaid activities performed for both the whole subsample, as well 
as for the female one. It is not jointly significant correlated with the outcome in the 
subsample of males 65+. Finally, the early-life variable, living in the rural area, is not a 
significant correlate of the outcome in any of the subsamples. 
Other variables that correlate significantly (but differently for different subsamples of 
65+) with the number of performed unpaid productive activities are as follows. The two 
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highest quintiles of wealth are equally significant correlates for males and females. However, 
the F-test shows that the categories of this variable are jointly much more significant for 
males than for females. The expectation to receive bequest is also more significant for men 
than for women. Interestingly, the F-test for joint significance reveals that the self-perceived 
health is a significant correlate for women and also for the whole 65+ subsample, but not at 
all for men. Regarding the presence of 3 or more depressive symptoms in the last month, it is 
significant only for the female subsample. Interestingly, the association is positive, i.e. 
women with such symptoms are more prone to be involved in unpaid productive activities. 
This point is addressed in the chapter Discussion. The next intriguing finding is that the 
presence of a partner is equally strongly significant correlate of being productive, but 
positively for males and negatively significant for females; it is not significant at all in the 
whole 65+ subsample. The household size has a significant association with being 
productive for females and in the entire 65+ subsample, but not for males. Having a spouse 
with IADL limitation/s is significant associates in all the subsamples. However, it is a less 
significant correlate of activity for males than for females (and the whole subsample 65+). 
The same is found with respect to vigorous sport activity. 
For all the 3 subsamples, the variables equally highly positively and significantly 
correlated with the outcome are: years of education, number of children, attendance of social 
club or a religious organization, having a spouse with ADL limitation/s, and performing 
moderate sport activity. The country dummies capture cross-country differences. 
Insignificant regressors are: own ADL/IADL, age, ever smoking, alcohol consumption, and 
the present area of residence. 
 
Table 6. Ordered Probit regression for Number of Unpaid Productive Activities for 
Respondents aged 65+  
Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
Number of Productive 
Activities 
   
    Books
1
 
   
    2. 11-25 books 0.0722* 0.0374 0.0970* 
 
[0.0328] [0.0484] [0.0450] 
    3. 26-100 books 0.110** 0.072 0.148** 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
 
[0.0377] [0.0559] [0.0515] 
    4. 101-200 books 0.116 0.0214 0.178* 
 
[0.0595] [0.0913] [0.0792] 
    5. More than 200 books 0.152* 0.105 0.183* 
 
[0.0629] [0.0934] [0.0859] 
    Early-Life Trauma
 4
 
   
    1Kind of trauma 0.134*** 0.143** 0.123* 
 
[0.0379] [0.0551] [0.0527] 
    2 Kinds of trauma 0.0237 -0.065 0.134 
 
[0.105] [0.135] [0.169] 
    3 Kinds of trauma 0.381 0.419 0.339 
 
[0.291] [0.385] [0.449] 
    4 Kinds of trauma 0.498 -0.338 1.675 
 
[0.654] [0.913] [1.037] 
    Math
5
 
   
    worse than the average 0.0571 0.234 -0.0485 
 
[0.0935] [0.149] [0.121] 
    about the same than the
average 0.0573 0.226 -0.044 
 
[0.0888] [0.142] [0.116] 
    better than the average 0.129 0.286* 0.0379 
 
[0.0908] [0.144] [0.119] 
    much better than the average 0.103 0.196 0.0823 
 
[0.0966] [0.151] [0.128] 
    Verb
6
 
   
    worse than the average -0.108 -0.0829 -0.165 
 
[0.114] [0.162] [0.162] 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
    about the same than the
average -0.11 -0.0621 -0.195 
 
[0.111] [0.158] [0.156] 
    better than the average -0.0488 -0.0389 -0.0973 
 
[0.112] [0.160] [0.158] 
    much better than the average 0.051 0.0617 -0.0231 
 
[0.117] [0.169] [0.164] 
    Rural_age10 0.0423 0.0542 0.0412 
 
[0.0276] [0.0409] [0.0378] 
    Edu 0.0203*** 0.0195*** 0.0217*** 
 
[0.00385] [0.00537] [0.00566] 
    Wealth
7
 
   2
nd
 quintile 0.0339 0.0311 0.0383 
 
[0.0402] [0.0612] [0.0538] 
    3
rd
 quintile 0.0561 0.0152 0.0951 
 
[0.0403] [0.0611] [0.0541] 
    4
th
 quintile 0.180*** 0.220*** 0.151** 
 
[0.0408] [0.0619] [0.0550] 
    5
th
 quintile 0.204*** 0.229** 0.182** 
 
[0.0499] [0.0756] [0.0672] 
    Expectation to receive 
bequest 0.00285*** 0.00316*** 0.00279** 
 
[0.000660] [0.000942] [0.000938] 
    Self-Perceived Health
8
 
   
    2. Fair 0.0423 -0.0175 0.0702 
 
[0.0492] [0.0774] [0.0642] 
    3. Good 0.0562 0.018 0.0669 
 
[0.0513] [0.0797] [0.0676] 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
    4.Very good 0.146* 0.0641 0.222** 
 
[0.0589] [0.0888] [0.0797] 
    5.Excellent 0.150* 0.0495 0.245* 
 
[0.0689] [0.101] [0.0967] 
    Depressive symptoms 0.0485 -0.0315 0.0834* 
 
[0.0323] [0.0541] [0.0408] 
    ADL or IADL -0.0378 0.00802 -0.0647 
 
[0.0350] [0.0566] [0.0450] 
    Male -0.0197 
  
 
[0.0289] 
  
    Age 0.0725 0.126 0.0024 
 
[0.0449] [0.0700] [0.0593] 
    Age2 -0.000779** -0.00107* -0.000371 
 
[0.000300] [0.000468] [0.000395] 
    Spouse -0.0133 0.173** -0.148*** 
 
[0.0345] [0.0580] [0.0442] 
    hhsize 0.0537** 0.0282 0.0794*** 
 
[0.0181] [0.0280] [0.0238] 
    nchild 0.0645*** 0.0653*** 0.0604*** 
 
[0.00881] [0.0136] [0.0117] 
    Social Club 0.293*** 0.294*** 0.298*** 
 
[0.0316] [0.0446] [0.0454] 
 
   Religious Organization 0.503*** 0.550*** 0.466*** 
 
[0.0356] [0.0571] [0.0463] 
 
   ADL Spouse 0.374*** 0.333*** 0.412*** 
 
[0.0524] [0.0731] [0.0763] 
    IADL Spouse 0.191*** 0.148* 0.254*** 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
 
[0.0439] [0.0590] [0.0666] 
    Ever smoked -0.0422 -0.0247 -0.0734 
 
[0.0274] [0.0377] [0.0415] 
    Alcohol 0.000465 -0.000203 0.00689 
 
[0.00310] [0.00373] [0.00575] 
    Vigorous Sport Dummy 0.163*** 0.129** 0.194*** 
 
[0.0277] [0.0413] [0.0380] 
    Moderate Sport Dummy 0.330*** 0.369*** 0.303*** 
 
[0.0440] [0.0731] [0.0557] 
    Rural_d -0.0201 -0.0749 0.0301 
 
[0.0300] [0.0435] [0.0417] 
    Country
9
 
   
    DE 0.262** 0.255* 0.268* 
 
[0.0850] [0.129] [0.115] 
    SE 0.557*** 0.437** 0.679*** 
 
[0.0887] [0.135] [0.119] 
    NL 0.552*** 0.442*** 0.651*** 
 
[0.0848] [0.130] [0.114] 
    ES -0.0015 -0.192 0.176 
 
[0.0909] [0.139] [0.122] 
    IT 0.234** 0.0477 0.421*** 
 
[0.0823] [0.125] [0.111] 
    FR 0.228** 0.113 0.329** 
 
[0.0846] [0.131] [0.112] 
    DK 0.500*** 0.477*** 0.532*** 
 
[0.0881] [0.136] [0.117] 
    GR 0.00578 -0.178 0.168 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
 
[0.0843] [0.129] [0.113] 
    CH 0.195* 0.137 0.262* 
 
[0.0913] [0.141] [0.121] 
    BE 0.526*** 0.419*** 0.618*** 
 
[0.0805] [0.125] [0.107] 
    CZ -0.136 -0.294* -0.00393 
 
[0.0905] [0.141] [0.119] 
    PD 0.00892 -0.0893 0.0925 
 
[0.0926] [0.142] [0.124] 
    N 8791 3989 4802 
pseudo R-sq 0.108 0.1 0.123 
F-test   Prob > chi2  Prob > chi2  Prob > chi2 
Books 0.0138 0.6691 0.0157 
Early-Life Trauma 0.0029 0.0404 0.0911 
Math 0.2019 0.2580 0.2293 
Verb 0.0132 0.5276 0.0407 
Self-Perceived Health 0.0305 0.7376 0.0065 
Wealth 0.0000 0.0003 0.0264 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reference categories: 1. 0-10 books; 4. No trauma; 5. Much worse than the average; 6. Much 
worse than the average; 7. 1
st
 quintile; 8. 1 Poor; 9. AU 
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5.4.2 TOBIT regression for the Intensity of Unpaid Productive Activities, 
performed by the Citizens aged 65 and Older 
 
 
As with the number of performed productive activities, the Table 7 (below) shows that 
running the same Tobit regression specification in 2 different subsamples (males and females 
aged 65 and older) helps to uncover important differences between the two. The three last 
categories of the “books” variable are significant positive correlates of the intensity outcome 
in the female subsample; in the male subsample, as well as in the whole subsample of 65+ 
none of these categories correlate significantly with the intensity outcome. Running the F-
test for joint significance (at the bottom of the table) shows that the categories of the “books” 
variable are jointly significantly correlated (at 5% level) with the outcome exclusively for the 
females 65+; it is not jointly significant for either entire 65+ subsample or the subsample of 
males 65+. Concerning the Early-Life Trauma, experiencing 1 or 3 traumatic events (in 
comparison to zero) are significant positive correlates of the outcome in the whole 65+ 
subsample, while 3 or 4 such events are significant in the female subsample; none are 
significant in the male subsample. The F-test for joint significance confirms that the 
categories of this variable are jointly significantly correlated with the outcome for both the 
entire 65+ subsample, and the one of females; it is uncorrelated with the outcome in the 
subsample of males 65+. Performing in math much better than the average (as compared to 
much worse than the average) is a significant correlate of intensity of the productive 
involvement in the male 65+ subsample (however, the F-test for joint significance showed 
that this variable is jointly uncorrelated with any of the subsamples). None of the other early-
life variable, selected from SHARELIFE (language performance and living in the rural area) 
is a significant correlate for all the subsamples jointly or separately. 
Other variables that correlate significantly (but differently for different subsamples of 
65+) with the intensity of performed unpaid productive activities are as follows. The years of 
education variable is a significant correlate in the whole 65+, less so in the female one and 
not at all in the male subsample. None of the wealth quintiles is a significant correlate in any 
of the subsamples; however, the F-test shows that this variable is a significant correlate only 
for the males 65+. The expectation to receive bequest is a significant correlate for the whole 
65+ subsample, as well as for the females 65+. It is not significant for men. The presence of 
3 or more depressive symptoms in the last month is a significant correlate in the whole 65+, 
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as well as in the female, subsamples. Again, the association is positive, i.e. women (as well 
as the whole 65+) with such symptoms devote more hours to unpaid productive activities. 
The presence of a partner is a significant positive correlate of productive hours only for the 
male subsample; it is not significant either for the whole subsample of 65+ or for the 
females. The household size has a very significant association with the intensity of 
performing productive activities for both the whole subsample of 65+ and for the females; it 
is a bit less significant for the male subsample. The same can be said about the attendance of 
a social club. The number of children is also a very significant correlate of the intensity 
outcome for the whole subsample of 65+, while it is a bit less significant for the one of the 
males, as well as for the female subsample. Having a spouse with IADL limitation/s is a 
more significant associate of the intensity outcome for females (and the whole subsample 
65+), than for males. Making vigorous sports is a significant correlate for intensity of 
involvement of females (and the whole 65+ subsample), and insignificant for the one of the 
males. The country dummies capture cross-country differences. For all the 3 subsamples, the 
variables equally significantly correlated with the intensity outcome are part of the list of 
correlates, cited above for the outcome of the number of activities, namely, attendance of a 
religious organization, involvement in the moderate sport activities and having a spouse with 
ADL limitation/s. Other regressors were found to be insignificant. 
 
Table 7. TOBIT regression for Intensity of Productive Activities for Respondents aged 65+     
Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
Intensity       
Books
1
       
2. 11-25 books 
0.899 
(1.007) 
-0.797 
(1.421) 
2.588 
(1.413) 
 
   
3. 26-100 books 
2.035 
(1.122) 
0.455 
(1.607) 
3.670* 
(1.556) 
 
   
4. 101-200 books 
2.694 
(1.603) 
-1.055 
(2.254) 
5.760** 
(2.234) 
 
   
5. More than 200 books 
2.924 
(1.719) 
1.274 
(2.494) 
5.013* 
(2.400) 
Early-Life Trauma
 4
       
1Kind of trauma 
2.728* 
(1.140) 
2.845 
(1.600) 
2.701 
(1.607) 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
2 Kinds of trauma 
1.156 
(2.693) 
-1.739 
(3.533) 
4.484 
(4.167) 
 
   
3 Kinds of trauma 
16.58* 
(7.721) 
7.105 
(10.06) 
29.73** 
(11.20) 
 
   
4 Kinds of trauma 
31.18 
(16.01) 
9.54 
(19.07) 
62.26*** 
(3.225) 
Math
5
       
worse than the average 
-0.781 
(2.975) 
5.442 
(4.435) 
-4.616 
(3.958) 
 
   about the same than the 
average 
0.0114 
(2.823) 
7.391 
(4.193) 
-4.303 
(3.764) 
 
   
better than the average 
1.164 
(2.889) 
8.028 
(4.250) 
-2.544 
(3.887) 
 
   
much better than the average 
1.902 
(3.029) 
9.109* 
(4.450) 
-2.157 
(4.078) 
Verb
6
       
worse than the average 
-0.947 
(3.582) 
2.361 
(4.594) 
-4.385 
(5.347) 
 
   about the same than the 
average 
-2.177 
(3.462) 
2.045 
(4.447) 
-7.439 
(5.125) 
 
   
better than the average 
0.392 
(3.517) 
4.488 
(4.524) 
-4.699 
(5.207) 
 
   
much better than the average 
-0.623 
(3.628) 
2.025 
(4.719) 
-5.288 
(5.326) 
 
   
Rural_age10 
0.816 
(0.831) 
-0.178 
(1.201) 
1.85 
(1.152) 
 
   
Edu 
0.360** 
(0.116) 
0.297 
(0.155) 
0.394* 
(0.173) 
Wealth
7
       
2
nd
 quintile 
0.165 
(1.366) 
1.08 
(2.044) 
-0.522 
(1.832) 
 
   
3
rd
 quintile 
-0.251 
(1.277) 
-1.683 
(1.858) 
1.323 
(1.751) 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
4
th
 quintile 
2.134 
(1.249) 
3.593 
(1.850) 
0.666 
(1.693) 
 
   
5
th
 quintile 
1.916 
(1.437) 
2.971 
(2.106) 
0.711 
(1.974) 
 
   
Expectation to receive bequest 
0.0514** 
(0.0189) 
0.0283 
(0.0249) 
0.0820** 
(0.0280) 
 
   Self-Perceived Health
8
       
2. Fair 
1.478 
(1.708) 
0.235 
(2.602) 
2.149 
(2.267) 
 
   
3. Good 
1.511 
(1.728) 
1.876 
(2.613) 
0.91 
(2.304) 
 
   
4.Very good 
1.716 
(1.887) 
0.764 
(2.833) 
2.971 
(2.523) 
 
   
5.Excellent 
1.56 
(2.084) 
0.967 
(3.066) 
2.177 
(2.848) 
 
   
Depressive symptoms 
2.918** 
(1.053) 
0.887 
(1.784) 
3.668** 
(1.317) 
 
   
ADL or IADL 
-1.539 
(1.131) 
-1.094 
(1.786) 
-1.819 
(1.467) 
 
   
Male 
-3.617*** 
(0.868) 
  
 
   
Age 
0.982 
(1.384) 
1.552 
(2.213) 
-0.428 
(1.770) 
 
   
Age2 
-0.0124 
(0.00927) 
-0.014 
(0.0149) 
-0.00471 
(0.0118) 
 
   
Spouse 
1.523 
(1.145) 
4.690* 
(1.872) 
-1.411 
(1.489) 
 
   
hhsize 
3.974*** 
(0.693) 
3.038** 
(1.096) 
4.808*** 
(0.910) 
 
   
nchild 
1.162*** 
(0.278) 
1.146** 
(0.425) 
1.104** 
(0.367) 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
 
   
 
   
Social Club 
3.810*** 
(0.861) 
3.500** 
(1.175) 
4.277*** 
(1.248) 
 
   
Religious Organization 
7.917*** 
(1.047) 
7.540*** 
(1.654) 
7.958*** 
(1.363) 
 
   
ADL Spouse 
20.91*** 
(1.881) 
19.63*** 
(2.535) 
21.54*** 
(2.767) 
 
   
IADL Spouse 
8.413*** 
(1.487) 
5.754** 
(1.882) 
11.82*** 
(2.348) 
 
   
Ever smoked 
-0.307 
(0.824) 
-0.0672 
(1.116) 
-0.83 
(1.241) 
 
   
Alcohol 
-0.00259 
(0.102) 
0.025 
(0.123) 
0.0231 
(0.176) 
 
   
Vigorous Sport Dummy 
4.131*** 
(0.842) 
2.039 
(1.231) 
6.077*** 
(1.151) 
 
   
Moderate Sport Dummy 
7.441*** 
(1.521) 
7.938*** 
(2.390) 
6.771*** 
(1.975) 
 
   
Rural_d 
-0.891 
(0.920) 
-1.585 
(1.284) 
-0.113 
(1.307) 
 
   Country
9
       
DE 
4.354 
(2.518) 
6.279 
(3.541) 
2.833 
(3.537) 
 
   
SE 
6.751** 
(2.541) 
5.09 
(3.620) 
8.660* 
(3.538) 
 
   
NL 
6.300* 
(2.478) 
5.728 
(3.503) 
6.786* 
(3.457) 
 
   
ES 
5.495 
(3.061) 
1.796 
(4.311) 
9.239* 
(4.307) 
 
   
IT 
10.44*** 
(2.622) 
6.557 
(3.659) 
14.72*** 
(3.711) 
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Variable 65+ Subsample 
Male, 65+ 
Subsample 
Female, 65+ 
Subsample 
FR 
4.587 
(2.594) 
4.256 
(3.694) 
5.44 
(3.602) 
 
   
DK 
6.873** 
(2.560) 
6.97 
(3.643) 
7.372* 
(3.565) 
 
   
GR 
6.087* 
(2.700) 
3.725 
(3.886) 
8.210* 
(3.702) 
 
   
CH 
2.833 
(2.702) 
2.52 
(3.907) 
3.882 
(3.703) 
 
   
BE 
9.812*** 
(2.454) 
9.279** 
(3.513) 
10.74** 
(3.390) 
 
   
CZ 
-1.057 
(2.786) 
-3.36 
(3.985) 
1.497 
(3.838) 
 
   
PD 
-0.112 
(3.097) 
-1.765 
(4.263) 
1.879 
(4.395) 
 Statistics       
N 8791 3989 4802 
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.018 0.032 
F-test  Prob > chi2 Prob > chi2 Prob > chi2 
Books 0.2408 0.8500 0.0408 
Early-Life Trauma 0.0180 0.2641 0.0157 
Math 0.4789 0.2614 0.4728 
Verb 0.1387 0.4784 0.1661 
Self-Perceived Health 0.9255 0.7935 0.5675 
Wealth 0.2309 0.0250 0.8847 
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001; 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Reference categories: 1. 1. 0-10 books; 4. No trauma; 5. Much worse than the average; 6. 
Much worse than the average; 7. 1
st
 quintile; 8. 1. Poor; 9. AU 
 
 
 
6. Discussion 
It is crucially important to clarify whether aging and retirement pose potential threats to 
society, as well as to the older individuals themselves due to their exit from the labor market. 
For that reason one needs to account for a broader range of productive activities performed 
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by older citizens outside the labor market, and not only for their workforce participation. 
Although the issue of elders’ engagement in unpaid productive activities has received 
considerable attention in the social science literature, few studies have addressed the 
question whether disparities in accessibility to capitals over the life course correlates with 
older people’s capability of engaging in ‘productive activity.’ To close this gap in the 
literature I suggest using the life-course perspective approach and a model that explains 
involvement in the volunteer activities, developed by Wilson and Musick (1997). I show that 
this model is well suited for the sample of the population that I review (65 and older). I 
hypothesize that older adults, who had better early-life conditions are also more productive. 
In particular, people are more productive if they: 1. have inherited higher “cultural capital” 
from their family of origin, 2. have a better mathematical ability (as a proxy of genetic 
endowment) and 3. lived through favorable historical and institutional circumstances. Main 
findings from the analysis of a sample of Europeans aged 65 and over show a partial support 
for the hypotheses. 
As to the 1
st
 hypothesis, namely that older adults, who inherited better cultural resources 
are also more productive, the findings are in general confirmative. Particularly, the analysis 
showed that being a descendant from a family with higher cultural resources — measured 
by number of books at home at the age 10 and language performance — was positively 
correlated with higher productive involvement among people aged 65 and older, and 
particularly among the subsample of women. The “books” variable was found to be a 
significant correlate also of the intensity of productive activities, but exclusively in the 
female subsample of 65+. At the same time, these two variables are not significant correlates 
for the subsample of men. As to the books at home, the finding might be a possible outcome 
of two reasons. First, the social status of females at least 65 years ago was such that having 
books at home represented a considerable advantage, while men had other social 
opportunities for increasing their work-related capitals. An additional explanation might be 
that female children are more likely to take advantage of having books and indeed had read 
them, while male children at age 10 did not use this opportunity, while taking advantages 
from engagement in other sports.  
Second, as to having a better mathematical ability, this variable is not a significant 
correlate of the productive outcomes. It is possible that this variable does not capture the 
genetic endowment in a proper way. I address this issue below, when discussing the 
limitation of the current study.  
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Third, as to the Early-Life Trauma, a variable constructed to reflect historical or 
institutional early-life circumstances, and is arguably unrelated to familial resources, is 
significantly and positively correlated with the productive outcome for both the entire 65+ 
subsample, and the one of males; it is also positively correlated with the outcome in the 
subsample of females 65+, but only at a 10% level. As to the intensity of the productive 
involvement, the Early-Life Trauma is significantly positively correlated with the outcome 
for both the entire 65+ subsample, and the one of females; however, it is uncorrelated with 
the outcome in the subsample of males 65+.  
The positive sign on the coefficient of this variable contradicts the hypothesis of the 
current study. This finding points out to a possibility that people, who survived adversity 
early in life, such as living in a children's home, relocation during a war, or prisoner of war 
camp, apparently were not weakened, but rather became stronger to continue working after 
65. It also might point out that those, who were able to endure the trauma and survived it, are 
more suited for work after 65. 
I interpret these findings as an evidence for the assertion that Early Life Conditions 
matter for individual capability of older people to engage in ‘productive activity. As was 
explained in the chapter on theory, economic literature already showed that skills are formed 
by the interplay of the early childhood environment and genes to produce cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. In particular, the formation of cognitive and socio-emotional skills is a 
function of the transfers from the family of origin. It has been already shown in the literature 
that these transfers from the family of origin at early ages are a key determinant of the 
economic and social success of children at an adult age (Mazzonna 2014: 26). Brunello et al. 
(2012) argue that access to books when young reflect home skill formation in cognitive and 
socio-emotional skills, which has been already identified as an important factor of economic 
success in life. The current paper takes this claim one step further and shows that the 
influence of the transfers from the family of origin goes beyond the adult outcomes to 
influence the older adults’ unpaid productive involvement (which is a component of 
‘successful aging’ (Youssim et al. 2015). The findings are also consistent with Bourdieu’s 
assertion that the power and ability to act in the social world stem from the possession of 
different capitals accumulated by and transmitted from one generation to the other within the 
social groups. These capitals may take different forms and human action is guided not only 
by (inherited) economic opportunities and constraints but also by cultural capital, that is, 
one’s habitus or inherited repertoire, from which individuals build lines of action. Bourdieu 
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particularly has emphasized the formative role of the early life stage, claiming that practice is 
produced by the ‘‘embodied predispositions’’ of a person to behave in ways meaningful for 
her or his native social milieu (Bourdieu 1990, 59). This is fully in line with Mazzona 
(2014), who includes among the endowments cognitive ability, physical appearance, 
attitudes, and family connections as well as cultural and genetic traits. As to the transmission 
of attitudes, the current study conjectures that the variables, reflecting the early-life cultural 
transfers, capture such values (aspects of culture that are relevant for involvement in optional 
productive activities) as being truthful, fair and responsible (Wilson and Musick, 1997), as 
well as those, identified by Weber (1958), namely valuing hard labor and avoiding idleness. 
The study also addressed some other assumptions following from my interpretation of 
the model suggested by Wilson and Musick (1997), as well as from the other literature. The 
current investigation found evidence regarding gender-related differences in correlation 
between the adult outcomes and the late-life productive involvement. The most salient ones 
are as follows. As to the extent of the performed activities, the wealth variable is associated 
more significantly with this outcome in the male subsample, while for females health is a 
significant correlate (insignificant for males). The presence of 3 or more depressive 
symptoms in the last month is positively and significantly associated with both productive 
outcomes in particular in the female subsample. This finding is consistent with the claim, 
found in recent research that depression may encourage helping in later life. It is because 
“Helping others” (or giving instead of receiving) is one way to fight loneliness or depressed 
affect (Li and Ferraro, 2006). It is also possible to interpret this finding as a reverse causality 
(Brandt, 2013). In particular, Brandt claims that time consuming help creates an intense 
burden for the givers, which significantly undermines their mental health. 
The current study is pioneering and for that reason has several limitations, which also 
represent potentials for future research. The suggested empirical approach does not address 
some issues, which should be dealt with in further elaborations of the current investigation. 
Below I discuss two such concerns. The 1
st
 one is possible endogeneity. As literature has 
claimed, one’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills are formed by the interplay of the early 
childhood environment and genes. If my measure for the genetic endowment, which is 
mathematical performance at 10, is not a good proxy for initial genetic endowment (this 
component might be partly/wholly inherited from the family, but also perhaps reflects own 
biological idiosyncrasy of a person), then genetic endowment is an omitted variable 
(suggested by the literature). In other words, genetically transmitted and unobserved 
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“ability” that has its origin in parents is affecting both the early familial milieu, as well as 
later life outcomes. In this case the early familial milieu variables (“books,” language 
performance and area of residence) are not exogenous, and correlate with the error term. As 
discussed in the Appendix, there is evidence from the data, showing that mathematical 
performance does not correlate with the parents’ occupational achievement. This lack of 
correlation between math performance and the parental occupational status gives some 
strength to my initial assumption that it is less dependent on the family SES, since apparently 
it is a factor that has to do with own biological (or even genetic) idiosyncrasy. On the other 
hand, the significance of association between Parental Occupations and verbal abilities (see 
the F-test at the bottom of the Table 8 in the Appendix) is in accordance with Bourdieu’s 
view, who claimed that language proficiency reflects the cultural baggage of the family of 
origin. 
Another potential source of endogenity is schooling. It is widely acknowledged that the 
variable ‘years of schooling,’ employed in the current specification is a choice variable. It 
may correlate both with productive involvement and unobservable ‘ability.’ To avoid this 
endogeniety problem, the common practice is to use state-promoted reforms as to the 
compulsory years of education as an instrument for the self-reported micro-level survey 
variable (Brunello et al., 2012). A final example is wealth. In the same manner as education, 
it can correlate with both the outcome and the unobserved ability. All these issues must be 
addressed in a warranted investigation. 
In addition to endogenity problems, in his paper Mazzonna (2014) warns about two 
identification issues, following from the current estimation strategy. First is the panel 
attrition, since my investigation requires retrospective information, I use SHARELIFE 
database, which is the third wave of SHARE. Unfortunately, not all wave 2 respondents were 
reached in the subsequent wave, and the percentage of such respondents, for whom 
SHARELIFE information is not available, is quite significant. We cannot exclude that the 
attrition is not random, but is correlated with our variables of interest. To address this 
predicament, Mazzonna (2014) used a semi-parametric two-step selection model. The second 
identification problem is ‘selective mortality’. As with panel attrition, I cannot rule out that 
people, who die during the longitudinal study, don’t die at random, but rather death or 
survival are correlated with my study variables. As the endogeneity considerations, 
discussed above, the identification issues must be necessary addressed in a further 
investigation. 
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Despite the limitations, the current paper presents a support for the hypothesis that 
disparities in accessibility to capitals over the life course correlate with older people’s 
capability of engaging in ‘productive activity.’ In particular, if we focus on the whole 65+ 
subsample, and in particular on the one of the females aged 65 and older, we find that the 
native social milieu as well as early-life institutional circumstances continue to correlate with 
engagement in a broad range of unpaid productive activities, performed by older adults, all 
else being equal. 
This fact has several consequences. First, to be a successful player in the emerging 
social field of productive aging, there might be a need to possess resources, part of which 
come from early life and therefore are unequally distributed in the population. Second, from 
the policy-making point of view this suggests that older adults’ productivity cannot be easily 
modified by old-age interventions. Brunello et al. (2012) claim that “cognitive abilities 
become stable around the age of 10, suggesting that environmental conditions below this age 
are important; and that early policy interventions pay off more than later interventions” 
(p.12). Thus, my findings contribute to the literature on the importance of early life 
interventions. In his article Mazzona (2014) explains that to be effective, public policies 
should put greater emphasis on early life interventions, because they are crucial for the 
subsequent evolution of abilities. This author cites recent empirical evidence, which 
indicates that the extent to which parental skills are transmitted to their offspring is a 
function not only of fixed “genetic rules”, but also of cross-country differences in public 
policies. The latter statement also suggests that analysis on the macro-level is also warranted 
for understanding differentials in ‘productive ageing’. 
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Appendix 
 
RE-DEFINING THE MODEL: Reconsidering the Early-Life Components  
 
I also considered such measures as the occupation of the main breadwinner and the 
number of facilities in the accommodation at 10 (fixed bath, cold and hot running water 
supply, inside toilet and central heating). SHARELIFE asks respondents about the 
occupation of main breadwinner when ten. I recoded these categories of professions into a 
scale, consisting of 3 categories, as in Brunello et al. (2012): white collar (legislator, senior 
official, manager, professional, technician or clerk); service worker (service worker, market 
sales worker, skilled agricultural or fishery worker, craft worker); and elementary occupation 
(plant operator or assembler, elementary occupation). I recoded the “Armed forces” into 
missing values (their number was very small, 344 respondents, or 1.49% of the sample). The 
SHARELIFE questionnaire also contains a question about facilities in the accommodation at 
the age 10. These include: fixed bath; cold running water supply; hot running water supply; 
inside toilet; or central heating. I create a variable that counts how many of those a 
respondent had. 
A few multivariate analyses on different subsamples of SHARELIFE, combined with 
the SHARE wave 2 data, led to the following conclusions. After controlling for many 
variables, parental occupations and facilities at home at age 10 are not correlated with the 
number of productive activities that a respondent reports. My guess is that the strength of 
their correlation is absorbed by the number of books at 10 and by own education. The 
Spearman’s rho between number of facilities at home, when 10 and the “books” is 0.55***; 
and between the “facilities” and the years of education is 0.44***. High correlations between 
the occupation of the main breadwinner and some of the other early-life conditions, as well 
as years of education, are documented in the Table 8 below. Although t-test on each category 
of language proficiency shows no significant correlation, the F-test shows significant joint 
correlation. Contrary to what I have been expecting, also the Early-Life Trauma was found 
as a significant correlate of the Parental Occupation pyramid, however not as strong, as other 
variables (earlier I suggested in the proposed specification that the Early-Life Trauma is 
independent of the parental status and has much more to do with the early-life 
historical/institutional events). A separate test, however, shows that the number of books and 
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the trauma are uncorrelated, as was suggested above. The early-life variables that are not 
correlated with the Parental Occupation pyramid are mathematical ability and area of 
residence at the age of 10.  The lack of correlation between math performance and the 
parental occupational status, gives some strength to my initial assumption that it is less 
dependent on the family SES, since apparently it is a factor that has to do with own 
biological (or even genetic) idiosyncrasy. On the other hand, the significance of association 
between Parental Occupations and verbal abilities (see the F-test at the bottom of the Table 
8) is in accordance with Bourdieu’s view, who claimed that language proficiency is a 
function of the family of origin. As expected, there is a high correlation association between 
Parental Occupations and the Own Education of the respondents. As a consequence, I 
suggest dropping out from the models the variables: parental occupations and facilities at 
home at age 10. 
 
Table 8. Ordered Probit for Parental Occupations 
Variable 
Parental 
Occupations 
Books
1
  
2. 11-25 books 0.228*** 
(0.0324) 
  
3. 26-100 books 0.532***  
(0.0387) 
  
4. 101-200 books 0.999***  
(0.0644) 
  
5. More than 200 books 1.326***  
(0.0718) 
N of Facilities at home, age 10
3
  
1 Facility 0.0197 
(0.0331) 
  
2 Facilities 0.0950* 
(0.0379) 
  
3 Facilities 0.331***  
(0.0492) 
  
4 Facilities 0.446***  
(0.0589) 
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Variable 
Parental 
Occupations 
  
5 Facilities 0.612***  
(0.0585) 
Early-Life Trauma
 4
  
1Kind of trauma 0.105**  
(0.0377) 
  
2 Kinds of trauma 0.00697  
(0.107) 
  
3 Kinds of trauma 0.623 
(0.346) 
  
4 Kinds of trauma 0.143  
(0.687) 
Math
5
  
worse than the average 0.182    
(0.0931) 
  
about the same than the average 0.112    
(0.0889) 
  
better than the average 0.0782    
(0.0908) 
  
much better than the average 0.130    
(0.0970) 
Verb
6
  
worse than the average 0.159    
(0.116) 
  
about the same than the average 0.232*                  
(0.113) 
  
better than the average 0.269* 
(0.114) 
  
much better than the average 0.274* 
(0.119) 
 
 
Rural_age10 
0.0451 
(0.0262) 
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Variable 
Parental 
Occupations 
Edu 
0.0225*** 
(0.00342) 
Statistics   
N 9465 
Pseudo R2        0.1025 
F-test Prob > chi2 
Books 0.0000 
n_fac 0.0000 
Early-Life Trauma 0.0282 
Math 0.1321 
Verb 0.0376 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Reference categories: 1. 0-10 books; 3. No facilities; 4. No trauma; 5. Much worse than 
the average; 6. Much worse than the average 
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ABSTRACT: The current study contributes to the burgeoning literature on private 
downward intergenerational transfers of money and time in the Western countries. 
Building on the research, which finds support for the exchange motive of such transfers, 
this study further investigates determinants of the parental decision to transfer money. 
The empirical analysis is based on variables from three waves of SHARE, 14,889 parent-
child dyads from 12 European countries. After discussing the risky nature of the 
exchange, I find that this decision to transfer money is dependent on the measures of 
current and childhood social status of the parents. This is congruent with the findings in 
the literature on trust that people from higher social status are less likely to be cheated; 
and that the people, who expect less to be cheated, are more willing to participate in risky 
transactions. This finding suggests that the parental decision to transfer money is 
determined by estimated uncertainty regarding the likelihood that the financial transfer 
will be reciprocated by children, who are expected to provide services later in life. 
Moreover, the study supplies an empirical support for the idea that this decision is 
informed by parental knowledge about the cultural norms characterizing their family.  
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1. Introduction 
Cox (1987) claimed that “Private income transfers are becoming increasingly 
recognized as a key aspect of the U.S. economy.” In economics private intergenerational 
transfers were extensively discussed in the studies of the life-cycle model of consumption 
and saving because of their role as a possible source of savings (e.g., Modigliani, 1988; 
Kotlikoff, 1989). Later Hurd et al. (2007) integrated the private financial transfers into 
their life-cycle model of consumption and saving, treating them as a consumption item. 
Moreover, recent studies of the intergenerational transfers over the life cycle have 
assigned even higher importance to all the generations and family members involved. 
This is especially so following the wide-ranging recognition of the unprecedented 
challenges posed to the Western Welfare State by the demographic trend of the 
population aging (Mason et al., 2006). 
Looking at the relationships between older adults and their grown-up children, 
economic literature suggested two competing theories to explain what motivates the 
inter-vivos financial transfers, as well as care provision between generations. One 
explanation is altruism (e.g. Becker, 1974); under this hypothesis an altruistic parent 
grants financial gifts to her child, because she cares about the child’s well-being. An 
alternative explanation stresses the importance of the exchange motive. For example, in 
his empirical study Cox (1987) found support for the claim that “inter vivos transfers are 
payments for services that are exchanged among family units.” Both motives were 
modeled and testable predictions were derived and examined empirically. A good number 
of existing empirical studies have demonstrated that the exchange model is a very 
important explanation of the financial transfers from parents to children (Alessie et al., 
2013). While the importance of the exchange motive is thus generally acknowledged, I 
am not aware of research that seriously considers the uncertainty that any exchange 
might involve. This is, thus, the first research that combines further investigation of 
motives of the private inter-generational exchange with a close look at the mechanism 
underlying it. 
This research gap requires attention for the following theoretical and methodological 
reasons. Firstly, if financial transfers from parents to children are motivated (even only 
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partly) by the exchange motive, then there always exists a positive probability that the 
child will fail to reciprocate the monetary gift, received earlier in life, by not providing 
the services (such as care, visits, etc.) expected by her parents later in life. Thus, 
obligations created earlier in life by giving financial transfers, might not be honored in 
the long run. Therefore, the current study suggests that parental assessment of the 
probability to get the expected service is important for her decision to transfer money. 
Hence, previous studies may thus have missed an important determinant of the 
transferring decision by the parents. Secondly, methodologically, the fact that the 
decision about a financial transfer is not made at random, but is driven by certain 
determinants, creates a sub-sample of givers, which is drawn from the wider population. 
Not accounting for this non-randomness may result in irremediable bias in the empirical 
estimation. Heckman (1979) suggested a procedure, which solves this problem. However, 
his estimator requires at least one exclusion restriction. Previous research on the current 
topic did not find any credible exclusion restriction, and therefore left open the selectivity 
issue, addressed by Heckman (e.g. Alessie et al., 2011, 2013; Mudrazija, 2013). 
My study contributes to closing the existing gap in three ways. First theoretically, in 
addition to using mathematical derivations, serving as testable predictions about the 
motives and determinants for the decision and the amount of time and money transfers, 
this study also seriously considers the uncertainty about the future behavior of the child. 
This uncertainty is considered to be crucially important for understanding the parental 
transferring decision. Second methodologically, this uncertainty would also serve as a 
perfect exclusion restriction for the Heckman selection procedure. The challenge is to 
find a proper proxy to capture it. Using studies about trust, I am able to propose variables 
that help to distinguish between the parents with high and low expectation that their 
transfer will be compensated by the services in the long run. Using the proposed 
exclusion restriction, I address the selectivity issue and, therefore obtain better estimates 
than the previous research. Third, this paper also contains an empirical innovation. While 
I use the same data source as Alessie, et al., 2011, namely the Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), my database is constructed in a different way. 
Specifically, unlike Alessie, et al., 2011, who used only the 1
st
 wave, I use wave 2 (2006) 
that is merged with the retrospective wave 3 (SHARELIFE, 2008), as well as with wave 
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4 (2011). Merging these three waves allows me to construct variables that do not exist in 
the 1
st
 wave, but are indispensable for the proposed analysis. 
 
2. Theory: A Model of Private Transfers 
I use a mathematical model, first developed in Cox (1987), and later revised in 
Alessie, Angelini and Pasini (2011). This model explains both transfer behavior of 
parents and provision of care by children. It captures both the altruism and the exchange 
motive. The parent donates financial transfer to the child because she cares about the 
child’s well-being. The child provides care to the parent in exchange of the transfer 
which she has received. For the sake of simplicity, the model implicitly assumes 
credibility: after receiving a financial transfer, the child will indeed provide services to 
parents later in life. 
The parent’s utility function has the following form: 
𝑈𝑝 = 𝑈(𝐶𝑝, 𝑠, 𝑉(𝐶𝑘, 𝑠))                                                 (1) 
where Up = parent's level of well-being, 𝐶𝑝 = parent's consumption, s = services 
provided by the child to the parent, V = child's level of well-being, and 𝐶𝑘= child's 
consumption. The assumptions are as follows. The parent cares about the well being of 
the child (
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑉
≡ 𝑈𝑉 > 0), but also likes to receive services from the child (
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑠
≡ 𝑈𝑠 > 0). 
The parent’s utility function is strictly concave and all goods are substitutes, i.e.: Ucc < 
0,Uss < 0,Uvv < 0, Ucs ≥ 0, Ucv ≥ 0, Usv ≥ 0. The child’s utility falls at an increasing 
rate as services increase (Vss < 0) and Vcs ≤ 0, Vcc < 0. 
The budget constraints are: 
𝐶𝑝 ≤ 𝐸𝑝 − 𝑇                                                                     (2) 
𝐶𝑘 ≤ 𝐸𝑘 + 𝑇                                                                      (3) 
where Ep and Ek are incomes, respectively of the parent and of the child and T denotes 
transfers from parent to child. 
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Using this setting, Alessie, et al. (2011) prove that the amounts of services (or 
financial transfers), conditional upon the decision to provide service (or financial 
transfer), have the following relationships with the parent and child incomes. Under 
altruism: 
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝐸𝑘
> 0, that is: poorer children provide fewer services. In addition, 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐸𝑘
< 0: an 
altruistic parent should give more to children who have less (conditional on transferring). 
Under exchange: 
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝐸𝑘
< 0: poorer child will provide more services. Authors cannot sign 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐸𝑘
 under the exchange setting. As to the probability of transferring money, the authors 
were not able to obtain the sign for the effect of 𝐸𝑘, while 𝐸𝑝was found to have a positive 
effect (pp. 10, 14). 
These findings serve as testable predictions for empirical analysis. Concerning the 
exchange motive the following considerations should be taken into account. Under 
exchange, an additional prediction would be that the amount, given to the children, 
depends on the parent’s assessment of her needs. Indeed, Szydlik (cited in Brandt, 2013: 
28) found that “People who need support are more likely to receive help.” Brandt (2013: 
37) herself finds that “children react to the needs of their parents.” Specifically, she 
shows that children are more likely to provide help to the parents, who are older, as well 
as to those, who have worse the health condition. Therefore, we may further hypothesize 
that parents in bad health today are more likely to believe that they might be disabled 
later in life. Also, parents, who are older, should transfer higher amounts.  
My contribution in the theoretical field is relaxing the assumption of credibility in this 
model and introducing uncertainty about the future. Namely, I consider the probability, 
with which after receiving a financial transfer, the child will indeed respect the agreement 
and provide services to his parents later in life. The section below deals with the 
relationship between this uncertainty and the parental decision to transfer money. Unlike 
the amount of the transfer, which is determined by the mathematical model and the 
expected future needs, the uncertainty should matter for the transferring decision. 
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3. The Decision to Transfer Money under Exchange: Introducing 
Uncertainty 
Fehr (2009) observes that in their economic activities some of the most important risks 
that people face are socially constituted “such as the risk of being cheated by the trading 
partner or the risk of expropriation by politicians or corrupt civil servants” (p. 247). This 
author also claims that people are more willing to engage in a risky economic activity, 
which entails “a given probability of bad luck than to trust when facing an identical 
probability of being cheated” (p. 237). Moreover, it is necessary to realize that the risk 
might be even higher when financial capital is exchanged to obtain goods that don’t have 
obvious monetary value, such as the services, expected by parents from their children. 
These services, in the form of care or visits, phone calls and other forms of giving 
attention and time, are a consequence of having social capital. This capital might be 
conceptualized as favorable relationships with the children, leading to a set of 
“obligations that are usable in the more or less long term.” Therefore we deal with an 
attempt made by parents to use their financial capital to produce social capital. 
Furthermore, making financial transfers to obtain this kind of capital is necessarily 
characterized by the “declared refusal of calculation and of guarantees.” That is, in this 
case, usually when financial transfer is done, the involved parties deny that it was a 
payment for the future services. Hence, the transfer of money is typically made 
purposefully in such a manner that creates “nonguaranteed debts.” This, obviously, 
entails the risk of ingratitude, the refusal of recognition of such debts. “Everything which 
helps to disguise the economic aspect also tends to increase the risk of loss (particularly 
the intergenerational transfers)” (Bourdieu, 1986). Therefore, by construction, the 
exchange of money and time is risky due to three reasons. First, there is a long time gap 
between the transfers; the second reason is the nature of the exchange, i.e. it requires 
creating “nonguaranteed debts;” finally these services don’t have clear monetary value. It 
follows, then, that exchange of money and time between generations bring about a high 
degree of uncertainty or “socially constituted” risk. Hence, following reasoning of Fehr 
(2009), the first hypothesis of the current study is that when making the decision about 
the financial transfer to a child under exchange, the parent estimates the probability, with 
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which the child will indeed provide the service. If the estimated probability to be cheated 
is high, the parent might not be willing to engage in such an exchange. 
While on the one hand private intergenerational transfers entail a high degree of 
uncertainty for the parent, on the other hand, the parent has an informational advantage, 
compared to her economic activities, which are not intergenerational. Namely, when 
making the transferring decision inside her family, the parent might exploit her 
knowledge about preferences, tastes, values and skills, characterizing her familial milieu, 
and particularly the ones of her children. First, the parent knows what cultural norms she 
transmitted to her children. Second, she also knows pretty well to what extent the 
children follow these familial norms. Therefore, the characteristics of the familial milieu 
might help the parent to make a better estimation of the extent to which the child will 
provide the services in exchange of the money transfer. In the economic literature Cox 
and Stark (2005) introduced the notion of the demonstration effect, which is transmission 
of a family norm. The authors also confirmed this hypothesis by empirical studies (see 
also Pezzin et al., 2009). The demonstration effect is a testable case of transmission of 
culture from one generation to another. In particular, Cox and Stark (2005) suggested that 
in the setting of three overlapping generations, the middle generation (children) will 
provide services to the first generation (parents) only in the presence of the third 
generation (grandchildren). This is because in case that the third generation 
(grandchildren) is present and observing the demonstration, there exists a sizeable 
likelihood that these grandchildren will adopt the same behavior toward their parents later 
in life, when the second generation (the current helpers) will become old. However, if the 
third generation (grandchildren) is absent, the middle generation does not have any 
incentive to help their older parents, because there is no one to teach about the duty of 
providing help to the older adult. Following this discussion, I suggest to take into 
consideration the idea that the norms that are transmitted inside families are important for 
helping the parent, who engages in exchange of money and time, to estimate the risk that 
the child will renege on created “nonguaranteed debts.” To summarize, the second 
empirical hypothesis of the current study is that while private intergenerational exchange 
of money and time involves substantial risk for the parent, knowing values at home or 
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characteristics of the familial milieu might be another important determinant of the 
parental transferring decision. 
 
4. Analytical Strategy 
When estimating the decision and the amount of financial transfer, the ideal empirical 
strategy would be using the Heckman selection procedure. Heckman (1979) suggested a 
two stages estimator to correct for the bias that results from using non-randomly selected 
samples to estimate behavioral relationships. The fact that the decision about financial 
transfers is not made at random, but is driven by certain determinants, creates a sub-
sample of givers, which is drawn from a wider population. This may result in the error 
term being correlated with explanatory variables, causing bias even asymptotically (see 
Hoffmann and Kassouf, 2005). The Heckman’s approach solves this problem. However, 
it requires at least one variable that affects the decision, but does not affect the amount 
transferred. This variable is called exclusion restriction. Finding a good exclusion 
restriction is not an easy task. As was mentioned above, when making empirical 
estimation of the predictions following from their theoretical model, Alessie, et al., 2011, 
2013 could not find an exclusion restriction; therefore they used the two-part model, 
rather than the Heckman selection procedure. Hence, they did not address the issue of the 
bias that might result from using non-randomly selected sample.  
Following from my first hypothesis, a perfect exclusion restriction for the Heckman 
selection procedure would be the uncertainty, i.e. the probability expected by the parent, 
with which the child reneges on the contract. This provides the motivation for the 
exclusion restriction. However, it is necessary to find a proper measure for this. I use 
research on trust to suggest a proxy for the exclusion restriction. Namely, Glaeser, et al., 
2000 found that people with higher social status have an ability to elicit trustworthy 
behavior from other people. Hence, from this research on trust it follows that the parents 
with higher social status are more likely to transfer. The social status, on the other hand, 
has nothing to do with the amount that will be given, because, as was shown above, the 
amount depends on totally different parameters. In particular, as follows from the 
mathematical model, the amount of transfer depends on the proxy for the child’s 
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permanent income, as well as on the future needs of the parent. If people with higher 
social status are less likely to be cheated (Glaeser, et al., 2000), then according to Fehr 
(2009) they will be more willing to engage in this transaction.  
Following this discussion, one of the possible candidates to serve as a proxy of the 
social status is a variable, available in the SHARE data, which is the number of books at 
home at the age of 10. This variable captures the social status of the parent’s family of 
origin. This is because having many books 50 years back or more was a characteristic of 
a pretty high social status. However, using this variable (or other variables that reflect the 
Early Life Conditions of the parents) as a proxy for person’s own social status poses a 
problem. Namely, it can be claimed that throughout the life-course this family of origin’s 
characteristic might affect not only the own social status of the parent, but also his other 
personal properties. For example, it might also shape his general preferences, educational 
achievement, health or income. Therefore, it is not clear why the Early Life Conditions 
should affect only the probability, but not the amount in the Heckman procedure. That is 
why we need a “clearer” measure of the social status. Hence, I suggest using the size of 
the social network as an exclusion restriction. This variable reflects the current social 
status: number of people, with whom the parent discusses his important concerns; it is the 
number of confidants, who are willing to listen to the older parent, i.e. his degree of 
connectedness. It should be mentioned, however that Guiso, et al., 2006 discussed 
reverse causality in research on economics and culture. The dimensions of culture 
inherited from previous generations (such as family history) are largely ‘given’ to 
individuals throughout their lifetimes (exogenous variables). Hence, these authors 
suggest that using such dimensions reduces the risk of the reverse causality problem in 
regressions that explore the impact of culture on economic outcomes. Therefore, in 
addition to the size of the social network, I also control for the social status in the family 
of origin (the number of books). 
 
5. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
My basic data source is the second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a multi-disciplinary, cross-national panel 
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survey that is representative of the population aged 50 and over in a number of European 
countries. The survey provides micro data on health, socio-economic status and social 
and family networks (Börsch-Supan, et al., 2008). In particular, it contains information 
on intergenerational time and money transfers between the respondents and their grown-
up children. To create a data file necessary for my analysis, I merge the wave 2 with the 
wave 3 (SHARELIFE), as well as with wave 4. SHARELIFE contains retrospective data 
across the entire life course in Europe over the past century, which relates in particular to 
such areas as childhood living conditions, or family history (Schröder, 2011). Wave 4 
contains a new social network module, which collects detailed information about social 
networks of the respondents. I reshape this dataset to create a dyadic (or child-level) file, 
like in other similar studies (e.g. Alessie, et al., 2011 or Brandt, 2013). In such a file, the 
observation is a parent–child dyad, rather than the respondent (i.e., parent). These 
reshaped data allow me to control not only for the respondents’ characteristics, but also 
for ones of their children, who might participate in the exchange of time and money. In 
particular, information about each child is unique, while the respondent’s data is repeated 
for each child in the same household.  
In SHARE, analogous to other similar surveys, the first respondent of an eligible 
couple is designated as a “family respondent.” This person provides information about 
the couple’s children. The detailed information on child characteristics is collected in 
SHARE only for up to four children, therefore my subsample does not contain parent–
child pairs for which the detailed information on children was not collected (the number 
of households with more than 4 children is, however, negligible). Moreover, I also 
exclude all dyads in which children were younger than 18, because my analysis focuses 
on parents and their adult children. Next, I restrict my sample only to the children, who 
do not live in their parents’ household. Finally, I excluded from my analysis the step-
children (see Alessie, et al., 2013). The resulting analytic sample contains 14,889 parent-
child dyads from 12 countries: Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain, Czech Republic and Poland. 
 
  
11 
 
5.1 Dependent Variables 
I consider two dependent variables. One is the proportion of the respondents, who 
gave financial transfers to their children. This is a dummy variable equal to one in case a 
parent gave a positive financial transfer to her children and it is equal to zero otherwise. 
In the 2
nd
 wave of SHARE the respondents were asked, whether in the twelve months 
prior to the interview they have given financial transfers amounting to 250 euros or more 
to someone, including the 4 children, for whom I have the detailed information. If the 
answer was positive, the respondents were asked about the size of the transfer. Hence, my 
second dependent variable is the amount given to the children. In case the decision 
variable is equal to zero, the amount variable’s value was set to missing, as required by 
the Heckman selection procedure. In addition, due to a skewed distribution, the amount 
variable was transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation. IHS is 
defined as  𝑙𝑛(𝑡 +  √𝑡2 + 1), and is approximately equal to ln(2t) for positive values of 
financial transfers (t). It is linear around zero (See Burbidge et al., 1988). 
 
5.2 Independent Variables 
Main Predictors. As follows from the mathematical model, both outcome variables 
depend on the incomes of the parent and the child (Ep and Ek). Since SHARE doesn’t 
provide information about the children’s income, we proxy Ek with the children years in 
full education (yedu_c). This variable was derived, using the ISCED-97 coding, available 
in the 2
nd
 wave of SHARE together with the country-specific tables that provide 
information about years corresponding to each ISCED-97 level in each country. Parent’s 
income (Ep) is proxied, using two variables: the current income (income_p), as well as the 
years of education (yedu_p, which captures parent’s permanent income). Similarly to the 
amount of financial gift, the current income of the parent was transformed, using the 
inverse hyperbolic sine. 
Other Regressors. In addition to the main predictors, I also control for parents’ health 
and a set of parents’ and children’s demographic characteristics. Parents’ health is a 
dummy (called badhealth_p), which is equal to one, if the parent’s self reported health is 
worse than good. Besides, I control for parents’ age (age_p), gender (female_p) and the 
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marital status (married_p). In particular, the marital status is a dummy equal to one, if the 
parent is married or in a registered partnership. Gender is a dummy equal to one, if the 
parent is a female. As to the children, I control for the information, provided by the 
family respondent about his/her up to 4 children, on age (age_c), gender (female_c), 
marital status (married_c), number of kids (nchild_c) and the number of the child’s 
siblings (sibling_c). Children’s variables are coded identically to the ones of their parents, 
however the last two (kids and siblings) are numbers. Finally, I put into the regression the 
countries’ dummies.        
Social Status. In accordance with my hypothesis, I also include into the analysis two 
additional variables to proxy the parent’s social status. One is a proxy for the current 
social status of the respondent. This proxy is the number of people in the parent’s social 
network, i.e. her degree of connectedness. This variable is found in the wave 4 of 
SHARE. I code this variable to be a dummy (called Many_Members) equal to one if the 
parent has 4 to 7 members in her network; and 0, if she has 0 to 3 members (Children are 
excluded from the Network Size). In addition, I control for the social status of the 
parent’s family of origin. This status is proxied by the number of books at home at the age 
of 10, supplied by SHARELIFE. I create a dummy (called Many_Books), which assumes 
value of one if the parent had 26 to over 200 books (codes 3 to 5), and zero, if he had 25 
books or less (codes 1 or 2). 
The descriptive statistics of the variables, composing my specification, are presented 
in the Table 1 below. It should be mentioned that I still use only parental and child 
characteristics, while do not take into account also dyad and welfare-regime variables 
(that are suggested by similar research, as in, e.g. Brandt, 2013; Brandt and Deindl 2013; 
Mudrazija, 2013). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IHS of financial transfer 2726 8.1 1.39 5.3 13.8 
Decided to give a financial transfer 14889 0.2 0.39 0 1 
income_p 14889 10.6 1.21 0 13.9 
yedu_p 14889 10.6 4.29 0 21 
yedu_c 14889 13.1 3.24 0 21 
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age_c 14889 39.5 9.12 18 75 
married_c 14889 0.8 0.41 0 1 
female_c 14889 0.5 0.50 0 1 
nchild_c 14889 1.4 1.24 0 23 
sibling_c 14889 1.8 1.19 0 11 
age_p 14889 67.8 8.92 50 98 
married_p 14889 0.7 0.48 0 1 
female_p 14889 0.6 0.50 0 1 
badhealth_p 14889 0.1 0.27 0 1 
Many_Members 14889 0.3 0.44 0 1 
Many_Books 14889 0.4 0.48 0 1 
 
6. Multivariate Analysis 
I estimate the data with the Heckman procedure (Table 2). First I use the current social 
status of the parents as an exclusion restriction, while the childhood social status 
(Many_Books) enters both the probit and the amount equations. Since Many_Books in the 
amount equation is not significant, I exclude it in the second specification. Finally, I also 
ran the Heckman procedure separately for the subsamples of females and males. 
However, it seems that the reduced sample sizes don’t allow achieving an appropriate 
estimation. Therefore, I don’t show the latter results. I use columns (2) of the table below 
to interpret the results.  
 
Table 2: The Heckman Selection Procedure 
 
(1)  (2) 
 
Books in Amount Eq.  Books Excluded 
 
Amount Probit  Amount Probit 
Many_Members  0.136**   0.136** 
 
 [0.042]   [0.042] 
 
 
 
  
 Many_Books 0.164 0.102***   0.102*** 
 
[0.099] [0.029]   [0.029] 
 
 
 
  
 income_p 0.409*** 0.127***  0.309*** 0.127*** 
 
[0.095] [0.016]  [0.062] [0.016] 
 
 
 
  
 yedu_p 0.091*** 0.033***  0.069*** 0.033*** 
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(1)  (2) 
 
Books in Amount Eq.  Books Excluded 
 
Amount Probit  Amount Probit 
 
[0.024] [0.004]  [0.017] [0.004] 
 
 
 
  
 yedu_c 0.050*** 0.006  0.046*** 0.006 
 
[0.013] [0.005]  [0.010] [0.005] 
 
 
 
  
 age_c -0.034** -0.016***  -0.022* -0.016*** 
 
[0.013] [0.003]  [0.009] [0.003] 
 
 
 
  
 married_c -0.209 -0.125***  -0.12 -0.125*** 
 
[0.111] [0.031]  [0.082] [0.031] 
 
 
 
  
 female_c 0.135 0.095***  0.061 0.095*** 
 
[0.089] [0.025]  [0.066] [0.025] 
 
 
 
  
 nchild_c 0.004 0.01  -0.005 0.01 
 
[0.031] [0.012]  [0.026] [0.012] 
 
 
 
  
 sibling_c -0.346** -0.167***  -0.214** -0.167*** 
 
[0.120] [0.013]  [0.076] [0.013] 
 
 
 
  
 age_p 0.016* -0.001  0.017** -0.001 
 
[0.007] [0.003]  [0.006] [0.003] 
 
 
 
  
 married_p 0.139 0.054  0.093 0.054 
 
[0.086] [0.031]  [0.069] [0.031] 
 
 
 
  
 female_p -0.124 -0.05  -0.084 -0.05 
 
[0.075] [0.028]  [0.060] [0.028] 
 
 
 
  
 badhealth_p 0.202 -0.052  0.242* -0.052 
 
[0.147] [0.054]  [0.126] [0.054] 
Countries
1
  
 
  
 SE 0.511* 0.294***  0.312 0.294*** 
 
[0.235] [0.057]  [0.169] [0.057] 
 
 
 
  
 DK -0.006 0.04  -0.033 0.04 
 
[0.133] [0.054]  [0.109] [0.054] 
 
 
 
  
 NL -0.113 -0.260***  0.092 -0.260*** 
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(1)  (2) 
 
Books in Amount Eq.  Books Excluded 
 
Amount Probit  Amount Probit 
 
[0.222] [0.058]  [0.158] [0.058] 
 
 
 
  
 BE 0.546*** -0.09  0.591*** -0.09 
 
[0.149] [0.057]  [0.123] [0.057] 
 
 
 
  
 FR 0.109 -0.114  0.19 -0.114 
 
[0.160] [0.059]  [0.127] [0.059] 
 
 
 
  
 CH -0.007 -0.325***  0.249 -0.325*** 
 
[0.269] [0.065]  [0.189] [0.065] 
 
 
 
  
 AT 0.02 -0.232**  0.19 -0.232** 
 
[0.262] [0.084]  [0.207] [0.084] 
 
 
 
  
 IT 0.597** 0.240***  0.402* 0.240*** 
 
[0.229] [0.066]  [0.165] [0.066] 
 
 
 
  
 ES -0.237 -0.541***  0.192 -0.541*** 
 
[0.462] [0.098]  [0.336] [0.098] 
 
 
 
  
 PL -0.882*** -0.119  -0.797*** -0.119 
 
[0.205] [0.072]  [0.170] [0.072] 
 
 
 
  
 CZ -1.109*** -0.269***  -0.891*** -0.269*** 
 
[0.244] [0.064]  [0.177] [0.064] 
 
 
 
  
 _cons -0.32 -1.687***  1.768 -1.687*** 
 
[1.877] [0.218]  [1.192] [0.218] 
mills  
 
  
 lambda 2.086* 
 
 1.075* 
 
 
[0.871] 
 
 [0.534] 
 N 14889 
 
 14889 
 lambda 2.086 
 
 1.075 
 rho 0.938 
 
 0.676 
 sigma 2.223 
 
 1.591 
  
Standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
1. Reference category: Germany (DE) 
16 
 
With respect to the amount equation, the most salient finding is that the children with 
higher income, as proxied by their years of education, receive higher amounts of the 
financial transfers from their parents. This contradicts the mathematical derivations, 
obtained from the theoretical model, for the case of altruism. Namely, an altruistic parent 
should give more to children who have less (conditional on transferring). Since (similarly 
to Alessie, et al. (2011) as well as to other studies) I find the opposite, the altruism 
hypothesis does not hold. Therefore, the amount equation suggests that the exchange 
motive is more probable explanation of the transfers.  In addition, I find empirical 
evidence that the parents, who expect higher need of help in the future, as measured by 
being in bad health today, also give more money to their children. To remind, in the 
exchange setting, the monetary transfers are payments for the future services. Therefore, 
those, who expect to be in need of more help, should pay higher amounts. Finally, as was 
hypothesized, basing on other studies, the older parents transfer more money, since the 
old age is a proxy of higher needs (Brandt, 2013). 
As to the decision to transfer money to the children, I find, as predicted by the 
mathematical model that parents with higher income are more likely to give. Concerning 
the variables of main interest for the current study, I observe that both proxies for the 
social status are important. When these variables are excluded from the amount equation, 
the coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) is statistically significant; this means 
that this exclusion was necessary to avoid the sample selection bias. Moreover, both 
variables are significant predictors of the probability to give financial transfers. These 
findings have several implications. First, I was able to take into account the selectivity 
issues and, hence, my analysis provides better estimation than the previous research did. 
Second, the contribution of both proxies of the parent’s social status requires attention. 
As to the measure of the current social status, the analysis shows that having many 
confidants leads to higher likelihood of making financial transfers to adult children. In the 
exchange setting, this transfer is made in expectation to be compensated in the long run 
by getting services from these children. Since, as was shown above, the intergenerational 
transfers are a risky exchange, this finding is in line with the literature on trust that 
showed that people from the high social status are less likely to be cheated, and hence are 
more willing to engage in such exchange. This reasoning suggests that the size of the 
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social network serves as a proxy for the probability to be cheated. And finally, this 
probability is the uncertainty about the future behavior of the child, which is a crucial 
determinant of the parental transferring decision. It is interesting that although the 
number of books at age 10 of the parent has no impact on the amount, it is an important 
determinant of the transferring decision, even after accounting for all other key 
predictors. This variable was used due to conjectured importance of control for 
exogenously given variables, distinguishing between people born to different social status 
groups, to account for possible reverse causality, as suggested by Guiso, et al., 2006. 
However, it is essential to discuss, whether the number of books at age 10 might provide 
additional information, which is important for the transferring decision of the parents, 
rather than just being a proxy for the childhood social status. 
 
7. Discussion 
If private transfers of money and time between parents and their grown-up children are 
motivated (even only partly) by the exchange motive, we are observing an attempt to use 
financial capital to produce social capital. The present study views this exchange as a 
very particular field of intergenerational transfers, and emphasizes the importance of 
understanding its causal mechanism, namely the drivers of the transferring decision of the 
parents. Following from the importance of private intergenerational transfers for 
economics and policy, understanding the drivers of private exchange has essential 
implications.  
The empirical findings point out that social status of the parents, as measured by 
current and childhood proxies thereof, is a significant predictor of the probability that the 
parents will make a financial transfer. This result supports the finding in Glaeser, et al., 
2000 that people with higher social status are less likely to be cheated and therefore 
(according to Fehr, 2009) are more likely to engage in risky exchange, because when 
making financial transfers they are more confident that they will be compensated by 
receiving services from their children later in life. Hence, I find an empirical support for 
my hypothesis that uncertainty in the field of intergenerational transfers of time and 
money is an important determinant of the transferring decision by the parents. Moreover, 
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the finding that the number of books at age 10 is a significant predictor of the probability 
to transfer provides support for the second hypothesis of this paper. Namely, this variable 
might also contain the information about the culture and norms transmitted between the 
generations of a family. As was discussed above, this information is necessary for the 
parent in order to estimate better the risk that the child will renege on “nonguaranteed 
debts” created by the financial transfer. And, therefore, this information is important for 
the parental decision to transfer. Here it might be instructive to look at the research by 
Brunello et al., 2012, who found that the number of books at home at the age of 10 
captures the cultural background (rather than the economic situation of the household). 
This research supports the idea that this measure might also contain a glimpse into the 
cultural heritage of the family, which is attempted to be transmitted by each previous 
generation to each successful one. The high significance it has for the decision of parent 
to transfer might point out not only at the social status, which is an important determinant 
of trust, but also at the information, available to the parent about preferences, tastes, 
values and skills, characterizing her familial milieu, and particularly ones that she was 
transmitting to her children. Exploiting this knowledge, the parent might make a better 
assessment of the extent to which the child is likely to provide the services in exchange of 
financial transfer. 
Finally, some limitations of the current analysis should be mentioned (these 
limitations also serve as suggestions for the further study). In fact, this project is informed 
about the complexity of that issue. On the one hand, interaction of at least three players 
should be considered: the family, the (insurance) market and the (welfare) state (e.g., 
Brandt, 2013, p. 27). Brandt and Deindl (2013, 243-245) found that older people are an 
important source of financial support to their adult children; however the authors provide 
evidence that the decision and the amount of these transfers differ considerably between 
different European countries, depending on the countries’ social policies. In particular, to 
be able to better evaluate the consequences of policy interventions, it is important to 
account for the redistribution of resources at the family level that follows public 
redistribution. In addition, it is necessary to estimate the impact of policies on the 
redistribution of resources across generations. On the other hand, focusing only on the 
period, when the parent is about the retirement age, and the child is a young adult, might 
19 
 
also distort the estimation of the likelihood and the amount of financial transfers. For 
example, Bernheim, et al. (1985) found that care was provided by children in order to 
stimulate future receipt of bequests. In fact, research about flow of transfers between 
generations should account for both, the transfers across the life cycle (i.e. e.g. the 
investment of parents in young children, as well as the volume of a potential bequest), as 
well as their link with the type of a welfare regime. Such research is still limited. Thus, 
taking the life-cycle overlapping-generations perspective and comparing different welfare 
regimes is warranted (see Mudrazija, 2013). Hence, further study of the determinants of 
the parental decision about inter-vivos financial transfers should adopt the life-cycle 
overlapping-generations perspective, while also comparing different welfare regimes (as 
is suggested by the recent research). 
In spite of these limitations, the current paper was able to introduce the notion of 
uncertainty into the theoretical discussion about the motives of private intergenerational 
transfers. This uncertainty was introduced as an important determinant of the parental 
decision to transfer money. It was shown that this uncertainty might serve as an exclusion 
restriction in the Heckman selection procedure, using which the current study obtains 
better estimates of the probability and the amount of financial transfers from parents to 
the children. The literature on trust was used to suggest proxies, capturing this 
uncertainty. These proxies provided support for the idea that when making transfers 
parents estimate the riskiness of the transaction. In addition, parents also use their 
informational advantage, i.e. the knowledge about the cultural norms in their family to 
make better prediction about the probability that their financial gift will be compensated 
by services later in life.  
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ABSTRACT: This study compares financial behavior (holding stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds and/or individual retirement accounts (IRA)) of older adults, belonging to 10 
different European linguistic communities: German-speakers in South Germany, 
German-speakers in Austria and in Switzerland; Italian-speakers in Northern Italy and 
those in Switzerland; French-speakers in East France, in Belgium and in Switzerland; and 
finally Dutch in the Netherlands and Flemish in Belgium. Previous research found 
profound differences in financial behavior among older adults across European countries. 
However, belonging to different linguistic groups in a country; or to the same linguistic 
group across different countries was usually neglected as a possible predictor of financial 
behavior. Recently many other noneconomic factors were found as important 
determinants of the household financial behavior of older adults, such as effects of social 
institutions and culture. However, the literature has missed the fact that belonging to 
different linguistic communities in Europe might serve as a proxy for a latent construct of 
having/lacking skills and values that are necessary for holding stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds and/or individual retirement accounts. Using the fourth wave of SHARE, I find 
first that for three kinds of financial instruments (holding stocks, risky assets and risky 
assets plus IRA) – after controlling for all possible determinants of private financial 
market participation – the behavior of the three linguistic communities in Switzerland and 
of the two communities in Belgium isn't the same, despite they face identical institutions. 
Second, in some cases (especially, concerning the French-speakers), the financial 
behavior of a language speaker can be identical, even when facing heterogeneous 
financial environment (i.e. the behavior is identical across countries). Thus, it is evident 
that language matters for private financial decisions – at least for some of the major 
European linguistic groups – even after controlling for a wide range of adequate 
variables.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Limited participation of households (and in particular the older ones) in financial 
market represents a challenge both to the classical model of portfolio allocation, as well 
as to states’ social security systems. In the recent decades Western countries experienced 
an extraordinary increase in availability of new financial products and services, such as 
mutual funds or individual retirement accounts (Hong et al.., 2004; Guiso et al., 2003). 
However, a large body of empirical research documents that many individuals do not 
invest in stocks and other financial assets (Christelis, et al., 2010; Campbell, 2006); while 
of those who do, many do not hold a diversified portfolio (Cardak and Wilkins, 2009). 
Many authors observe that limited financial market participation, particularly among the 
wealthy, is one of the great challenges to financial theory (e.g. Hong, et al., 2004; van 
Rooij, et al., 2011). They claim that the classical model is unable to explain individual 
financial behavior (holding stocks, bonds, mutual funds and/or individual retirement 
accounts). According to this model of portfolio allocation, having risky financial assets is 
a simple business. It assumes that investors are concerned only with the payoffs from 
their portfolios, with risk the only preference parameter; or assessing the “true” 
distribution of returns (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011). However, as many scholars point out, 
empirical evidence shows that households do not follow the portfolio theory’s predictions 
(Cardak and Wilkins, 2009). 
In addition, these findings are placed in the context of the discourse about state’s 
social security systems. This discourse stresses challenges in provision of adequate social 
security coverage in face of increasing ratios of retirees to workers, resulting from the 
ageing of the population. There are concerns that households are not taking advantage of 
financial innovation, hence they are not saving enough for retirement and accumulate 
excessive debt (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Campbell, 2006). As more workers face 
situation, in which they have to decide how much to save for retirement and how to 
invest their retirement wealth, it is important to consider ways to enhance their use of 
financial instruments (van Rooij et al., 2011). Some scholars even maintain that it is an 
imperative for households to take advantage of asset accumulation opportunities during 
their working life (Christelis, et al., 2011; van Rooij et al., 2011). Specifically with 
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respect to the older households, it is claimed that inadequate social security coverage for 
retirees calls for having an additional retirement income from private pension and/or 
mutual funds (Guiso et al., 2003). 
The failure of the standard model of portfolio choice to account for limited financial 
market participation and undiversified portfolios, generated a growing body of research, 
which either develops models that explain and predict observed portfolios or empirically 
identifies factors explaining household portfolio allocations or some combination of the 
two (Cardak and Wilkins, 2009). In general, the literature has recently paid a lot of 
attention to the effects of noneconomic factors on financial behavior, such as institutions 
or culture. In particular, there are two main strands of explanation. One is that financial 
instruments, such as stocks or mutual funds are not a simple business, but rather complex 
assets, and many households may not know or understand financial instruments and the 
working of the financial market. Lack of understanding of new financial instruments is a 
significant barrier for their ownership. This explanation has not yet been well-explored in 
the literature (van Rooij, et al., 2011). The second strand claims that investors have tastes 
for financial assets as in consumption goods. Such tastes (or values/opinions) could 
potentially explain the phenomenon of participation by factors like socially responsible 
investing (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011).  
Many other noneconomic factors may also matter in understanding the household 
financial behavior, for example trusting the social environment (e.g. Guiso et al, 2008). 
However, the research almost neglected such possible cultural determinant of 
participation as belonging to different linguistic groups in a country; or the behavior of 
the same linguistic group across different countries. The only exception is Chen (2013). 
Yet, this author tests a very specific hypothesis about the causal mechanism, namely that 
speakers of “the languages that grammatically associate the future and the present” save 
more and retire with more wealth. Thus, although considering language as a possible 
determinant of financial behavior, it relates to different outcomes than ones that I 
examine in the current paper. My paper instead sheds light on differences in financial 
market participation (holding stocks, bonds, mutual funds and/or individual retirement 
accounts IRA) among older adults from different European linguistic communities. As 
explained below in a more detailed way, I assume that speaking different languages 
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captures bearing distinctive cultures; and therefore can be used as a proxy for the latent 
construct of having skills and values that triggers or deters holding of financial assets.  
Thus, this paper contributes to the growing literature which reflects the effort of 
economists to apply their analytical frameworks and empirical tools to study the cultural 
influences on economic decisions and behaviors (Guiso et al.., 2006; Nunziata and 
Rocco, 2010). After controlling for a wide range of adequate variables, I find that 
language matters for three types of financial behavior of people 50 and older: Stock-
holding, holding Risky Assets (stocks and/or bonds and/or mutual funds) and holding 
Risky Assets and/or individual retirement accounts (IRA).  
 
 
2. The Role of Linguistic Communities in Financial 
Behavior of Older Adults and the Research Question 
 
Recent research found that noneconomic (specifically, social and/or cultural) factors 
matter in understanding the household financial behavior. Section 2 provides literature 
review about cultural and social determinants of domestic financial behavior. First, 
however, I discuss theoretical literature on possible effects of social and cultural variables 
– one of which is belonging to a linguistic community – on economic outcomes.  
Social variables reflect ways in which individuals are clustered into groups, which 
are different with respect to owning of knowledge, skills and values. Empirical studies 
have already found some differences in use of financial instruments with respect to some 
social variables. For example, literature finds remarkable variation in financial behavior 
among older adults, when using such social variable as country of citizenship in Europe 
(e.g. Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011; Christelis, et al.., 2013). See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Differences in Stock-Market Participation in Europe 
 
Source: Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) 
According to the recent article by Haliassos , Jansson and Karabulut (2014), these 
differences should be a result of either institutions, or culture, however it is still not 
clear what is the relative importance of these two factors. Next I describe possible 
mechanisms through which culture and institutions may affect economic outcomes. 
 
2.1 Culture 
Landes cited in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), states that "if we learn 
anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes all the 
difference” (p. 29). Culture is defined by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) as “those 
customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly 
unchanged from generation to generation” (p. 23). This definition is focused only on 
those dimensions of culture that are inherited by an individual from previous generations. 
For that reason, they claim, it allows identification of a causal effect from culture to 
economic outcomes. Specifically, the authors state that in making many economic 
decisions (e.g. which college to attend, which profession to choose, how much to save for 
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retirement) people’s choices must be based on beliefs (i.e., priors) and values (i.e., 
preferences), which are determined by culture (e.g. by religion or ethnicity). 
 
2.1.1 Which specific cultural attributes are important for economic outcomes and 
Why?  
Already in his early fundamental work The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1958) Max Weber claimed that belonging to religious denominations matters 
for economic behavior. The capitalist ethic is informed by the Calvinist idea (as opposed 
to Catholic) about one’s election (salvation), which is a function of such behaviors as 
hard labor, avoiding enjoyment of wealth, idleness. Landes (1998) identifies cultural 
factors, such as thrift, hard work, tenacity, honesty, and tolerance, which he contrasts 
with xenophobia, religious intolerance, bureaucratic corruption, and laws that hurt 
economic development. He states that the former factors create attitudes that are crucial 
drivers of the states’ economic prosperity. Nunziata and Rocco (2010) find that thriving 
entrepreneurship depends on characteristics (rooted in belonging to religious 
denominations), such as: intuition, courage, self-control, leadership, propensity to 
invest. Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007) identify three opposite cultural factors 
that encourage or dampen respect of law, corruption, and democratic accountability. 
These opposite cultural factors are: “embeddedness” vs. autonomy, hierarchy vs. 
egalitarianism, and mastery vs. harmony with nature. The authors document that national 
economies derive success from autonomy, egalitarianism, and mastery.  
Tabellini (2010) provides comprehensive empirical evidence on the effects of culture 
on economic development. He uses four measures of values and beliefs (such as 
generalized trust, respect for others, and confidence in the virtues of individualism) 
at the regional level in Europe. Then, he instruments these measures with historical 
variables. He finds that exogenous regional component of culture is correlated with the 
current economic development. Tabellini has established the following causal 
mechanisms from these four values to the economic outcome. 
1. Tabellini makes a distinction between generalized trust versus limited morality 
(i.e. when trust is limited only to the local community). Individuals who practice 
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generalized (as opposed to limited) observe social norms also when dealing with citizens, 
whom they don’t know personally (they are reluctant to free-ride on others). Therefore, in 
societies, characterized by higher generalized trust, the cost of external monitoring of 
transactions outside the local community is relatively low, thus facilitating the 
development of anonymous market exchange. Otherwise, limited morality leads to fear of 
fraud and raises monitoring costs, thus reducing gains from trade. 
2. Societies, where members don’t respect their fellow citizens, as well as society as 
a whole, public administration tends to exhibit more corruption, such as nepotism. This 
cultural feature of respect can be captured by the extent of citizens’ participation in the 
political and administrative life of their society (or “res publica”). If participation is low, 
there is no adequate monitoring of public administrators. Consequently, this leads to 
worse functioning of the social institutions, which in its turn deter the development of 
economy.  
3. In societies with rigid hierarchy the individual is regarded as responding to instinct 
rather than reason. Consequently, such societies tend to be coercive towards its members, 
therefore discouraging individual initiative and cooperation. As a result, entrepreneurial 
environment becomes inadequate, which hurts economic development. To capture this 
distrust of the benefits of individualism, Tabellini uses a survey question, which asks if 
respondents believe that children should learn to exhibit “obedience.” 
4. Individuals, who view success as direct outcome of their personal choices, are 
more likely to work hard, to plan for their future, to be innovative and undertake new 
initiatives. Consequently, they are usually highly motivated people. On the other hand, 
people who think that the success is out of their personal control, and is a result of 
external events, are more likely to adopt passive attitudes and exhibit low motivation to 
undertake economic initiative. For that reasons, Tabellini (and other authors) considers 
the variable of control (i.e. belief that individual effort pays off) as a cultural feature that 
may serve as a driver of economic development. 
In sum, generalized trust and respect for others are expected to be correlated with 
higher benefits from anonymous exchange and with improvement in the functioning of 
societal institutions. The two latter variables measure confidence in the virtues of 
9 
 
individualism, hence reflecting quality of the entrepreneurial environment and 
willingness of citizens to look for and take advantage of economic opportunities. 
 
2.1.2 Persistence of Culture?  
For Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) culture is an outcome of two factors: current 
social interactions and the cultural traditions inherited from earlier generations. Culture, 
shaped by social interactions (the so-called fast-moving components) is out of the scope 
of the current paper. However, in my model I control for variables that were found as 
proxies for social interactions. With respect to the inherited culture (the so-called slow-
moving components), Bisin and Verdier maintain that parents have a natural tendency to 
teach their children what they have learned from their own parents, usually without an 
appropriate assessment of adequacy of this education. This corresponds to Bourdieu’s 
claim that practice is produced by the “embodied predispositions” (or inherited repertoire 
of cultural attributes) of a person to behave in ways meaningful for her or his native 
social milieu (Bourdieu, 1990).  Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) maintain that also 
organizations (such as governments, church, and academia) play a role in promoting 
culture. Therefore, they are able to shape values and beliefs that serve their interests (see 
the next section on Institutions). According to these authors, regardless of the exact 
mechanisms, the persistence of the slow-moving components of culture allows us to use 
such variables as ethnic origin, religious denomination or culture inherited from the 
previous generations as exogenous predictors of economic outcomes, i.e. avoiding the 
issue of reverse causality. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that in recent years, researchers has put an extensive 
emphasis on studying the role of culture on cross-country disparity in economic 
outcomes. Quite a few studies have linked economic outcomes directly to the slow-
moving components of culture. For example, country of origin (as a proxy for possibly 
different social preferences and beliefs) of immigrants to Canada was found to correlate 
with saving behavior (Caroll et al., 1994).  Being an ancestor of immigrants from 
countries with higher financial development is correlated in the US with higher 
probability to own a home, to work in the financial industry, and to take on more debt 
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(Bogaard and Pirinsky, 2011). Again, such immigrants are more likely to be self-
employed than immigrants from less developed countries (Oyelere and Belton, 2012). 
Being US immigrant from countries with poorer investment protection is associated with 
higher averseness of shares, because in the new country these immigrants follow their old 
prior belief (Osili and Paulson, 2008). Lastly, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) show 
that particular religious denominations affect thriftiness. 
 
2.2 Institutions 
Similarly to Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), Tabellini (2010) states that 
cultural traits can influence economic development also “indirectly through the 
functioning of current institutions” (p. 711). With specific reference to households’ 
participation in financial markets Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) point out that 
macroeconomic processes (demographic, institutional, and policy-related), some of 
which appeared in the Western countries as early as1980s, forced governments to aim at 
changing the citizens’ political culture. To achieve this goal the governments were able to 
reduce the entry costs to the stock market (such as distribution costs of institutional 
investors or information costs). According to the authors, these costs serve as factors that 
generate cross-country differences in participation. As a result of the costs’ reduction, the 
perceived barriers to stockholding were lowered relative to the expected benefits of stock 
market participation. This created incentive for relatively less wealthy investors to enter 
the market of risky assets. In particular, such European investors became able to hold 
diversified portfolios in stocks at much lower costs than through direct acquisition. These 
macroeconomic processes included: pension reforms, financial liberalization reforms, 
growth of the managed fund sector and wider availability of financial information.  
1. As was already mentioned in the Introduction, the demographic transition and 
rising dependency ratios created a situation, in which the governments experience 
difficulties with providing adequate social security coverage for retired households. 
Therefore, the households were increasingly stimulated to have an additional source of 
retirement income from participation in stockholding through retirement accounts 
(occupational and/or individual). However, the retirees’ demand for such supplementary 
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retirement accounts differs across European countries. Since in some countries public 
pension schemes still play a dominant role, these countries are characterized by low 
participation in private pension funds.  
Due to these developments the governments undertook measure to stimulate 
participation of the households in private retirement schemes by lowering costs. They 
offered extra incentives to the households, which accumulate stocks as part of their 
retirement accounts. The incentives included: reduced taxation, inducing employers to 
participate in the payments for future private pension of employees, and facilitating 
dissemination of information about stockholding. As a result the defined-benefit pension 
schemes (DB) became increasingly replaced by defined-contribution schemes (DC). 
However, despite the increase in the size of institutional investors (such as pension 
funds) as a share of GDP in the recent decades, in some countries it is still too small in 
comparison to the size of the social security systems. For example, in France, Germany 
and Italy, the countries with the largest social security systems, the perceived importance 
of private pension funds is low, unlike the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden, where the 
role of public pensions is limited. Table 1 below provides summary on pensions systems 
in some of the European countries. It is instructive to look at the differences between the 
Netherlands and other Member States (MS) (Eichhorst, et al., 2011). 
 
Table 1. Pensions Systems in Several European Countries 
MS Pillar 1 
 
Universal coverage, 
redistributive 
Pillar 2 
 
Occupational 
pension 
schemes 
BE DB DC 
DE DB DC 
FR DB DC 
IT  Old: DB DC 
NL Flat rate DB 
AT DB DC 
Source: Annex 1 to the 2009 Ageing Report (European Commission, 2008a), the OECD Report 2009, the 
OECD Report 2011 and the Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (European Commission, 
2010b). 
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2. Increasing financial integration, financial liberalization policy and coordination in 
Europe, mainly due to introduction of common currency, led to further availability of 
stocks to households. Namely, the costs were further reduced, while the households got 
an opportunity to invest in stock markets of other European countries either directly or 
through mutual funds. In addition, European public corporations became increasingly 
prone to cross-list in foreign exchanges. However, European households still tend to 
invest in stocks of their own countries’ economies, rather than in the foreign (the so 
called ‘home bias’). For example, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) document that until recently 
Italian households are still characterized by old tradition of “holding their financial 
wealth in the form of transaction accounts or governmental bonds, and portfolios are 
poorly diversified” (p. 251). 
3. A very important development was the growth and technological advance in the 
industry of institutional investors (such as mutual funds or pension funds). These 
institutions became able to replicate the market portfolio and to provide better 
diversification (for example by adding foreign securities) for lower price than direct stock 
acquisition. In addition, they served to provide information, professional portfolio 
management and other services for households. Finally, they offer assets with lower risk, 
while holding expected return constant, thereby boosting participation.  
Large funds enjoy economies of scale and exhibit lower ratios of operating expenses 
to fund assets, thus providing to their customers significant cost savings. On the other 
hand, smaller funds that in addition operate in concentrated industries increase 
distribution costs. Another factor that affects the cost is the mode of stock distribution, 
i.e. via banks as opposed to direct sales by brokers. For example, in France, Germany and 
Italy mutual funds were mainly distributed by banks, while in the UK distribution of 
mutual funds by brokers is very significant. Differences in the availability and size of 
institutional investors (such as mutual or pension funds) may explain different 
participation across countries.  
4. Participation is also influenced by information-related barriers that arise from lack 
of transparency of financial institutions, as well as from limited financial knowledge of 
the households. Participation in the financial market involves high degree of delegation. 
Households with higher knowledge have lower monitoring costs, and therefore are more 
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likely to participate. The authors provide an example how this knowledge could be 
boosted by employer-sponsored seminars about the nature of the defined-contribution 
retirement accounts. Transparency of financial institutions is higher in the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Germany than in France and in Italy. As to financial, as well as computer 
literacy, France and Italy – the countries with the lowest participation – are ranked lower 
than Sweden and the Netherlands. 
However, according to Fehr and Hoff (2011) institutions may affect households not 
only through creating new opportunities for potential investors, but in a much more subtle 
way. Namely, they claim that preferences are malleable to social influences. They cite 
literature, confirming that preferences may be influenced by the elicitation method, the 
mode of presentation of a problem, or by making an aspect of one’s social identity more 
salient. Thus, institutions may shape peoples’ preferences by influencing peoples’ 
cognition, and therefore, the meaning of facts.  
The authors provide evidence that individual preferences (i.e. values and opinions) are 
readjusted in response to changes in social institutions and other socially defined 
variables; and that such readjustments are central to the modification of economic 
behavior. The study of Henrich et al. (2010) shows that the preferences of individuals for 
fairness and for punishing unfair behavior intensify with the level of the society’s market 
integration (measured as average percentage of calories that are purchased by 
households). In addition, Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) show that the size of welfare state 
may affect parents’ inclination to educate their children to work hard. This is because if 
the grown-up children suffer from economic hardship, the altruistic parents will want to 
help them. However, if the state bears the obligation to alleviate peoples’ economic 
hardships, the parents don’t need to care about children’s work-related ethics.  
 
2.3 Institutions or Culture? 
As was mentioned above, the Eurozone experiences pressure for institutional 
harmonization, however given the importance of cultural predispositions for economic 
behavior, more skeptical researchers doubt the likelihood that the behavior will converge 
to allow the harmonization. In their recent paper, Haliassos, Jansson and Karabulut 
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(2014) claim that given considerable cultural diversity in Europe, it is crucial to 
understand whether or not disparities in financial behavior across the continent reflect 
cultural predispositions, and thus will remain stable also in the face of institutional 
harmonization. If they persist, harmonization of institutions across Europe may not be 
effective. Special policies might be needed to address diverse cultural behavioral 
tendencies in order to be able to implement the desirable reforms, to which European 
Union is striving for. Haliassos, Jansson and Karabulut (2014) address the following 
questions: 
1. To what extent households’ financial behavior is influenced by their cultural 
backgrounds? 
2. Whether dissimilar financial behavior of diverse cultural groups will 
synchronize, when these households face identical institutional environment? 
To test the feasibility of harmonization reforms in Eurozone, the study compares 
financial behavior of households that belong to different cultural backgrounds (immigrant 
and non-immigrant households) but live in the same country (Sweden) and thus face a 
common institutional and policy environment. This research’s design helps to make sure 
that institutions are “imposed” on households of different cultural backgrounds, rather 
than “evolve naturally.” 
The authors group immigrant households in Sweden using two different approaches, 
one is genetic distance, and the second one is Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. They find 
that statistically significant differences in financial behavior between immigrant groups 
and Swedish households persist, even after controlling for a wide range of households’ 
characteristics. They make sure that these differences are not a result of discrimination 
against immigrants. They find that participation in assets depends on time that an 
immigrant spent in the country and to whether s/he participated in home country 
economic institutions at young age. The differences in financial behavior between 
immigrants and Swedish households, controlling for characteristics, diminish after 
sufficient exposure to host country’s institutions and policies, even for those who spent 
the early part of their economic lives in their home countries. Finally, statistically 
significant differences remain across different cultural groups, even among those who 
have spent the longest time in the host country and even among those who have become 
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so assimilated that they adopted Swedish citizenship. Thus, the conclusion of the study is 
that both the cultural background and institutional environment are important 
determinants of households’ financial behavior. 
 
2.4 Why belonging to different Linguistic Community in Europe 
should matter?  
European linguistic communities are interactions of languages (which capture cultural 
predispositions) and countries (which reflect institutional environments). Licht, 
Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007) claim that “language and culture constitute one 
another, with language being the stable factor that constrains the development of cultural 
norms” (p. 661). In particular, languages, which require the explicit use of pronouns, like 
‘I’ or ‘you,’ reflect more individualistic culture, which values autonomy. Conversely, 
languages, in which such pronouns are unnecessary, may suggest that the subject isn’t 
distinguished from the general context of his/her social group, thus pointing out on 
culture which favors “embeddedness” (p. 661). As was argued above, cultures that favor 
autonomy are characterized by such economically favorable conditions as greater rule of 
law, lower corruption, and better accountability of the institutions. 
Here also Max Weber’s reasoning might apply, since the division between Protestants 
and Catholics in Switzerland is pronounced and corresponds to German as opposed to the 
French and Italian linguistic communities. As was stated above the Protestant ethics puts 
stress on such attitudes as hard labor and avoiding enjoyment of wealth, as well as 
idleness. Thus, in Switzerland German-speakers’ financial behavior might be different 
from the other communities. Many other cultural characteristics might also be captured 
by European linguistic communities. The current paper (see chapter 2.2 and Appendix I) 
uncovers thought-provoking patterns between European linguistic communities with 
respect to risk preferences, optimism, prevalence of volunteering behavior, participation 
in religious organizations, feeling of control over things that happen and religiosity (or 
intensity of trust in God). 
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With respect to countries’ institutional environments, as an example relevant to the 
current study, according to Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer, and Zweimüller (2011) Swiss 
institutional environment is characterized by identical universal supply of social 
insurance (e.g. unemployment insurance, the retirement system, maternity leave, etc.). In 
addition, the wealth distribution, the probability of becoming unemployed, and other risks 
are identical within the country.  
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Figure 2. Predominant Religions in Europe and Neighboring Regions 
 
     Roman Catholic Christianity      Protestant Christianity 
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2.5 Hypothesis and Research Question 
In this paper I use what Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) call a “reduced form 
approach.” Often direct information about tastes, values and skills is not available in the 
data; therefore researchers need to link directly cultural differences to economic 
outcomes. Some examples of such research were already cited above (section 1.1.2).  
Also in the current investigation I use data that provide a limited set of beliefs 
variables: trusting others, risk preferences, political preferences, optimism, sense of 
control, volunteering, and religiosity. If they do not capture all cultural aspects relevant to 
differences in financial behavior, then belonging to European linguistic communities 
might include the rest of such aspects. For example, because in the data that I have at my 
disposal, there are no direct questions about such cultural features as thrift, hard work, 
tenacity, honesty, tolerance etc., I hypothesize that they might be proxied by linguistic 
communities. Since, as will be shown below, financial instruments are highly complex 
assets, which demand certain skills and world views to be used, the decision to hold them 
might correlate with culture. In particular, these skills and opinions might not be at 
disposal of different ethnic, religious or social-class communities. Specifically, this paper 
hypothesizes that belonging to different linguistic communities in Europe might serve as 
a proxy for the latent construct of having skills and values that triggers or deters holding 
of stocks and other risky financial assets. I also hypothesize that if belonging to a 
linguistic community matters, it might explain some of the cross-country differences in 
all the three outcomes (holding stocks, risky assets and risky assets plus IRA). Therefore, 
my research question is: Does belonging to a linguistic community in Europe matter in 
determining the three kinds of financial behavior of older adults?  
 
3. Empirical Findings about Financial Instruments, 
Culture and Institutions 
Financial instruments are assets characterized by informational complexity, and many 
households may not own appropriate skills to manage them. Using a representative 
sample of the Dutch population, van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011) show that lack of 
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understanding of economics and finance is a significant deterrent to stock ownership. 
Those who have low financial knowledge are less likely to hold stocks. Therefore, 
financial literacy is an important determinant of stock market participation. This is also 
not a matter of general level of education, “those with high levels of schooling did not 
always score high on financial knowledge.” This suggests that schooling is not 
necessarily a good proxy for literacy.  
In addition, Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) maintain that the mutual funds are 
often complicated instruments that are not easy to understand even for well-educated 
investors. However, problems that are even more serious arise when the entry costs 
decrease. First, it leads to the entrance of less informed investors and second to increased 
delegation of portfolios’ management to the brokers. These two reasons (limited financial 
education of the new entrants and the delegation) may create the following imperfections. 
Since mutual funds managers usually also provide financial advice to investors, they 
might be inclined to manipulate the information in their own interest (i.e. provide 
untruthful information, abuse their role as financial advisors, and profit from their 
information advantage). For example, the managers might understate the riskiness of the 
instrument, hide the exit costs or information about better alternative financial 
instruments. Therefore, increased delegation may lead to bigger probability of fraud. 
Financially unsophisticated investors, who become afraid of being cheated by the 
brokers, are less likely to use mutual funds.  
Thus, it is not surprising that research points out that trust is an important determinant 
of economic exchange, and financial transactions in particular. Guiso et al. (2004) found 
that the proportion of stockholders is higher in Italian provinces with relatively high 
social trust, other things being equal. Using Dutch micro data, they (Guiso et al.,  2005) 
also found that individual level of trust does affect stock market participation. 
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011), who studied trust, sociability, and stock market 
participation, point out that these two variables act via two distinct channels. Mistrust 
lowers the expected return from an investment, because investors who live in a low-trust 
region have to take into account the possibility that a contract will not be respected by the 
counterpart. It should be mentioned that Glaeser et al. (2000) found that trust, as 
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measured by the survey question, reflects trustworthiness of the environment, and 
therefore is a measure of social capital, rather than personal value variable. 
In addition to the informational complexity and the need for appropriate skills to 
manage financial assets, the research pointed out to another explanation. Namely that as 
in every consumption taste matters, personal values affect consumption decisions 
(Vinson et al., 1977). Value-expressive elements may also be present in investment 
behavior, consistent with the popularity of socially responsible investing (see Statman, 
2000; Bollen, 2007; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). As a result, some people may exhibit a 
feeling of inconsistency between their personal values, and the values they perceive to be 
associated with the financial market. One can think of this mismatch as an additional 
participation cost. Some potential investors may thus stay out of the stock market because 
of their need to avoid this inconsistency (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011).  
Besides, literature also shows that social interaction affects portfolio outcomes.  Not 
only financial practitioners provide information about the financial instruments.  Guiso, 
Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) state that there are informational spillovers from informed 
to uninformed investors in the same social circle. For example, Hong, Kubik and Stein 
(2004) show that households who visit their neighbors more often or take part in religious 
activities have a higher propensity to participate in financial market, and they attribute 
this finding to the possibility that social interactions lower information costs. The two 
channels through which social interaction might influence participation in financial 
market are word-of-mouth and observational learning. A similar argument is provided 
by Christelis, Jappelli and Padula (2010), who use variable called social activities.  
Christelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2011) used engagement in volunteering, as an 
indicator of social interactions and of concern for others. As was mentioned above, 
Tabellini (2010) points out that respect for others, expressed in participation of 
individuals in the political and administrative life of their local communities, is an 
important predictor of economic development. 
As was stated above, empirical studies have found crucial differences in financial 
behavior among older adults across European countries. Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) 
and Christelis, et al. (2013) used country dummies to capture the effects of country-
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specific institutional environment that is likely to affect stockholding, such as the level of 
economic development, features of market or the legal environment. For example, 
Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) found that stock market participation is more widespread 
in countries with better investor protection. Additional differences across Western Europe 
were found with respect to such an important determinant of financial behavior as 
volunteering among people aged 50 or more years (e.g. Erlinghagen and Hank, 2006). 
What if we compare Linguistic Communities rather than states? There are many 
parameters (relevant for the financial behavior of older adults), in which the linguistic 
communities across Europe are different or identical, and there are many determinants of 
these differences/similarities. As was already mentioned, the current paper (see chapter 
2.2 and Appendix I) documents interesting variability between European linguistic 
communities with respect to some of such parameters.  
 
4. Other Variables Identified as Good Predictors of 
Stocks- or Bonds-holding 
 
Traditional theory predicts that investor’s willingness to participate in financial market 
depends on risk aversion (Christelis et al., 2010). Also Guiso and Paiella (2004) find that 
risk aversion is an important factor in explaining investing behavior. As was already 
mentioned above, another subjective preference that was identified by recent research as 
an important determinant of low participation in stock-markets is left-wing political 
orientation (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011). 
The positive effect of education on financial behavior is already well documented 
(Fratantoni, 1998; Haliassos and Bertaut,1995; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Yamishita, 2003). 
Christelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2011) explain that the level of education tends to 
influence not only future employment and earnings prospects but also the ability of the 
household to collect and process information relevant for asset and debt market 
participation.  
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These authors also explain that controlling for resources is dictated both by modern 
portfolio theory, with its emphasis on “cash on hand” (the sum of wealth and labor 
income) as an important determinant of portfolio formation, and by the need to avoid 
confounding role of other determinants with that of wealth when the latter is not 
adequately accounted for. Moreover, further relevance of income and wealth in the 
participation decision should be related to the fact that the financial services sector offers 
better terms to large investors than to smaller ones (Guiso et al., 2003). Therefore, 
Christelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2011) control for income and net wealth quartiles 
(where wealth excludes the asset in question), in order to capture the relevance of 
household economic resources for asset demand. Income (in logs) and dummies for 
quartiles of wealth were used also by van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011); Guiso, 
Haliassos and Jappelli (2002) and Campbell (2006). Also Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) 
control for an independent role of resources including separate controls for net total 
wealth and income. Finally, Kaustia, and Torstila (2011) controlled for house ownership 
as an additional proxy for wealth. 
The positive effect of good health on stock-market participation is also already well 
studied (Fratantoni, 1998; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Christelis et al., 2010). According to 
Rosen and Wu (2004) households with health problems are discouraged from investing in 
stocks. Christelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2011) claim that physical health can 
influence not only the ability and inclination of the household to make the effort required 
for investing in asset markets, but also the amount of background risk the household 
faces due to out-of-pocket health expenditures (for a detailed discussion about the effects 
of health on financial behavior among the older adults see Christelis et al., 2010). As a 
measure of health they used the number of activities of daily living (ADLs) with which 
the household has problems (see also Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011). Finally, 
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) accounted for the state of mental health (depression) as a 
measure of pessimism. 
Christelis, Jappelli and Padula (2010) found a significant role of cognitive abilities on 
stockholding. In particular, they considered such indicators as numeracy (or mathematical 
ability), verbal fluency, and recall skills. These abilities affect how people make financial 
decisions and manage their portfolios.  
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Christelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2011), who studied differences in portfolios 
across countries, controlled for household size, which is likely to determine consumption 
needs and affect the amount available for saving out of a given amount of resources. 
They also controlled for marital status, which can determine spending decisions, the 
responsibilities of the household member in charge of finances, and potential constraints 
on that member’s behavior in asset and debt markets. Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) also 
accounted for the number of children. 
Studies of financial behavior included in their analyses also the demographic 
variables: age and gender (Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011; Haliassos and Bertaut,1995; 
Guiso et al., 2002; Campbell, 2006).  van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011) found that 
stock market participation increases with age; stock ownership is concentrated among 
those 40 and older. Hurd (1990) found that the large proportion of stock ownership for 
those older than 70 may be the result of differential mortality between richer and poorer 
households. As to gender, stock market participation is much lower among women than 
men (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). This was found by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) to be 
consistent with the immense differences in literacy between women and men. Finally, as 
was already demonstrated above, it is very important to control for country dummies in 
order to capture country-specific institutional environment that in some cases promotes, 
while in other deters access to the financial assets. 
 
5. Data and Variables 
For empirical analysis I use the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE). SHARE is a multi-disciplinary, cross-national panel survey that is 
representative of the population aged 50 and over in a number of European countries. The 
survey provides micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family 
networks (Börsch-Supan, et al, 2008). In particular, it contains detailed information on 
both financial and real assets and a wide range of household background characteristics, 
including the language of interview. Financial assets include bank and other transaction 
accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks, mutual funds, individual retirement 
accounts, contractual savings for housing, and life insurance policies (Christelis et al., 
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2010). The current analysis is done, using wave 4 of the survey (2010/11). However, if an 
answer was asked only to a new respondent, I copied values for the longitudinal 
respondents also from Wave 1 or Wave 2, using method, developed in Gruber, Hunkler 
and Stuck (2013). 
In SHARE, analogous to other similar surveys, one respondent of an eligible couple is 
designated as a “financial respondent.” This person provides information about the 
household finance. Therefore my sample is at the household level, rather than at 
individual level, i.e. includes only the household representative, who answered the 
questions about finance. 
To perform analysis, I chose only such countries, where there exists a linguistic group, 
which speaks a language also spoken in another country. There are 10 linguistic 
communities: German-speakers, living in Germany (de), German-speakers, living in 
Austria (at) and ones, living in Switzerland (ch); Italian-speakers in Italy (it) and Italian 
in Switzerland (ch); French in France (fr), French in Belgium (be) and French in 
Switzerland (ch); and finally Dutch in the Netherlands (nl) and Flemish in Belgium (be). 
Moreover, I have chosen only close regions by using the 1st level of the Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics Classification (NUTS1), which is a hierarchical system for 
dividing up the economic territory of the EU (see Figure 3 below). Namely, I chose South 
Germany (specifically, DE1 Baden-Wuerttemberg and DE2 Bayern), Northern Italy (ITC 
Nord-Ovest, ITD - Nord-Est) and Eastern France plus Paris (FR1 Ile de France, FR3 
Nord - Pas-de-Calais, FR7 Centre-Est, FR8 Mediterranee). After choosing the 
appropriate regions, I am left with 14,243 households of people 50 years old and older. 
See Table 2 below, which describes the composition of the sample by the Linguistic 
Communities.  
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Figure 3. Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics Classification (NUTS1) 
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5.1 Dependent Variables 
I consider three dependent variables, which are different kinds of household financial 
behavior. The first kind is pure stock-holding (direct and indirect), which is defined as a 
dummy, taking value of 1, if respondents answered that they own stocks and/or mutual 
funds and/or individual retirement accounts (IRA), two last mostly in stocks. The second 
kind is holding of stocks and/or bonds (Risky Assets), which is defined as a dummy, 
taking value of 1 if they reported that they own at least one of the following: bonds, 
stocks, mutual funds. Finally, I consider also holding risky assets plus IRA. In other 
words, the last outcome variable is defined as a dummy, taking value of 1 if they reported 
that they own at least one of the following: bonds, stocks, mutual funds, IRA.  
 
5.2 Independent Variables 
Main Predictors. As follows from above discussion, the main variable of interest in the 
current investigation is belonging to one of the linguistic groups, which enters the 
equations in form of dummy variables. Table 2 describes these variables and provides 
Abbreviated Variable Names that were used in the analyses. 
 
Table 2. The Sample by Linguistic Community 
Linguistic 
Community 
Abbreviated 
Variable Name 
Wave 4 
German (at) l_DE_at 3,756 
German_S (de) l_DE_de 233 
German (ch) l_DE_ch 1,869 
Italian_N (it)           l_IT_it 497 
Italian (ch)           l_IT_ch 99 
French_E (fr)           l_FR_fr 1,489 
French (ch) l_FR_ch 666 
French (be) l_FR_be 1,908 
Dutch (nl) l_Du_nl 1,891 
Flemish (be) l_FL_be 1,835 
Total  14,243 
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In addition, I also control for Subjective Preferences, defined as risk aversion and 
political preferences. The former preference is represented by three dummies derived 
from the question, which was asked in wave 4 only for new participants. For longitudinal 
respondents I copied values from SHARE wave 2. The question was worded as follows: 
“When people invest their savings they can choose between assets that give low return 
with little risk to lose money, for instance a bank account or a safe bond, or assets with a 
high return but also a higher risk of losing, for instance stocks and shares. Which of the 
statements comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you are willing to take when 
you save or make investments? 1. Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn 
substantial returns 2. Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average 
returns 3. Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 4. Not willing to 
take any financial risks.” I derived 3 dummies, low risk aversion =1 if a respondent chose 
answers 1 or 2, zero otherwise; average risk aversion =1 if a respondent chose answer 3, 
zero otherwise; and high risk aversion =1 if a respondent chose answer 4. The latter 
preference is a continuous variable (called rightist, Kaustia and Torstila, 2011) and was 
derived from the question “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. On a 
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right, where would you place 
yourself?” Again, for the longitudinal respondents I used values from SHARE wave 2. 
I also have a block of Objective Characteristics, which includes human capital, health 
and demographic variables. First human capital variable is numeracy. SHARE 
respondents are asked to perform the following simple calculations: (1) find 10 percent of 
a number; (2) find one half of a number; (3) find the number of which another known 
number represents two-thirds; (4) find 10 percent of another number at the end of 2 years. 
On the basis of these four questions Dewey and Prince (2005) construct a numeracy 
indicator, which ranges from one to five. The next variable of human capital sub-block is 
education. In SHARE the individual’s highest educational degree appears in the form of 
the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). I created a dummy 
equal 1 if ISCED is at least some post-secondary education (value=4); values of ISCED 
that are below 4 correspond to zero in the education dummy. Next, I include variables, 
related to the resources. SHARE provides detailed information on real assets. The 
questions on real assets refer to the value of the house of residence, other real estate, 
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business wealth and vehicles (see Christelis et al., 2005 for details). In my analyses this 
variable is represented in the form of quintiles of real assets. In addition, I control for 
household income, which is calculated as total household income from all sources net of 
capital income, adjusted for purchase power parity (ppp). I transform this variable, as 
suggested by literature, using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation. IHS is 
defined as 𝑙𝑛(𝑡 +  √𝑡2 + 1), and is approximately equal to ln(2t) for positive values of t. 
It is linear around zero (See Burbidge et al., 1988). Finally, I control for home ownership 
using a dummy derived from a variable provided by SHARE in the form of estimated 
values of the respondents’ main residence. I also consider health as a human capital 
variable, accounting for limitations in activities of daily living. I construct a dummy =1 if 
a respondent has 1 to 6 limitations, zero if s/he reports 0 limitations;  
Social capital is measured by the household’s size, which is a number of all persons in 
the household. In addition, I include presence of a partner/spouse in the household; this 
variable is dummy for partner inside the household =1 if respondents and their partners 
live together/ married. I also account for the number of children. Finally, I control for 
standard demographic variables, age (from 50 to 104) and gender (where the binary 
indicator equals 1, if the respondent is female). 
The last block of variables captures some cultural characteristics. Trusting other 
people was derived from the standard survey question: “generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with 
people? Please tell me on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful 
and 10 means that most people can be trusted.” Sense of control is a dummy (=1 if 
respondents answer “Rarely/Never feel that what happens is out of their control,” 0 
otherwise). Optimism is measured by two variables: life is full of opportunities (=1, if 
respondents answer “Often/Sometimes feel that life is full of opportunities,” 0 otherwise) 
and future looks good (=1 if respondents answer “Often/Sometimes feels that the future 
looks good,” 0 otherwise). I also included an indicator of volunteering or participating in 
political or community-related organization. SHARE Wave 4 provides information about 
various kinds of social activities that individuals have performed in the year prior to the 
interview. I counted (1) done voluntary or charity work and/or (2) taking part in a 
political or community-related organization (the dummy volunteering). I also used a 
29 
 
separate dummy, religious organization (= 1 if respondents attended a religious 
organization in the year prior to the interview). For the respondents, who had missing 
values for these two variables (i.e. volunteer activities and religious organization) I 
copied answers from Wave 1 or Wave 2, if these values were non-missing. It should be 
mentioned that in contrast to Wave 4, in two previous waves the question about activities 
was asked for a different period, namely in the month prior to the interview (distributions 
of answers for one year and one month are identical). Finally I introduced a variable 
capturing religiosity or intensity of trust in God, derived from the question “How often 
you pray?” I recoded the original variable into three categories: 1.Never; 2. Sometimes; 
3. Often.  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics and description of all variables used in the empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 3. With respect to the financial behavior, it shows that in the sample 
18% of the households hold stocks either directly or indirectly (in mutual funds or IRA). 
Next, 27% report that they hold risky assets; and finally 39% hold risky assets plus IRA. 
The table also shows that 70% of the sample is highly risk averse. Most of the sample 
(above 80%) is optimistic and two-thirds (67%) report that they feel control over things 
that happen to them. The participation in the voluntary activities is quite high: 28%, this 
is apparently so due to inclusion of the whole Swiss and Dutch samples (the countries 
that are characterized by higher levels of volunteering). Attending of religious 
organizations was reported by 15% of the households. Almost one-third of the sample has 
post-secondary education. With respect to the wealth, on average the households are 
found in the middle, i.e. belong to the 3
rd
 quintile. The two-thirds of the households 
(65%) own a home. Regarding health, the vast majority of the sample (89%) is healthy, 
i.e. doesn’t have any ADL limitation. The sample contains a bit more female financial 
respondents (54%) than males. Almost two-thirds (60%) of the households consists of 
two partners. Average age is 66 years old. On average household size is 2 persons and the 
same is their number of the children. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pure stock-holding Dummy for having stocks 
directly, or indirectly (in 
mutual funds or IRA) 
13749 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Holding of risky 
assets  
Dummy for having bonds, 
stocks or mutual funds 
13875 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Holding risky assets 
plus IRA 
Like the above + IRA 13871 0.388 0.487 0 1 
Low risk aversion  =1 if a respondent chose 
answers 1 or 2, zero otherwise;  
13405 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Average risk aversion  =1 if a respondent chose 
answer 3, zero otherwise;  
13405 0.252 0.434 0 1 
High risk aversion =1 if a respondent chose 
answer 4. 
13405 0.702 0.457 0 1 
Trusting other people Trusting Scale: 0 – 10 (most 
people can be trusted) 
13565 5.733 2.389 0 10 
Control Rarely/Never feels that what 
happens is out of his/her 
control 
14023 0.671 0.470 0 1 
Life is full of 
opportunities 
Often/Sometimes feels that life 
is full of opportunities 
13982 0.839 0.368 0 1 
Future looks good Often/Sometimes feels that the 
future looks good 
13962 0.817 0.387 0 1 
Volunteering 
 
Volunteering or participating 
in political or community-
related organization: Last Year 
or Last Month 
13955 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Religious organization Attended a Religious Org Last 
Year or Last Month 
13957 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Trust in god How often you pray: 
1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. 
Often 
12843 1.903 0.804 1 3 
Rightist Scale: 0 (Left) – 10 (Right) 11797 5.082 2.080 0 10 
Numeracy The higher the better 14243 3.659 1.038 1 5 
Post-Secondary ISCED>=4 14008 0.296 0.457 0 1 
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Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Education 
Quintiles of real assets Derived from  a ppp-adjusted 
rough variable 
14243 3.159 1.562 1 5 
Home-ownership Imputations: dummy derived 
from homev 
14243 0.646 0.478 0 1 
IHS of ppp-adjusted 
household income 
Inverse hyperbolic sine of hh 
income, ppp-adjusted 
14243 10.885 1.215 0 14.9 
Health (ADL 
limitations) 
 
Dummy, =1 if a respondent 
has 1 to 6 limitations, zero if 
s/he reports 0 limitations; 
14194 0.113 0.317 0 1 
Female Gender 14243 0.543 0.498 0 1 
Partner in household =1 if there is a partner inside 
the household 
14243 0.596 0.491 0 1 
Age  14243 66.189 10.502 50 104 
Household size  14243 1.940 0.959 1 10 
Number of children  14180 2.085 1.452 0 14 
 
 
6.2 Distribution of the Dependent and Selected Independent 
Variables by the Linguistic Communities 
6. 2.1 Dependent Variables 
Graphical evidence in Table 4 represents ownership rates of all the three kinds of 
financial assets by linguistic community. It is evident that there are quite a few thought-
provoking patterns across the chosen groups. For example, the German-speakers behave 
differently in the 3 countries (this pattern repeats itself for all the figures). The same 
pattern of financial behavior characterizes also Flemish and Dutch communities across all 
the outcomes; among the Flemish the fraction of assets holding is always much higher 
than among the Dutch. For other communities the patterns are changing. With respect to 
directly and indirectly held stocks Italian-speakers behave identically in Italy and 
Switzerland (Figure 4). Italians in Italy own much more of risky assets (stocks, bonds 
and/or mutual funds) than Italian speakers in Switzerland (Figure 5). This finding is in 
line with the tradition of purchasing government bonds as a type of investing money in 
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Italy. The same is true about Italian speakers with respect to the risky assets plus 
individual retirement accounts (Figure 6). Finally, French in France and Switzerland 
behave identically with respect to stock-holding; while in Belgium the fraction of French-
speaking stock-holders is lower (Figure 4). With respect to the risky assets, French in 
Switzerland have a higher fraction than French-speakers in the two other countries 
(Figure 5). Considering the last outcome, i.e. holding risky assets plus IRA, French-
speakers in France have a higher fraction of holders than in the two other countries 
(Figure 6). 
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Table 4. Outcomes: Proportion of hhd's by Linguistic Community 
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6.2.2. Selected Preferences and Social or Cultural Characteristics (See figures 
in the Appendix I) 
There is no much variability among the Linguistic Communities with respect to risk 
aversion (Figure 7, Appendix I). The most risk averse community is Italian-speakers in 
Switzerland, while French-speakers in this country are the least risk averse community. 
Other communities lie in between. There is no much similarity among linguistic groups, 
except for French-speakers in France and Belgium, as well as Dutch and Flemish.  
Regarding volunteering (Figure 8), the Dutch community has the highest rate of 
volunteering, followed by the Swiss communities. German-speakers in Germany 
volunteer less, while other communities have even lower rates, especially the Italian-
speakers in Italy. Attendance of religious organization is characterized by significant 
heterogeneity among the communities (Figure 9). Except for Italian-speakers in both 
countries, all other linguistic communities behave differently. The most active 
participants are German-speakers in Austria, followed by German-speakers in 
Switzerland and the Dutch. The lowest fraction of participants is found in France, while 
other communities lie in between. Also the respondents’ feeling of control over what 
happens in their life is characterized by significant heterogeneity among the communities 
(Figure 10). Again, Italian-speakers in both countries behave identically. The same now 
applies to the French-speakers in France and Switzerland, as well as to the Dutch and 
Flemish communities. The highest fraction of those, feeling control is found among 
German-speaking Swiss, followed by Austrians. The lowest fraction is found among 
French-speaking Belgians. Other communities lie in between. Figures 11 and 12 report 
distribution of the measures of optimism. There is no much variability with respect to the 
distribution of respondents’ feeling that life is full of opportunities (Figure 11). The 
highest fractions of respondents optimistic in terms of this variable are found among 
Swiss linguistic communities, as well as the Dutch. The lowest fraction is found among 
Italian-speakers in Italy. Other communities lie in between. Regarding the respondents’ 
feeling that future looks good (Figure 12), again, the highest rates of optimism are found 
among Swiss linguistic communities (with the highest fraction among German-speakers), 
as well as the Dutch, but now also among Austrians. French-speakers in Belgium show 
less optimism. Other communities lie in between. Finally, I report findings about trust in 
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God by linguistic community (Figure 13). I assume that the respondents, who answered 
that they never pray, are secular. The most secular community is French-speakers in 
France (however this finding should be treated with caution, because it was asked only to 
the new respondents in Wave 4). The German-speakers are identical in terms of 
secularity, but also very similar in terms of the composition with moderate and strong 
believers. Switzerland and Belgium show that there is similarity with respect to 
religiosity among the linguistic communities in these countries. Finally, the linguistic 
community that behaves identically in terms of secularity, despite living in different 
countries, is the Dutch and Flemish.  
 
6.3. Empirical Strategy 
To test the hypothesis that belonging to different linguistic communities in Europe 
matters for financial behavior of older adults I use the Linear Probability Model (LPM). I 
ran 4 OLS regressions, where each OLS adds more controls to the 1
st
 - baseline – model. 
I regress three kinds of household financial behavior (see Table 5) on these 4 models (see 
Table 6).  
Table 5. Outcomes: 3 kinds of financial behavior 
1
st
 Outcome  Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect) 
  
2
nd
 Outcome  Risky Assets (holding stocks and/or BONDS) 
  
3
rd
 Outcome  Risky Assets + IRA 
 
First, the base-line model explains differences in the outcome only by belonging to a 
linguistic community. Then, in the second model in addition to the language dummies, I 
also include objective socio-economic characteristics, such as quintiles of real assets, 
inverse hyperbolic sine of ppp-adjusted household disposable income, home-ownership, 
education, health (ADL limitations) and a measure of cognitive abilities (numeracy). The 
second model also includes demographic variables (gender and age), as well as social 
capital variables, having a partner in the household, household size and number of 
children. In the third model I added to the above variables also respondents' subjective 
preferences, as suggested by literature on financial market participation (risk aversion and 
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political orientation). Finally, in the 4
th
 model social/cultural characteristics were added 
as explanatory variables. These included the measure of trusting other people, 
participating in volunteer activities, optimism (life is full of opportunities and future 
looks good), attendance of a religious organization, and finally a measure of trusting in 
god (as captured by the frequency of prayer).  
 
Table 6. Description of the 4 Models 
Model 1 Only Country/Language Interactions Dummies 
  
Model 2 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics 
  
Model 3 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences 
  
Model 4 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences + Social/Cultural Characteristics 
 
Table 7 provides illustration of the LPM strategy. In every regression table (Table 8, 
Table 10 and Table 12), each of the 4 models (described above) contains 2 columns. The 
first column refers to a LPM with country dummies, whereas the second refers to the 
linguistic communities (interaction terms of country and language). The entire regression 
tables are placed the Appendix II. In the section 5.4 below, I present only the main 
findings, i.e. the coefficients for country dummies and for linguistic communities, 
without showing the controls. In addition, below each regression table, I also present 
graphical illustration, which compares the regression coefficients for country dummies 
with the country-language interaction terms. 
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Table 7. Description of the LPM Procedure 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Country 
Dummies 
Ling. 
Com. 
Country 
Dummies 
Ling. 
Com. 
Country 
Dummies 
Ling. 
Com. 
Country 
Dummies 
Ling. 
Com. 
Only Country or 
Linguistic 
Dummies 
V V V V V V V V 
         
+ Objective 
Characteristics 
  V V V V V V 
         
+ Subjective 
preferences 
    V V V V 
         
+ 
Social/Cultural 
Variables  
      V V 
 
The main variable of interest in the current investigation is belonging to one of the 
linguistic groups. Hence, after running 4 OLS models for each of 3 kinds of financial 
behavior I performed F-Test for joint equality of the same linguistic group across 
countries, as well as for the joint equality of different linguistic groups within countries, 
where different linguistic groups coexist, i.e. Switzerland and Belgium. Next, to address 
the issue of clustering the standard errors by the linguistic communities, as suggested by 
Cameron and Miller (2015), I performed an additional analysis in the Appendix III (for 
more details see section Discussion). Finally, as a robustness check I performed the same 
analysis, using the probit model (see Appendix IV), which confirmed my findings, using 
the LPM. 
 
6.4. Multivariate Analysis 
1 Outcome:  Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect) 
Table 8 shows that – even after accounting for a wide set of controls – belonging to 
different linguistic communities matters in determining stock-market participation. To 
present these results I created graphical evidence below this table, and used F-test 
analyses to formally confirm the results (Table 15 and Table 16). Italian-speakers in 
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Northern Italy are significantly less likely to hold this type of financial assets than the 
reference group (Germans in the South Germany); however the significance and 
magnitude of the coefficient decrease after addition of the objective characteristics. 
Swiss Italian-speakers, as well, are less likely to hold this type of financial assets than the 
reference group, but significance of the coefficient disappears after addition of the 
objective characteristics and the magnitude is decreasing. Table 15 (Post-Estimation 
Results of the F-Test) shows that when we consider the pure stock-holding, it is evident 
that already in the 1
st
 model we fail to reject the hypothesis that Italian-speakers in the 
North of Italy behave identically to the Italian-speakers in Switzerland.  
If we look at German-speakers, while Austrians always  are significantly less likely to 
hold this type of financial assets than the reference group (Germans in the South 
Germany), Swiss German-speakers are  more likely to hold them than the reference group 
until the subjective preferences are included (in the 3
rd
 model), when their stock-holding 
becomes indistinguishable from that in South Germany. Post-Estimation Results of the F-
Test (Table 15) confirm that no variables-block in my models is able to explain the fact 
that the identity in stock-holding among German-speakers must be rejected, as well as the 
identity of this behavior between Dutch and Flemish-speakers. Dutch and Flemish-
speakers are always indistinguishable from the reference group; however the coefficient 
for the Dutch dummy is always negative, while for the Flemish it is positive.  
French-speakers represent a more interesting case. While the behavior of French-
speakers in France and in Switzerland is not distinguishable from the reference group 
(German-speakers in South Germany), French-speakers in Belgium alone are 
significantly less likely to have stocks, however the 4
th
 model diminishes the explanatory 
power of this group, which contributes to closing the gap in behavioral differences 
between Francophone populations in different countries. Post-Estimation Results (Table 
15) show the change in p-values of the F-Test for rejection of the hypothesis that the 
stock-holding behavior of French-speakers is identical. The test becomes less significant 
with introducing each new block of regressors, and in the last model – after adding the 
cultural characteristics – we cannot anymore reject the identity of the behavior at 95% 
level. This finding should be attributed to the decrease in explanatory power of the 
dummy for French-speakers in Belgium. 
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In addition (see Table 8 in Appendix II), with respect to subjective preferences and 
social/cultural variables, being less risk-averse and having more right-wing political 
orientation (perhaps not surprisingly) increase stock-market participation. Finally, 
cultural traits, such as volunteering and, especially, trusting other people are positively 
correlated with the stock-market participation. 
 
Table 8: LPM. OLS. Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect), 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Country/ 
Linguistic 
Communities 
Dummies 
        AT -0.151*** 
 
-0.105*** 
 
-0.113*** 
 
-0.120*** 
 
 
[0.029] 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.030] 
 
         CH 0.04 
 
0.032 
 
0.021 
 
0.014 
 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
 
         IT_N -0.107** 
 
-0.071* 
 
-0.084* 
 
-0.076* 
 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         NL -0.047 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.045 
 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
 
         FR_E -0.036 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.005 
 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.039] 
 
         BE -0.02 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.012 
 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.151*** 
 
-0.107*** 
 
-0.115*** 
 
-0.120*** 
  
[0.029] 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.030] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.072* 
 
0.062* 
 
0.052 
 
0.048 
  
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.032] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
l_IT_it 
 
-0.107** 
 
-0.071* 
 
-0.085* 
 
-0.078* 
  
[0.033] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.106* 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.058 
 
-0.063 
  
[0.044] 
 
[0.046] 
 
[0.049] 
 
[0.049] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.007 
  
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.039] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.057 
  
[0.033] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.088** 
 
-0.060* 
 
-0.067* 
 
-0.063* 
  
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.042 
  
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.052 
 
0.047 
 
0.042 
 
0.041 
  
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.032] 
         _cons 0.231*** 0.231*** -0.204*** -0.152** -0.270*** -0.215*** -0.319*** -0.256*** 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.047] [0.046] [0.052] [0.052] [0.054] [0.054] 
Controls 
  
V V V V V V 
N 13749 13749 13516 13516 11178 11178 10842 10842 
r2 0.032 0.044 0.13 0.137 0.18 0.188 0.182 0.189 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In addition to the regression tables I also present graphical illustration (Table 9), 
comparing the regression coefficients (from the Table 8). Each panel in the table 
corresponds to one of the 4 Models; it compares country dummies (the upper plot) with 
the country-language interaction terms (the lower plot) as deviations from South 
Germany and German-speakers in South Germany (respectively). Table 9 demonstrates 
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the influence of each of 4 variables-blocks (Models) on country and linguistic 
communities’ dummies.  
 
Table 9: Graphical illustration for influence of the 4 Models on country (the upper plot in 
each panel) and linguistic communities’ dummies (the lower plot in each panel), as 
deviations from South Germany and German-speakers in South Germany (respectively) 
 
  
42 
 
2 Outcome:  Risky Assets (holding stocks and/or bonds and/or mutual funds) 
Table 10 shows that – even after accounting for a wide set of controls – belonging to 
different linguistic communities (especially to the Francophone community) matters in 
determining holding of Risky Assets. Italian-speakers in Northern Italy are 
indistinguishable from the reference group and are unaffected by addition of explanatory 
variables, while Swiss Italian-speakers are significantly less likely to hold this type of 
assets than the reference group, but this significance decreases a little after addition of the 
objective characteristics. As to the German-speakers, different models also do not 
change much the coefficients of the linguistic groups; Austrians are significantly less 
likely to hold risky assets than the reference group, while Swiss German-speakers are 
indistinguishable from the reference group. Finally, Dutch are unaffected by addition of 
explanatory variables and are significantly less likely to hold this type of assets than the 
reference group, while Flemish are indistinguishable and unaffected. Post-Estimation 
Results of the F-Test (Table 15) confirm that no variables-blocks in my models are able 
to explain the fact that the identity in this financial behavior must be rejected among 
Italian-speakers in the North of Italy and the Italian-speakers in Switzerland, as well as 
among German-speakers and Dutch and Flemish-speakers. 
Again, Francophone populations represent a special case. All the three French-
speaking groups are significantly less likely to hold risky assets than the reference group. 
Adding blocks of variables does not seem significantly alter explanatory power of the 2 
groups, but only of the Swiss French-speakers, and adding the subjective preferences 
increase its significance to 99.9% level. Post-Estimation Results of the F-Test (Table 15) 
show that the identity of their financial behavior cannot be rejected already after 
introducing the objective characteristics. 
In addition (see Table 10 in Appendix II), again, being less risk-averse increases 
stocks- and bonds-holding, however political orientation plays no role in determining this 
kind of behavior. Finally, cultural traits, such as trusting other people, future looks good 
and especially volunteering are positively correlated with the stocks- and bonds-holding. 
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Table 10: OLS. Risky Assets (holding of stocks and bonds and/or mutual funds), 50+, 
HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Country/ 
Linguistic 
Communities 
Dummies 
        AT -0.255*** 
 
-0.197*** 
 
-0.213*** 
 
-0.220*** 
 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.033] 
 
         CH 0.014 
 
0.001 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.035 
 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         IT_N -0.021 
 
0.024 
 
0.01 
 
0.024 
 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.040] 
 
         NL -0.168*** 
 
-0.148*** 
 
-0.167*** 
 
-0.180*** 
 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         FR_E -0.155*** 
 
-0.129*** 
 
-0.162*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.041] 
 
         BE -0.090** 
 
-0.077* 
 
-0.092** 
 
-0.094** 
 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.255*** 
 
-0.199*** 
 
-0.215*** 
 
-0.219*** 
  
[0.033] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.033] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.066 
 
0.048 
 
0.021 
 
0.013 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.035] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.021 
 
0.023 
 
0.009 
 
0.022 
  
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.040] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.205*** 
 
-0.171** 
 
-0.144* 
 
-0.163** 
  
[0.052] 
 
[0.054] 
 
[0.057] 
 
[0.057] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.155*** 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.172*** 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.041] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.097** 
 
-0.102** 
 
-0.137*** 
 
-0.142*** 
  
[0.037] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.037] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
-0.140*** 
  
[0.034] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.168*** 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.177*** 
  
[0.034] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_FL_be 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.049 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.035] 
         _cons 0.399*** 0.399*** -0.344*** -0.284*** -0.387*** -0.329*** -0.447*** -0.381*** 
 
[0.033] [0.033] [0.053] [0.053] [0.058] [0.058] [0.060] [0.060] 
Controls 
  
V V V V V V 
N 13875 13875 13637 13637 11259 11259 10914 10914 
r2 0.047 0.062 0.172 0.181 0.229 0.237 0.234 0.242 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Below there is graphical evidence about influence of each of 4 variables-block on 
country and linguistic communities’ dummies as deviations from the reference categories 
(i.e. South Germany and German-speakers, living in South Germany). See panels 1 – 4. 
Looking at the Model 4 (the last panel of the Table 11), an additional remark must be 
made with respect to this financial behavior. The older population in Belgium as a 
country is less likely to hold risky assets than the reference country (South Germany). 
However, this fact should be attributed to its French-speakers' behavior, while Belgian 
Flemish-speakers behave similarly to the reference group. Also Switzerland as a country 
is indistinguishable from South Germany, but this is only because of the behavior of the 
country's German-speakers (which is identical to the reference group), while French- and 
Italian-speaker respondents are significantly less likely to hold risky assets. 
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Table 11: Graphical illustration for influence of the 4 Models on country (the upper plot 
in each panel) and linguistic communities’ dummies (the lower plot in each panel), as 
deviations from South Germany and German-speakers in South Germany (respectively) 
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3     Outcome:  Risky Assets (holding stocks and/or bonds and/or mutual funds) plus 
individual retirement accounts (IRA) 
 
Table 12 shows that – even after accounting for a wide set of controls – belonging to 
different linguistic communities (especially to the Francophone community) matters also 
in determining holding of Risky Assets plus IRA. As to the German-speakers, different 
models do not change much the coefficients of Austrians, who are significantly less likely 
to hold this type of financial assets than the reference group, while Swiss German-
speakers are significantly more likely to hold them than the reference group; however the 
magnitude of the coefficient decreases after adding each new variables block. Dutch are 
almost unaffected by addition of explanatory variables and are significantly less likely to 
hold this type of assets than the reference group, while Flemish are significantly more 
likely than the reference group and addition of each variables-block causes decrease in 
significance and magnitude of the coefficient, especially after adding the subjective 
preferences. The Post-Estimation Results of the F-Test (Table 15) confirm that no 
variables-block in my models is able to explain the fact that the identity in this financial 
behavior must be rejected among German-speakers, as well as among Dutch and 
Flemish-speakers. 
As to Italian-speakers in the North of Italy and the Italian-speakers in Switzerland, as 
well as (especially) the Francophone communities, the picture is more involved. Italian-
speakers in Northern Italy are indistinguishable from the reference group, however the 
magnitude of the coefficient is decreasing with each additional bock of variables and 
after adding cultural ones, the sign becomes positive. Swiss Italian-speakers are 
significantly less likely to hold this type of assets than the reference group, but 
significance and magnitude of the coefficient decrease after addition of the objective 
characteristics and especially after addition of the subjective preferences. The Post-
Estimation Results of the F-Test (Table 15) confirm that for the Italian-speakers adding 
risk-aversion (political orientation is not significant in this model) makes less significant 
the rejection of the identity.  
Finally, Belgian French-speakers are indistinguishable from the reference group, and 
unaffected by addition of the variable-blocks. The dummy for Swiss French-speakers is 
also insignificant; however the magnitude of its coefficient decreases with addition of 
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each variables block. Those in France are changing their sign to negative and become 
insignificant after adding subjective preferences, thereby becoming equivalent to other 
Francophone groups. The Post-Estimation Results of the F-Test (Table 15) shows that for 
the Francophone populations adding risk-aversion makes impossible the rejection of the 
identity in this financial behavior. 
In addition (see Table 12 in Appendix II), again, being less risk-averse increases risky 
assets-holding plus IRA, however, as before, political orientation plays no role in 
determining this kind of behavior. Finally, the cultural traits, such as trusting other 
people, future looks good, attending a religious organization, and especially volunteering 
are positively and significantly correlated with assets-holding plus IRA; at the same time 
frequent prayer is negatively related with this type of financial behavior. 
 
Table 12: OLS. Risky Assets plus IRA, 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Country/ 
Linguistic 
Communities 
Dummies 
        AT -0.208*** 
 
-0.166*** 
 
-0.177*** 
 
-0.191*** 
 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         CH 0.129*** 
 
0.095** 
 
0.079* 
 
0.063 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.035] 
 
         IT_N -0.032 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.008 
 
0.005 
 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.041] 
 
[0.041] 
 
         NL -0.147*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
-0.155*** 
 
-0.175*** 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.035] 
 
         FR_E 0.067 
 
0.085** 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.008 
 
 
[0.036] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.044] 
 
[0.045] 
 
         BE 0.055 
 
0.046 
 
0.038 
 
0.033 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.035] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.208*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 
-0.180*** 
 
-0.191*** 
  
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.191*** 
 
0.154*** 
 
0.135*** 
 
0.121*** 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.036] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.009 
 
0.002 
  
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.041] 
 
[0.041] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.182*** 
 
-0.159** 
 
-0.124* 
 
-0.135* 
  
[0.055] 
 
[0.057] 
 
[0.059] 
 
[0.060] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
0.067 
 
0.084* 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.012 
  
[0.036] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.044] 
 
[0.045] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.056 
  
[0.039] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.039] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.031 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.036] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.140*** 
 
-0.153*** 
 
-0.171*** 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.035] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.147*** 
 
0.111*** 
 
0.105** 
 
0.096** 
  
[0.036] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.036] 
         _cons 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.007 0.084 0.045 0.124 -0.006 0.084 
 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.059] [0.059] [0.065] [0.065] [0.068] [0.067] 
Controls 
  
V V V V V V 
N 13871 13871 13639 13639 11260 11260 10923 10923 
r2 0.075 0.092 0.227 0.238 0.266 0.277 0.27 0.281 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Below there is graphical evidence about influence of each of 4 variables-block on 
country and linguistic communities’ dummies as deviations from the reference categories 
(i.e. South Germany and German-speakers, living in South Germany). See panels 1 – 4. 
Looking at the panel for the Model 4 (the last panel of the Table 13), we remark that 
with respect to this financial behavior Switzerland as a country behaves indistinguishably 
from the reference country (South Germany). However, this is due to the fact that Italian-
speakers are less likely to have this kind of assets than the reference group; and the 
French-speakers are indistinguishable from the reference group. However, as was 
mentioned above, the Swiss German-speakers are significantly more likely to have this 
asset than the reference group. A similar picture is observed with respect to Belgium. As 
a country it is indistinguishable from South Germany, which is due to the behavior of the 
French-speakers, while (as was mentioned above) the Belgian Flemish-speakers are 
significantly more likely to have this asset than the reference group. 
 
  
50 
 
Table 13: Graphical illustration for influence of the 4 Models on country (the upper plot 
in each panel) and linguistic communities’ dummies (the lower plot in each panel), as 
deviations from South Germany and German-speakers in South Germany (respectively) 
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Table 15. Post-Estimation: Results of the F-Test for Equality of Language 
Interactions Dummies 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3  Model  4 
F- Test P-value P-value P-value P-value 
Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect) 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  0.0000 0.0011 0.0542 0.0906 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  0.9885 0.7766 0.5245 0.7305 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Risky Assets (holding of stocks and bonds and/or mutual funds) 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  0.0039 0.3130 0.5951 0.4777 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  0.0001 0.0001 0.0033 0.0003 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Risky Assets plus IRA 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  0.0000 0.0000 0.4884 0.3677 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  0.0019 0.0037 0.0348 0.0119 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
For all the Kinds of Financial Behavior, in Switzerland and Belgium all the 
Linguistic Communities Behave Differently  
 
Finally, and perhaps very importantly, the results of the F-Test (Table 16) show that 
for all the three kinds of financial behavior (holding of Stocks, Risky Assets and Risky 
Assets plus IRA), after controlling for all possible determinants of private financial 
behavior, the hypothesis that the linguistic groups in Switzerland (German-, Italian- and 
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French-speakers) behave identically in the country's financial market must be rejected, 
despite the isomorphism of the financial and other institutions. The same is true for the 
French- and Flemish-speakers in Belgium. In other words, the behavior of different 
linguistic groups isn't the same, despite they face identical institutions.  
 
Table 16. F-Test for Equality of Language Groups in Switzerland and Belgium, Same 
Results for all the three Outcomes: holding of Stocks, Risky Assets and Risky Assets plus 
IRA 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3  Model  4 
F- Test P-value P-value P-value P-value 
test (_b[l_DE_ch] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_IT_ch])  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_FR_be] = _b[l_FL_be])  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
7. Discussion 
The limited participation of older households in the financial market has received 
considerable attention in the economic literature. There are several reasons for this. In the 
recent decades European Union faces multiple macro-economic processes, such as 
increasing dependency ratios and the pressure of reforms calling for harmonization of 
institutions and policies across the member states (Haliassos et al., 2014). Governments 
responded to these processes by attempts to liberalize financial markets in order to 
encourage the wide society to exploit the new financial instruments. First, massive 
entrance of retirees and workers was expected to bring supplementary retirement income 
in order to address the declining provision of public social security. The second aim was 
to change political preferences to “enhance the popularity of capitalism and laissez faire 
by allowing more people to own a share of the pie” (Guiso et al., 2003). However, as 
Haliassos, Jansson and Karabulut (2014) put it considerable cultural diversity in Europe 
raises the question, whether harmonization of institutions and policies is plausible, given 
that diverse cultural predispositions of European communities lead to substantial 
differences in financial behavior.  
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The previous research found striking differences in financial behavior among older 
adults across European countries. Recently many other noneconomic factors were found 
as important determinants of the household finance behavior of older adults, such as 
effects of social institutions and culture. However, belonging to different linguistic 
groups in a country; or to the same linguistic group across different countries was usually 
neglected as a possible predictor of financial behavior. This study fills this gap in the 
research and compares financial behavior (namely, holding stocks, bonds, mutual funds 
and/or individual retirement accounts) of older adults, belonging to 10 different European 
linguistic communities: German-speakers in South Germany, German-speakers in Austria 
and in Switzerland; Italian-speakers in Northern Italy and those in Switzerland; French-
speakers in East France, in Belgium and in Switzerland; and finally Dutch in the 
Netherlands and Flemish in Belgium. I hypothesized that belonging to different linguistic 
communities in Europe might serve as a proxy for a latent construct of having/lacking 
tastes, skills and values that are necessary for holding stocks, bonds, mutual funds and/or 
IRA. My second hypothesis was that if belonging to a linguistic community matters, it 
might explain some of the cross-country differences in all the three outcomes. The 
research question was: Does belonging to a linguistic community in Europe matter in 
determining the three kinds of financial behavior of older adults? Main findings provide 
support for my hypotheses. 
1. Speaking Italian (either in Italy or in Switzerland) and French (in France, Belgium and 
Switzerland) is responsible for identical holding of stocks (directly or indirectly) within 
these groups in the respective countries. Both groups behave almost indistinguishably 
from the German-speakers in Germany (the reference group). In addition, speaking 
French predicts identical behavior with respect to holding risky assets across all the three 
countries. French-speakers are significantly less likely to hold these assets than the 
German-speakers in Germany. Finally, French language is associated with identical 
holding of risky assets plus IRA across the three countries; French-speakers are 
indistinguishable from the reference group. This persistence of behavior is observed 
despite the respondents are living in different institutional contexts and after accounting 
for a rich set of household characteristics. 
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2. Importantly, for all the three kinds of financial participation (holding of stocks, risky 
assets and/or risky assets plus IRA), after controlling for all possible determinants of 
private financial decisions, the behavior of different linguistic groups in Switzerland  and 
Belgium isn't the same, despite they face identical institutions. 
3. The financial behavior of German-speakers is different across countries for all the 
three outcomes. Considering the pure stock-holding, while Austrians are significantly less 
likely to hold this type of assets than Germans in the South Germany, after introducing all 
the controls the Swiss German-speakers behave identically to those in South Germany. 
The same applies to holding of the risky assets. When considering risky assets plus IRA, 
Austrians are again significantly less likely to hold this type of assets than Germans in the 
South Germany, while Swiss German-speakers are significantly more likely to hold this 
type of assets than the reference group. 
4. Also the financial behavior of Dutch- and Flemish-speakers is different for all the three 
outcomes. Considering the pure stock-holding, the Dutch and Flemish-speakers are 
indistinguishable from the reference group; however the coefficient for the Dutch dummy 
is negative, while for the Flemish it is positive. With respect to the risky assets, Dutch are 
significantly less likely to hold this type of assets than the reference group, while Flemish 
are indistinguishable from it. Finally, when considering risky assets plus IRA, Dutch are 
again significantly less likely to hold also this type of assets than the reference group, 
while Flemish are significantly more likely to hold this type of assets than the reference 
group. 
5. With respect to holding risky assets, Italian-speakers in the North of Italy and the 
Italian-speakers in Switzerland behave differently. Italian-speakers in Northern Italy are 
indistinguishable from the reference group, while Swiss Italian-speakers are significantly 
less likely to hold this type of assets than the reference group. Finally, when risky assets 
plus IRA is considered, Italian-speakers in Northern Italy are also indistinguishable from 
the reference group. Swiss Italian-speakers are significantly less likely to hold also this 
type of assets than the reference group. This finding is consistent with the pattern of 
holding the governmental bonds, predominant in Italy. As was mentioned above, Guiso 
and Jappelli (2002) document that Italian households are still characterized by the old 
tradition of holding their financial wealth in the form of transaction accounts or Italian 
governmental bonds. 
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Another important result of my analysis is decomposing some of the cross-country 
differences: 
6. Although older population in Belgium as a country is less likely to hold risky assets 
(stocks, bonds, mutual funds) than the reference country (South Germany), this fact 
should be attributed to its French-speakers' behavior. However, Belgian Flemish-speakers 
behave similarly to the reference group. Also Switzerland as a country is 
indistinguishable from South Germany, but this is only because of the behavior of the 
country's German-speakers (which is identical to the reference group), while French- and 
Italian-speakers are significantly less likely to hold risky assets. 
7. Although older population in Switzerland as a country behaves indistinguishably from 
the reference country (South Germany) with respect to holding risky assets plus IRA, this 
is due to the fact that Italian-speakers are less likely to have this kind of assets than the 
reference group; and the French-speakers are indistinguishable from the reference group. 
However, the Swiss German-speakers are significantly more likely to have this asset than 
the reference group. A similar picture is observed with respect to Belgium. As a country 
it is indistinguishable from South Germany, which is due to the behavior of the French-
speakers, while the Belgian Flemish-speakers are significantly more likely to have this 
asset than the reference group. 
I summarize these findings by a statement that belonging to a linguistic community in 
Europe matters in determining the three kinds of financial behavior of older adults. Next I 
provide interpretation for these findings. In the current investigation I use a set of 
social/cultural variables, available in SHARE: trusting others, risk preferences, political 
preferences, optimism, sense of control, volunteering, and religiosity. However, as was 
hypothesized they do not capture all cultural differences in financial behavior. Namely, 
the linguistic communities dummies remain significant also after adding the available 
measures of preferences and cultural/social characteristics, therefore, as was 
hypothesized, belonging to European linguistic communities might include some latent 
cultural aspects. For example, because in the data that I have at my disposal, there are no 
direct questions about such cultural features as thrift, hard work, tenacity, honesty, 
tolerance etc., I hypothesize that they might be proxied by linguistic communities. The 
“linguistic communities” might contain certain skills and world views that are important 
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predictors for holding financial instruments. For example, these skills and opinions might 
not be at the disposal of such linguistic groups as French-speakers, Italian-speakers and 
German-speakers in Austria. Hence, for these linguistic communities the explanation of 
persistent cultural predisposition may apply. However, for example, the difference 
between the Dutch and the Flemish communities may deal with the negative side of 
liberalization policies. 
One explanation for persistence of the cultural predispositions may relate to stable 
religious beliefs and institutions; the other might be connected to the Early-Life 
conditions and inheritances from family. Thus, for Switzerland, Max Weber’s reasoning 
might apply, since the division between Protestants and Catholics in Switzerland is 
pronounced and corresponds to German as opposed to the French and Italian linguistic 
communities. It should be remembered that in Switzerland the institutional environment 
is identical (Eugster et al., 2011), hence language bears some persistent cultural 
characteristics. As was stated above, the Protestant ethics puts stress on such attitudes as 
hard labor and avoiding enjoyment of wealth, as well as idleness. This fact may explain 
why in Switzerland the German-speakers are more likely to rely on use of financial 
instruments than other Swiss communities. The same reasoning might explain why 
Catholic German-speakers in Austria are less likely to hold all the kinds of financial 
instruments than Swiss German-speakers. 
However, given the identity of the behavior of the French-speakers across-countries, it 
also might be that the finding should be attributed to some specificities of the French 
language/culture, which might also serve as an explanation for the differences between 
the French and Flemish communities in Belgium. Language is a “slowly-moving 
component of culture,” i.e. it is not so easy to change it. Specifically, the pervasive role 
of the mother-tongue must be considered, being a part of the Early-Life Conditions. 
Mother-tongue acquisition occurs early in life. Hence, it is one of the parameters that 
parents and other early life agents teach children in the same form as they themselves 
have learned from the previous generations (Bisin and Verdier, 2000). Therefore, the 
mother-tongue bears “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social 
groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso et al., 2006). For 
example, France (and, perhaps, the “Latin” cultures, in general) is consistently described 
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as a country with relatively low financial and computer literacy, as well as low 
transparency of financial institutions (Guiso et al., 2003). In addition, the authors claim, 
mutual funds are mostly distributed by banks in a concentrated way, rather than by 
brokers (as in Anglo-Saxon cultures). It might be conjectured that all these equally apply 
to the “French tradition” in general. Another aspect is a possible specificity of the French 
communication-skills culture, with higher reliance on advice of specialists, rather than on 
personal effort. With respect to the increased participation in the financial market Guiso, 
Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) point out to a problem of biased interpretation of the 
information, provided by bank clerks to the investors. This problem might arise if the 
culture promotes reliance on explanations by bank clerks, rather than active acquisition of 
financial literacy. In general, mother-tongue as a part of the Early-Life environment leads 
to formation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, which are key determinants of the 
economic success of children at an adult age (Mazzonna, 2014). As an early life 
endowment, it may capture transmission of such important for later financial behavior 
qualities as: the preference to rely on authority (and thus giving up personal opinion in 
favor of an ‘expert’s’ view) vs. forming own independent opinion, based on acquired 
knowledge. In addition, if in accordance with Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007) 
view, language is the stable factor that constrains the development of cultural norms, then 
little might be done to decrease the pervasiveness of the mother-tongue influence. 
The differences between the Dutch and Flemish populations might relate to 
institutional differences between the Netherlands and Belgium. The Netherlands is 
characterized as one of the most liberalized economies in the EU. The Netherlands and 
Sweden are countries where social security has a more limited role than in other 
European countries (Guiso et al., 2003; see also Table 1). The Netherlands is 
characterized by higher transparency of financial institutions. Finally, the share of the 
stock market held by Dutch banks is zero, meaning that the stock market is completely 
privatized and open to the general public. These facts, as was explained above, apparently 
led to massive entrance of inexperienced investors. New entrants are likely to be of lower 
education than experienced stockholders and to have fewer financial means at their 
disposal to withstand the ups and downs of the stock market. Since education tends to 
correlate negatively with risk aversion, the new entrants are also likely to be more risk 
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averse (Guiso et al., 2003). Thus, first Dutch older households might feel less protected 
(due to lower social security coverage) to participate in risky exchanges. Instead 
Belgians, who have more generous public pension system, might feel more protected and 
less afraid to invest in the risky assets. Second, as was mentioned above, using financial 
instruments might not only bring opportunity to increase income, but also increased risks. 
“Excessive or ill-advised trading of stocks can significantly reduce realized returns, and 
poor judgment in allocating retirement wealth can create major financial distress at a 
point in the lifecycle where the potential for offsetting adjustments is quite limited” 
(Guiso et al., 2003, p. 126). Losses may be irreversible when incurred by persons close to 
retirement. All these considerations raise the possibility of massive exodus from the stock 
market. Apparently, this is what we observe in the SHARE, wave 4 (2010/11) data, i.e. 
the massive exodus from the stock market and/or feeling of lack of financial security 
among the Dutch older investors. 
This study has several limitations, which also serve as opportunities for future 
research. Four aspects in particular seem worth mentioning here. First, as follows from 
the discussion about the Netherlands and Belgium, the following research must account 
for institutions. Indeed, as Tabillini (2010) claims, an important question is whether the 
effect of culture on economic outcomes survives the inclusion of variables measuring 
features of institutions. However, Haliassos, Jansson and Karabulut (2014) already have 
shown that both the cultural background and institutional environment are important 
determinants of households’ financial behavior. 
Next important issue is using the “reduced form approach.” Although a very rich 
dataset, SHARE provides quite limited information on respondents’ relevant beliefs and 
opinions; hence I have to link directly the cultural background (belonging to a linguistic 
community) to financial behavior. In relation to this aspect Haliassos, Jansson and 
Karabulut (2014) state that regressions of outcomes directly on cultural differences are 
less informative about the nature of the channel through which culture influences 
economic outcomes than are studies that explore a specific cultural feature. However, in 
the latter case an opposite problem arises that cultural differences, such as a linguistic 
community, might affect financial behavior through multiple cultural features, beyond 
one which is studied. Nevertheless, it is not possible to control for all the channels. 
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Indeed, Tabellini (2010) maintains that “culture” is still a black box. Much more work is 
needed at a microeconomic level to understand which features of individual beliefs and 
social norms are economically relevant… and how they interact with the institutional 
environment” (p. 711). Due to these reasons, as I have already cited, existing research 
uses the “reduced form approach,” despite the possible limitation. 
Third, it must be remembered that in Switzerland a couple could speak a few 
languages, or in other words couples might be mixed with respect to the linguistic 
community, but they must choose a language to answer the interview. What might be the 
interpretation of my results in this case? I assumed that the mixed couples of 50 and older 
are not a common case, and rather their proportion is negligible. Moreover, the language 
that they choose to answer the questionnaire is the one they feel more comfortable for 
communication within the household. 
Lastly, I would like to point out to a very recent article by Cameron and Miller (2015). 
The authors raise concern about inference, when using models where observations can be 
grouped into clusters, with model “errors uncorrelated across clusters but correlated 
within cluster,” for example data, where observations are grouped according to village or 
a state. The issue is that errors for individuals in the same cluster may be correlated, 
while model errors for individuals in different clusters are assumed to be uncorrelated. In 
theory, “failure to control for this within-cluster error correlation can lead to using 
standard errors that are too small, with consequent overly-narrow confidence intervals, 
overly-large t-statistics, and over-rejection of true null hypotheses” (p. 5). However, the 
authors also mention that in practice “it is possible for cluster-robust errors to actually 
be smaller than default standard errors” (p. 17). One of the main assumptions for using 
this method is that the number of clusters (G) is very large, or tends to infinity. In 
particular, “the cluster-robust estimate of the variance matrix (CRVE) of the OLS 
estimator ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢[?̂?] is consistent, as 𝐺→∞ (p. 8). In addition, in “richly specified model 
with thousands of observations in far fewer clusters, leading to more regressors than 
clusters, the ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢[?̂?] is rank-deficient, so it will not be possible to perform an overall F 
test of the joint statistical significance of all regressors (p. 11). Unfortunately, in my case 
the number of clusters (10 linguistic communities) is far from infinity, thus the 
assumption for consistent estimate of CRVE is violated. Moreover, I have much more 
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regressors than clusters, hence I am not able to compute the F test. Finally, when using 
OLS, “the cluster-robust standard errors should be multiplied by the square root of 
[𝑁−(𝐾−1)]/[𝑁−𝐺−(𝐾−1)], especially if 𝐺 is small” (p. 15). However, again, since my G 
(10 linguistic communities) is too small, then this number is 
√[𝑁 − (𝐾 − 1)]/[𝑁 − 𝐺 − (𝐾 − 1)]  1. In spite of these possible limitations, I 
addressed this issue in the Appendix III by running the regression with clustering by 
linguistic communities. All in all, the results in the Appendix III look unreliable, since 
contrary to what is expected in theory, in practice I receive very small standard errors, 
much smaller than the standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity. Therefore, clustering 
does not help to solve the issue with model “errors uncorrelated across clusters but 
correlated within cluster.” Thus, little can be done rather than simply taking that issue 
into account, when interpreting the results presented in this paper.  
In conclusion, a few remarks are in place, concerning suggestions how to increase the 
limited participation of the older households in financial markets. In general there are two 
ideas. One is educational policies, while the second is public monitoring of financial 
dealers. Sizeable differences in financial behavior between the linguistic communities 
may suggest the need for policies to iron out cultural predispositions to be able to meet 
the call for harmonization of institutions across European Union (Haliassos et al., 2014). 
However, one may wonder how effective such policies could be if the differences arise 
due to early-life circumstances, as seems to be the case in Switzerland and Belgium 
according to the current research and in the light of findings by Haliassos, Jansson and 
Karabulut, 2014 that statistically significant differences remain across different cultural 
groups of immigrants to Sweden, even among those who have spent the longest time in 
the host country and among those who have become very assimilated. Second, and 
perhaps related, a set of policies is suggested by different authors (e.g. Guiso et al., 2003) 
calls for developing programs to provide the “unsophisticated” investors with basic 
financial education. For these scholars such programs could lead to lower dependence on 
the advice of the non-neutral financial brokers, as well as to lower delegation of the 
portfolio management, thus reducing the risk of frauds by mutual funds’ managers (as 
was described above). The second suggestion is public monitoring and supervision of 
private financial institutions. In particular, it is advised that governments should “punish 
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collusive behavior and discourage practices aimed at limiting customer mobility across 
intermediaries” (Guiso et al., 2003:163). 
To summarize, I have empirically confirmed that belonging to a linguistic community 
in Europe matters for determining the three kinds of financial behavior of older adults. 
Although I control for a set of current social/cultural variables, available in SHARE, 
trusting others, risk preferences, political preferences, optimism, sense of control, 
volunteering, and religiosity, they do not capture all cultural differences in financial 
behavior. Particularly, the linguistic communities’ dummies remain significant also after 
controlling for the latter variables. It might be plausibly conjectured that belonging to 
European linguistic communities might include some latent cultural aspects that my data 
do not contain, e.g. independent thinking, lower reliance on experts’ advice, propensity to 
invest, intuition or courage. Since linguistic community is a “slow moving” aspect of 
culture, which mostly reflects mother-tongue and thus the early life influences, then my 
findings imply that financial behavior of older households is, at least partly, the result of 
the life course. This claim raises question about effectiveness of such policy suggestions 
as “well-designed financial education programs” (van Rooij, et al., 2011), especially, 
when targeted at linguistic communities, which do not have appropriate tastes, values 
and/or skills. Perhaps, interventions might be more effective at the earlier phases of the 
life-course. 
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Figure 13. Trust in God by Linguistic Community 
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APPENDIX II 
Linear Probability Models 
 
 
Model 1 Only Country/Language Interactions Dummies 
  
Model 2 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics 
  
Model 3 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences 
  
Model 4 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences + Social/Cultural Characteristics 
 
Table 8 shows – in addition to the main findings reported in the paper – that the 
significant predictors of stock-market participation, even after accounting for the 
linguistic group, are having a very high score in numeracy test, having post-secondary 
education, belonging to 4
th
 or 5
th
 quintiles of real assets distribution, high income, having 
less children, being older and having higher household size. 
 
 
Table 8: LPM. OLS. Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect), 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.176*** 0.175*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
     
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.285*** 0.287*** 0.281*** 0.283*** 
     
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] 
         Rightist 
    
0.006*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.005** 
     
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
-0.008 -0.008 -0.01 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 
   
[0.014] [0.014] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
-0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
   
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.018] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.025 0.025 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.014 
   
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.018] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.082*** 0.078*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.063** 0.060** 
   
[0.015] [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.074*** 0.081*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 
   
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.008 0.011 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.005 
   
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
         3.Real Assets 
  
0.018 0.023 0.019 0.024 0.016 0.021 
   
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.062*** 0.063*** 0.044** 0.047** 0.036* 0.039** 
   
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.170*** 0.171*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.130*** 0.133*** 
   
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
  
0.030*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
household 
income 
   
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Home 
Ownership 
  
-0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 0 -0.004 
   
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
 
  
-0.005 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
   
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
         Female 
  
-0.026*** -0.026*** 0.003 0.003 0 0 
   
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.021* 0.020* 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.006 
   
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] 
         Age 
  
0 -0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 
   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         HH size 
  
0.010* 0.011* 0.010* 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 
   
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
   
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.005*** 0.004** 
       
[0.002] [0.002] 
         Control 
      
0.002 -0.005 
       
[0.008] [0.008] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.007 0.006 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
       
[0.010] [0.009] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.021* 0.017 
       
[0.010] [0.010] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.020* 0.022* 
       
[0.008] [0.008] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.021* 0.017 
       
[0.010] [0.010] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.018* 0.017 
       
[0.009] [0.009] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.013 -0.012 
       
[0.010] [0.009] 
         AT -0.151*** 
 
-0.105*** 
 
-0.113*** 
 
-0.120*** 
 
 
[0.029] 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.030] 
 
         CH 0.04 
 
0.032 
 
0.021 
 
0.014 
 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
 
         IT_N -0.107** 
 
-0.071* 
 
-0.084* 
 
-0.076* 
 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         NL -0.047 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.045 
 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
 
         FR_E -0.036 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.005 
 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.039] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
BE -0.02 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.012 
 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.151*** 
 
-0.107*** 
 
-0.115*** 
 
-0.120*** 
  
[0.029] 
 
[0.027] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.030] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.072* 
 
0.062* 
 
0.052 
 
0.048 
  
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.032] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.107** 
 
-0.071* 
 
-0.085* 
 
-0.078* 
  
[0.033] 
 
[0.030] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.106* 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.058 
 
-0.063 
  
[0.044] 
 
[0.046] 
 
[0.049] 
 
[0.049] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.007 
  
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.039] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.057 
  
[0.033] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.088** 
 
-0.060* 
 
-0.067* 
 
-0.063* 
  
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.042 
  
[0.030] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.031] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.052 
 
0.047 
 
0.042 
 
0.041 
  
[0.031] 
 
[0.028] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.032] 
         _cons 0.231*** 0.231*** -0.204*** -0.152** -0.270*** -0.215*** -0.319*** -0.256*** 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.047] [0.046] [0.052] [0.052] [0.054] [0.054] 
N 13749 13749 13516 13516 11178 11178 10842 10842 
r2 0.032 0.044 0.13 0.137 0.18 0.188 0.182 0.189 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 10 shows that – in addition to the main findings reported in the paper – other 
significant predictors of holding risky assets are having a very high score in Numeracy 
test, having post-secondary education, belonging to 4
th
 or 5
th
 quintiles of real assets 
distribution, high income, having less children and being older.  
 
Table 10: OLS. Risky Assets (holding of stocks and bonds and/or mutual funds), 50+, 
HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.239*** 0.238*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 
     
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.293*** 0.296*** 0.288*** 0.292*** 
     
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] 
         Rightist 
    
0.004* 0.003 0.004 0.003 
     
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
-0.005 -0.006 -0.013 -0.013 -0.021 -0.02 
   
[0.017] [0.017] [0.022] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
0.026 0.027 0.019 0.021 0.011 0.013 
   
[0.016] [0.016] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.023] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.052** 0.052** 0.038 0.037 0.023 0.023 
   
[0.016] [0.016] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.023] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.111*** 0.105*** 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.071** 0.066** 
   
[0.018] [0.018] [0.022] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.103*** 0.111*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.067*** 
   
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.017 0.02 0.014 0.018 0.01 0.014 
   
[0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
         3.Real Assets 
  
0.026 0.032 0.026 0.032 0.019 0.026 
   
[0.017] [0.016] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.082*** 0.086*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.050** 0.056** 
   
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.210*** 0.213*** 0.171*** 0.175*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 
   
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.046*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 
   
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Home 
ownership 
  
0.011 0.006 0.019 0.013 0.021 0.014 
   
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
  
-0.012** -0.009* -0.011* -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 
   
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
         Female 
  
-0.016* -0.016* 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 
   
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.037*** 0.036*** 0.023* 0.021* 0.016 0.015 
   
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
         Age 
  
0.001* 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         HH size 
  
0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
   
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.015*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
   
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.005** 0.005** 
       
[0.002] [0.002] 
         Control 
      
-0.004 -0.013 
       
[0.009] [0.009] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.021 0.021 
       
[0.011] [0.011] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.036** 0.033** 
       
[0.011] [0.011] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.046*** 0.049*** 
       
[0.009] [0.009] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.025* 0.021 
       
[0.012] [0.011] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.019* 0.018 
       
[0.010] [0.009] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.02 -0.02 
       
[0.011] [0.011] 
         AT -0.255*** 
 
-0.197*** 
 
-0.213*** 
 
-0.220*** 
 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.033] 
 
         CH 0.014 
 
0.001 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.035 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         IT_N -0.021 
 
0.024 
 
0.01 
 
0.024 
 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.040] 
 
         NL -0.168*** 
 
-0.148*** 
 
-0.167*** 
 
-0.180*** 
 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         FR_E -0.155*** 
 
-0.129*** 
 
-0.162*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.041] 
 
         BE -0.090** 
 
-0.077* 
 
-0.092** 
 
-0.094** 
 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.255*** 
 
-0.199*** 
 
-0.215*** 
 
-0.219*** 
  
[0.033] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.033] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.066 
 
0.048 
 
0.021 
 
0.013 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.035] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.021 
 
0.023 
 
0.009 
 
0.022 
  
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.040] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.205*** 
 
-0.171** 
 
-0.144* 
 
-0.163** 
  
[0.052] 
 
[0.054] 
 
[0.057] 
 
[0.057] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.155*** 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.172*** 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.041] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.097** 
 
-0.102** 
 
-0.137*** 
 
-0.142*** 
  
[0.037] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.037] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
-0.140*** 
  
[0.034] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.168*** 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.177*** 
  
[0.034] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_FL_be 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.049 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.035] 
         _cons 0.399*** 0.399*** -0.344*** -0.284*** -0.387*** -0.329*** -0.447*** -0.381*** 
 
[0.033] [0.033] [0.053] [0.053] [0.058] [0.058] [0.060] [0.060] 
N 13875 13875 13637 13637 11259 11259 10914 10914 
r2 0.047 0.062 0.172 0.181 0.229 0.237 0.234 0.242 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 12 shows that – in addition to the main findings reported in the paper – other 
significant predictors of holding risky assets plus IRA are having post-secondary 
education (however now Numeracy scores play no role), belonging to 2
nd
, 4
th
 or 5
th
 
quintiles of real assets distribution, high income, home-ownership, and especially being 
younger and having less children. 
 
Table 12: OLS. Risky Assets plus IRA, 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.218*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 
     
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.217*** 0.220*** 0.210*** 0.213*** 
     
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
         Rightist 
    
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
     
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
0 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 
   
[0.020] [0.020] [0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
0.026 0.028 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.003 
   
[0.019] [0.019] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.062** 0.061** 0.038 0.036 0.021 0.021 
   
[0.019] [0.019] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.104*** 0.096*** 0.073** 0.065** 0.054* 0.049 
   
[0.020] [0.020] [0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.120*** 0.131*** 0.087*** 0.098*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 
   
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.044*** 0.049*** 0.042** 0.047*** 0.038** 0.043** 
   
[0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
         3.Real Assets 
  
0.03 0.038* 0.029 0.038* 0.024 0.032 
   
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.096*** 0.102*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.069*** 0.076*** 
   
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.191*** 0.196*** 0.155*** 0.160*** 0.143*** 0.150*** 
   
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.054*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 
   
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
         Home 
ownership 
  
0.035* 0.029* 0.039* 0.032* 0.041** 0.034* 
   
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
  
-0.014** -0.010* -0.011* -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 
   
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
         Female 
  
-0.018* -0.018* 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
   
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.034** 0.032** 0.019 0.017 0.012 0.011 
   
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
         Age 
  
-0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         HH size 
  
0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
   
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
   
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.007*** 0.006** 
       
[0.002] [0.002] 
         Control 
      
0.009 -0.002 
       
[0.009] [0.009] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.02 0.02 
       
[0.013] [0.013] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.035** 0.030* 
       
[0.013] [0.012] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.039*** 0.043*** 
       
[0.010] [0.009] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.035** 0.029* 
       
[0.012] [0.012] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.018 0.017 
       
[0.010] [0.010] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.033** -0.032** 
       
[0.011] [0.011] 
         AT -0.208*** 
 
-0.166*** 
 
-0.177*** 
 
-0.191*** 
 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
 
         CH 0.129*** 
 
0.095** 
 
0.079* 
 
0.063 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.035] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         IT_N -0.032 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.008 
 
0.005 
 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.041] 
 
[0.041] 
 
         NL -0.147*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
-0.155*** 
 
-0.175*** 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.035] 
 
         FR_E 0.067 
 
0.085** 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.008 
 
 
[0.036] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.044] 
 
[0.045] 
 
         BE 0.055 
 
0.046 
 
0.038 
 
0.033 
 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.035] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.208*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 
-0.180*** 
 
-0.191*** 
  
[0.034] 
 
[0.031] 
 
[0.034] 
 
[0.034] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.191*** 
 
0.154*** 
 
0.135*** 
 
0.121*** 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.036] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.009 
 
0.002 
  
[0.040] 
 
[0.037] 
 
[0.041] 
 
[0.041] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.182*** 
 
-0.159** 
 
-0.124* 
 
-0.135* 
  
[0.055] 
 
[0.057] 
 
[0.059] 
 
[0.060] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
0.067 
 
0.084* 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.012 
  
[0.036] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.044] 
 
[0.045] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.056 
  
[0.039] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.039] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.031 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.036] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.140*** 
 
-0.153*** 
 
-0.171*** 
  
[0.035] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.035] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.147*** 
 
0.111*** 
 
0.105** 
 
0.096** 
  
[0.036] 
 
[0.032] 
 
[0.035] 
 
[0.036] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         _cons 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.007 0.084 0.045 0.124 -0.006 0.084 
 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.059] [0.059] [0.065] [0.065] [0.068] [0.067] 
N 13871 13871 13639 13639 11260 11260 10923 10923 
r2 0.075 0.092 0.227 0.238 0.266 0.277 0.27 0.281 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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APPENDIX III 
Standard Errors clustered by Linguistic communities 
 
 
Model 1 Only Country/Language Interactions Dummies 
  
Model 2 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics 
  
Model 3 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences 
  
Model 4 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences + Social/Cultural Characteristics 
 
 
 
Table 1: LPM. OLS. Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect), 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.176*** 0.175*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
     
[0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.017] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.285*** 0.287*** 0.281*** 0.283*** 
     
[0.025] [0.031] [0.027] [0.034] 
         Rightist 
    
0.006 0.005* 0.006* 0.005* 
     
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
-0.008 -0.008 -0.01 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 
   
[0.013] [0.013] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.022] 
         
87 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
3.Numeracy 
  
-0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
   
[0.013] [0.014] [0.024] [0.022] [0.021] [0.019] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.025 0.025 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.014 
   
[0.015] [0.016] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.082* 0.078* 0.066 0.062 0.063 0.06 
   
[0.031] [0.027] [0.039] [0.033] [0.034] [0.028] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.074*** 0.081*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.040** 0.048*** 
   
[0.010] [0.011] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.008 0.011 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.005 
   
[0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
         3.Real Assets 
  
0.018 0.023* 0.019 0.024* 0.016 0.021 
   
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.062** 0.063*** 0.044** 0.047** 0.036* 0.039* 
   
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.170*** 0.171*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.130*** 0.133*** 
   
[0.017] [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.015] [0.014] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.030*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 
   
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Home 
Ownership 
  
-0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 0 -0.004 
   
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.013] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
 
  
-0.005 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
   
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] 
         Female 
  
-0.026* -0.026** 0.003 0.003 0 0 
   
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.021** 0.020** 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.006 
   
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] 
         Age 
  
0 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
         HH size 
  
0.01 0.011 0.01 0.011 0.01 0.01 
   
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.007* -0.007** -0.008* -0.008** -0.009* -0.009* 
   
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.005* 0.004* 
       
[0.002] [0.002] 
         Control 
      
0.002 -0.005 
       
[0.003] [0.008] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.007 0.006 
       
[0.011] [0.011] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.021* 0.017 
       
[0.006] [0.010] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.020* 0.022 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
       
[0.008] [0.012] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.021 0.017 
       
[0.013] [0.011] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.018 0.017 
       
[0.014] [0.014] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.013 -0.012 
       
[0.008] [0.008] 
         AT -0.151*** 
 
-0.105*** 
 
-0.113*** 
 
-0.120*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.007] 
 
[0.009] 
 
[0.006] 
 
         CH 0.040*** 
 
0.032*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.014** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.003] 
 
         IT_N -0.107*** 
 
-0.071*** 
 
-0.084*** 
 
-0.076*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
         NL -0.047*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
-0.037*** 
 
-0.045*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.002] 
 
         FR_E -0.036*** 
 
-0.014* 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.005 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.007] 
 
[0.008] 
 
         BE -0.020*** 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.014* 
 
-0.012* 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.151*** 
 
-0.107*** 
 
-0.115*** 
 
-0.120*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.007] 
 
[0.008] 
 
[0.006] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.072*** 
 
0.062*** 
 
0.052*** 
 
0.048*** 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.004] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.107*** 
 
-0.071*** 
 
-0.085*** 
 
-0.078*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.106*** 
 
-0.083*** 
 
-0.058*** 
 
-0.063*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.008] 
 
[0.006] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.014** 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.007 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.007] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.027*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
-0.053*** 
 
-0.057*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.003] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.088*** 
 
-0.060*** 
 
-0.067*** 
 
-0.063*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.006] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.047*** 
 
-0.026*** 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.042*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.052*** 
 
0.047*** 
 
0.042*** 
 
0.041*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
         _cons 0.231*** 0.231*** -0.204* -0.152 -0.27 -0.215 -0.319* -0.256* 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.078] [0.068] [0.115] [0.098] [0.124] [0.105] 
N 13749 13749 13516 13516 11178 11178 10842 10842 
r2 0.032 0.044 0.13 0.137 0.18 0.188 0.182 0.189 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 2: Graphical illustration for influence of the 4 Models on country (the upper plot) 
in each panel and linguistic communities’ dummies (the lower plot), as deviations from 
South Germany and German-speakers in South Germany (respectively).  
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Table 3: OLS. Risky Assets (holding of stocks and bonds and/or mutual funds), 50+, HH's 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.239*** 0.238*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 
     
[0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.293*** 0.296*** 0.288*** 0.292*** 
     
[0.025] [0.030] [0.026] [0.031] 
         Rightist 
    
0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
     
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
-0.005 -0.006 -0.013 -0.013 -0.021 -0.02 
   
[0.018] [0.016] [0.029] [0.027] [0.029] [0.028] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
0.026 0.027 0.019 0.021 0.011 0.013 
   
[0.015] [0.019] [0.025] [0.026] [0.022] [0.023] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.052* 0.052* 0.038 0.037 0.023 0.023 
   
[0.019] [0.021] [0.027] [0.028] [0.024] [0.026] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.111** 0.105** 0.087* 0.081* 0.071* 0.066* 
   
[0.028] [0.023] [0.035] [0.029] [0.027] [0.022] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.103*** 0.111*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.067*** 
   
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.017 0.02 0.014 0.018 0.01 0.014 
   
[0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] 
         3.Real Assets 
  
0.026 0.032 0.026 0.032 0.019 0.026 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
   
[0.023] [0.019] [0.024] [0.020] [0.022] [0.019] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.082*** 0.086*** 0.061*** 0.065** 0.050** 0.056* 
   
[0.011] [0.015] [0.009] [0.017] [0.010] [0.019] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.210*** 0.213*** 0.171*** 0.175*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 
   
[0.020] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.046*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 
   
[0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] 
         Home 
ownership 
  
0.011 0.006 0.019 0.013 0.021 0.014 
   
[0.023] [0.021] [0.021] [0.019] [0.017] [0.016] 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
  
-0.012* -0.009* -0.011* -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 
   
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
         Female 
  
-0.016 -0.016 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 
   
[0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.037** 0.036** 0.023* 0.021 0.016 0.015 
   
[0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] 
         Age 
  
0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.003* 0.002* 
   
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
         HH size 
  
0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
   
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.015*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018** -0.018*** 
   
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.005 0.005 
       
[0.002] [0.002] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         Control 
      
-0.004 -0.013* 
       
[0.010] [0.005] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.021 0.021 
       
[0.010] [0.011] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.036* 0.033* 
       
[0.011] [0.012] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.046* 0.049** 
       
[0.013] [0.014] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.025*** 0.021** 
       
[0.004] [0.005] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.019 0.018 
       
[0.019] [0.018] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.02 -0.02 
       
[0.012] [0.011] 
         AT -0.255*** 
 
-0.197*** 
 
-0.213*** 
 
-0.220*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.007] 
 
[0.008] 
 
[0.005] 
 
         CH 0.014*** 
 
0.001 
 
-0.025*** 
 
-0.035*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
 
         IT_N -0.021*** 
 
0.024** 
 
0.010** 
 
0.024*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.004] 
 
         NL -0.168*** 
 
-0.148*** 
 
-0.167*** 
 
-0.180*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
FR_E -0.155*** 
 
-0.129*** 
 
-0.162*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.010] 
 
[0.012] 
 
         BE -0.090*** 
 
-0.077*** 
 
-0.092*** 
 
-0.094*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.005] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.255*** 
 
-0.199*** 
 
-0.215*** 
 
-0.219*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.007] 
 
[0.004] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.066*** 
 
0.048*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.013* 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.021*** 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.009* 
 
0.022*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.004] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.205*** 
 
-0.171*** 
 
-0.144*** 
 
-0.163*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.004] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.155*** 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.172*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.008] 
 
[0.010] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.097*** 
 
-0.102*** 
 
-0.137*** 
 
-0.142*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.003] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
-0.140*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.006] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.168*** 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.165*** 
 
-0.177*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.005] 
         l_FL_be 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.043*** 
 
-0.049*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.003] 
         _cons 0.399*** 0.399*** -0.344** -0.284** -0.387* -0.329** -0.447* -0.381** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.085] [0.073] [0.109] [0.087] [0.128] [0.104] 
N 13875 13875 13637 13637 11259 11259 10914 10914 
r2 0.047 0.062 0.172 0.181 0.229 0.237 0.234 0.242 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 4: Graphical illustration for influence of the 4 Models on country (the upper plot) 
in each panel and linguistic communities’ dummies (the lower plot), as deviations from 
South Germany and German-speakers in South Germany (respectively).  
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Table 5: OLS. Risky Assets plus IRA, 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.218*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 
     
[0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.014] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.217** 0.220*** 0.210** 0.213*** 
     
[0.039] [0.034] [0.036] [0.033] 
         Rightist 
    
0.003* 0.002 0.002* 0.002 
     
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
0 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 
   
[0.015] [0.017] [0.020] [0.023] [0.019] [0.024] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
0.026 0.028 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.003 
   
[0.022] [0.025] [0.020] [0.022] [0.017] [0.022] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.062 0.061 0.038 0.036 0.021 0.021 
   
[0.029] [0.032] [0.028] [0.029] [0.022] [0.027] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.104* 0.096** 0.073* 0.065* 0.054* 0.049* 
   
[0.031] [0.027] [0.030] [0.024] [0.022] [0.020] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.120*** 0.131*** 0.087** 0.098*** 0.074** 0.086*** 
   
[0.012] [0.008] [0.015] [0.011] [0.017] [0.013] 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.044*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.043** 
   
[0.004] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.010] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
3.Real Assets 
  
0.03 0.038 0.029 0.038 0.024 0.032 
   
[0.018] [0.027] [0.016] [0.030] [0.015] [0.031] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.096** 0.102** 0.079* 0.085* 0.069* 0.076 
   
[0.025] [0.030] [0.025] [0.032] [0.027] [0.034] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.191** 0.196*** 0.155** 0.160** 0.143** 0.150** 
   
[0.038] [0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.038] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.054*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 
   
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
         Home 
ownership 
  
0.035 0.029 0.039 0.032 0.041 0.034 
   
[0.038] [0.038] [0.036] [0.038] [0.033] [0.036] 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
  
-0.014* -0.010* -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 
   
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009] [0.007] 
         Female 
  
-0.018 -0.018* 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
   
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.034** 0.032*** 0.019* 0.017 0.012 0.011 
   
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.010] 
         Age 
  
-0.005* -0.006** -0.005* -0.005** -0.005* -0.005** 
   
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
         HH size 
  
0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
   
[0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.017** -0.017*** -0.016** -0.016*** -0.017** -0.016*** 
   
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.007 0.006 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
       
[0.003] [0.003] 
         Control 
      
0.009 -0.002 
       
[0.013] [0.008] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.02 0.02 
       
[0.011] [0.012] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.035*** 0.030* 
       
[0.004] [0.013] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.039* 0.043** 
       
[0.012] [0.013] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.035** 0.029* 
       
[0.007] [0.010] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.018 0.017 
       
[0.015] [0.014] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.033** -0.032* 
       
[0.007] [0.011] 
         AT -0.208*** 
 
-0.166*** 
 
-0.177*** 
 
-0.191*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.006] 
 
         CH 0.129*** 
 
0.095*** 
 
0.079*** 
 
0.063*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.005] 
 
         IT_N -0.032*** 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.008 
 
0.005 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
         NL -0.147*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
-0.155*** 
 
-0.175*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.004] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         FR_E 0.067*** 
 
0.085*** 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.008 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.008] 
 
[0.011] 
 
         BE 0.055*** 
 
0.046*** 
 
0.038*** 
 
0.033*** 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.003] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.208*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 
-0.180*** 
 
-0.191*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.006] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.191*** 
 
0.154*** 
 
0.135*** 
 
0.121*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.007] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.032*** 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.009* 
 
0.002 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.003] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.182*** 
 
-0.159*** 
 
-0.124*** 
 
-0.135*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.006] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
0.067*** 
 
0.084*** 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.012 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.009] 
 
[0.010] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.029*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
-0.056*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.006] 
 
[0.005] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.032*** 
 
-0.018** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
-0.031*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.140*** 
 
-0.153*** 
 
-0.171*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.007] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.147*** 
 
0.111*** 
 
0.105*** 
 
0.096*** 
  
[0.000] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.005] 
         _cons 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.007 0.084 0.045 0.124 -0.006 0.084 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.143] [0.130] [0.119] [0.108] [0.137] [0.122] 
N 13871 13871 13639 13639 11260 11260 10923 10923 
r2 0.075 0.092 0.227 0.238 0.266 0.277 0.27 0.281 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Graphical illustration for influence of the 4 Models on country (the upper plot) 
in each panel and linguistic communities’ dummies (the lower plot), as deviations from 
South Germany and German-speakers in South Germany (respectively). 
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Table 7. Post-Estimation: Results of the F-Test for Equality of Language Interactions 
Dummies 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3  Model  4 
F- Test P-value P-value P-value P-value 
Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect) 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  N/A 0.0001 0.0004 0.0043 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Risky Assets (holding of stocks and bonds and/or mutual funds) 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  N/A 0.0002 0.0085 0.0026 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Risky Assets plus IRA 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  N/A 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 8. F-Test for Equality of Language Groups in Switzerland and Belgium, Same 
table for all the three Outcomes: holding of Stocks, Risky Assets and Risky Assets plus 
IRA 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3  Model  4 
F- Test P-value P-value P-value P-value 
test (_b[l_DE_ch] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_IT_ch])  N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_FR_be] = _b[l_FL_be])  N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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APPENDIX IV 
Probit 
 
Model 1 Only Country/Language Interactions Dummies 
  
Model 2 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics 
  
Model 3 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences 
  
Model 4 Country/Language Interactions Dummies + Objective Characteristics + 
Subjective preferences + Social/Cultural Characteristics 
 
 
Table 8: Probit. Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect), 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.650*** 0.655*** 0.641*** 0.647*** 
     
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.956*** 0.974*** 0.947*** 0.964*** 
     
[0.061] [0.061] [0.062] [0.062] 
         Rightist 
    
0.025*** 0.023** 0.025** 0.024** 
     
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
0.093 0.094 0.062 0.06 0.065 0.066 
   
[0.128] [0.129] [0.158] [0.159] [0.170] [0.171] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
0.166 0.17 0.102 0.104 0.101 0.108 
   
[0.123] [0.124] [0.152] [0.153] [0.165] [0.166] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
4.Numeracy 
  
0.289* 0.291* 0.209 0.207 0.193 0.196 
   
[0.122] [0.123] [0.152] [0.153] [0.164] [0.165] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.481*** 0.471*** 0.390* 0.375* 0.370* 0.363* 
   
[0.124] [0.125] [0.153] [0.154] [0.165] [0.166] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.260*** 0.293*** 0.180*** 0.216*** 0.144*** 0.180*** 
   
[0.030] [0.030] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.134* 0.146** 0.1 0.115 0.088 0.103 
   
[0.056] [0.056] [0.061] [0.061] [0.062] [0.062] 
         3.Real Assets 
  
0.185** 0.204** 0.177* 0.198** 0.156* 0.177* 
   
[0.069] [0.069] [0.074] [0.074] [0.075] [0.075] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.380*** 0.394*** 0.300*** 0.318*** 0.258*** 0.277*** 
   
[0.064] [0.064] [0.069] [0.069] [0.070] [0.070] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.708*** 0.720*** 0.591*** 0.607*** 0.552*** 0.571*** 
   
[0.062] [0.062] [0.067] [0.067] [0.068] [0.068] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.201*** 0.178*** 0.157*** 0.134*** 0.151*** 0.130*** 
   
[0.023] [0.022] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] 
         Home 
Ownership 
  
-0.015 -0.027 -0.003 -0.019 0.002 -0.013 
   
[0.052] [0.052] [0.056] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] 
         Health (ADL 
  
-0.057* -0.044 -0.065* -0.049 -0.048 -0.035 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
limitations) 
 
   
[0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] 
         Female 
  
-0.116*** -0.115*** 0.008 0.011 -0.003 0.001 
   
[0.028] [0.028] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.064 0.063 0.036 0.033 0.008 0.008 
   
[0.040] [0.040] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] 
         Age 
  
-0.001 -0.002 0.004* 0.004* 0.005** 0.005* 
   
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         HH size 
  
0.032 0.037 0.038 0.042* 0.039 0.042 
   
[0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.045*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.056*** 
   
[0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.024*** 0.020** 
       
[0.007] [0.007] 
         Control 
      
0.01 -0.021 
       
[0.036] [0.036] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.097 0.097 
       
[0.057] [0.057] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.123* 0.109* 
       
[0.053] [0.053] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.085* 0.095** 
       
[0.034] [0.034] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Religious 
organization 
      
0.094* 0.073 
       
[0.045] [0.045] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.088* 0.083* 
       
[0.038] [0.038] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.058 -0.058 
       
[0.046] [0.046] 
         AT -0.671*** 
 
-0.514*** 
 
-0.561*** 
 
-0.603*** 
 
 
[0.099] 
 
[0.102] 
 
[0.113] 
 
[0.116] 
 
         CH 0.127 
 
0.106 
 
0.083 
 
0.042 
 
 
[0.098] 
 
[0.102] 
 
[0.113] 
 
[0.115] 
 
         IT_N -0.419*** 
 
-0.293* 
 
-0.363* 
 
-0.325* 
 
 
[0.120] 
 
[0.126] 
 
[0.142] 
 
[0.143] 
 
         NL -0.166 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.127 
 
-0.167 
 
 
[0.100] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.115] 
 
[0.117] 
 
         FR_E -0.123 
 
-0.025 
 
0.008 
 
0.02 
 
 
[0.102] 
 
[0.105] 
 
[0.141] 
 
[0.146] 
 
         BE -0.067 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.03 
 
 
[0.097] 
 
[0.100] 
 
[0.112] 
 
[0.114] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.671*** 
 
-0.520*** 
 
-0.568*** 
 
-0.599*** 
  
[0.099] 
 
[0.101] 
 
[0.113] 
 
[0.115] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.220* 
 
0.204* 
 
0.19 
 
0.158 
  
[0.099] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.115] 
 
[0.116] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
l_IT_it 
 
-0.419*** 
 
-0.295* 
 
-0.365** 
 
-0.330* 
  
[0.120] 
 
[0.125] 
 
[0.141] 
 
[0.143] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.416* 
 
-0.306 
 
-0.176 
 
-0.206 
  
[0.189] 
 
[0.214] 
 
[0.221] 
 
[0.224] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.123 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.002 
 
0.01 
  
[0.102] 
 
[0.105] 
 
[0.141] 
 
[0.145] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.111 
 
-0.202 
 
-0.228 
  
[0.110] 
 
[0.115] 
 
[0.127] 
 
[0.129] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.331** 
 
-0.233* 
 
-0.258* 
 
-0.239* 
  
[0.101] 
 
[0.104] 
 
[0.116] 
 
[0.118] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.166 
 
-0.085 
 
-0.122 
 
-0.156 
  
[0.100] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.115] 
 
[0.117] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.163 
 
0.149 
 
0.141 
 
0.132 
  
[0.099] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.115] 
 
[0.117] 
         _cons -0.734*** -0.734*** -3.634*** -3.366*** -3.741*** -3.465*** -4.048*** -3.745*** 
 
[0.094] [0.094] [0.325] [0.322] [0.358] [0.354] [0.368] [0.365] 
N 13749 13749 13516 13516 11178 11178 10842 10842 
Pseudo R2 0.0365 0.0476 0.1491 0.1554 0.1939 0.2014 0.1968 0.2034 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 10: Probit. Risky Assets (holding of stocks and bonds and/or mutual funds), 50+, 
HH's 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.732*** 0.737*** 0.721*** 0.726*** 
     
[0.031] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.893*** 0.912*** 0.887*** 0.905*** 
     
[0.061] [0.061] [0.062] [0.062] 
         Rightist 
    
0.012 0.01 0.011 0.01 
     
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
0.112 0.114 0.042 0.04 -0.008 -0.007 
   
[0.104] [0.105] [0.126] [0.127] [0.133] [0.134] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
0.274** 0.282** 0.194 0.201 0.139 0.149 
   
[0.099] [0.100] [0.121] [0.122] [0.128] [0.129] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.364*** 0.365*** 0.264* 0.260* 0.183 0.184 
   
[0.099] [0.099] [0.120] [0.121] [0.128] [0.129] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.533*** 0.520*** 0.418*** 0.400** 0.335** 0.322* 
   
[0.101] [0.102] [0.122] [0.123] [0.130] [0.131] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.305*** 0.337*** 0.216*** 0.248*** 0.181*** 0.213*** 
   
[0.028] [0.028] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.032] 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.140** 0.155** 0.123* 0.140** 0.106 0.125* 
   
[0.049] [0.049] [0.054] [0.054] [0.055] [0.055] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
3.Real Assets 
  
0.183** 0.207*** 0.177** 0.203** 0.150* 0.176** 
   
[0.061] [0.062] [0.066] [0.067] [0.067] [0.068] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.369*** 0.391*** 0.295*** 0.319*** 0.254*** 0.281*** 
   
[0.057] [0.058] [0.062] [0.062] [0.063] [0.063] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.698*** 0.721*** 0.587*** 0.614*** 0.546*** 0.576*** 
   
[0.056] [0.056] [0.061] [0.061] [0.062] [0.062] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.253*** 0.232*** 0.208*** 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.180*** 
   
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
         Home 
ownership 
  
0.049 0.032 0.077 0.056 0.082 0.062 
   
[0.048] [0.048] [0.051] [0.052] [0.052] [0.053] 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
  
-0.074*** -0.063** -0.062* -0.048 -0.045 -0.036 
   
[0.022] [0.022] [0.026] [0.026] [0.028] [0.028] 
         Female 
  
-0.054* -0.054* 0.057 0.059* 0.052 0.053 
   
[0.026] [0.026] [0.029] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.087* 0.086* 0.05 0.047 0.027 0.026 
   
[0.036] [0.036] [0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.041] 
         Age 
  
0.004** 0.004** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
   
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         HH size 
  
0.003 0.008 0.013 0.018 0.014 0.018 
   
[0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.066*** -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
   
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.019** 0.016* 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
       
[0.007] [0.007] 
         Control 
      
-0.014 -0.045 
       
[0.032] [0.033] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.118* 0.117* 
       
[0.050] [0.050] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.161*** 0.151** 
       
[0.047] [0.047] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.161*** 0.173*** 
       
[0.032] [0.032] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.096* 0.078 
       
[0.042] [0.042] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.081* 0.077* 
       
[0.035] [0.035] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.067 -0.069 
       
[0.042] [0.042] 
         AT -0.806*** 
 
-0.689*** 
 
-0.767*** 
 
-0.807*** 
 
 
[0.089] 
 
[0.093] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.106] 
 
         CH 0.037 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.141 
 
 
[0.089] 
 
[0.094] 
 
[0.104] 
 
[0.106] 
 
         IT_N -0.055 
 
0.132 
 
0.086 
 
0.127 
 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.110] 
 
[0.123] 
 
[0.125] 
 
         NL -0.481*** 
 
-0.476*** 
 
-0.552*** 
 
-0.609*** 
 
 
[0.091] 
 
[0.095] 
 
[0.106] 
 
[0.109] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         FR_E -0.437*** 
 
-0.403*** 
 
-0.512*** 
 
-0.548*** 
 
 
[0.092] 
 
[0.098] 
 
[0.133] 
 
[0.139] 
 
         BE -0.241** 
 
-0.246** 
 
-0.296** 
 
-0.307** 
 
 
[0.088] 
 
[0.093] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.105] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.806*** 
 
-0.694*** 
 
-0.773*** 
 
-0.802*** 
  
[0.089] 
 
[0.093] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.106] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.167 
 
0.106 
 
0.044 
 
0.005 
  
[0.090] 
 
[0.096] 
 
[0.105] 
 
[0.108] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.055 
 
0.126 
 
0.08 
 
0.119 
  
[0.103] 
 
[0.110] 
 
[0.122] 
 
[0.124] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.608*** 
 
-0.531** 
 
-0.412* 
 
-0.500* 
  
[0.168] 
 
[0.196] 
 
[0.201] 
 
[0.206] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
-0.437*** 
 
-0.407*** 
 
-0.523*** 
 
-0.558*** 
  
[0.092] 
 
[0.097] 
 
[0.133] 
 
[0.139] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.262** 
 
-0.336** 
 
-0.451*** 
 
-0.482*** 
  
[0.099] 
 
[0.106] 
 
[0.116] 
 
[0.119] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.468*** 
 
-0.407*** 
 
-0.452*** 
 
-0.451*** 
  
[0.091] 
 
[0.096] 
 
[0.106] 
 
[0.109] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.481*** 
 
-0.470*** 
 
-0.547*** 
 
-0.599*** 
  
[0.091] 
 
[0.095] 
 
[0.106] 
 
[0.108] 
         l_FL_be 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.103 
 
-0.158 
 
-0.184 
  
[0.090] 
 
[0.095] 
 
[0.106] 
 
[0.108] 
         _cons -0.256** -0.256** -4.086*** -3.843*** -4.037*** -3.794*** -4.274*** -4.009*** 
 
[0.085] [0.085] [0.260] [0.260] [0.287] [0.286] [0.296] [0.296] 
N 13875 13875 13637 13637 11259 11259 10914 10914 
Pseudo R2 0.0416 0.0525 0.1645 0.1707 0.209 0.2156 0.2144 0.2205 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 12: Probit. Risky Assets plus IRA, 50+, HH's 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Average risk 
aversion 
    
0.643*** 0.646*** 0.629*** 0.633*** 
     
[0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.032] 
         Low risk 
aversion 
    
0.639*** 0.659*** 0.623*** 0.642*** 
     
[0.064] [0.064] [0.064] [0.064] 
         Rightist 
    
0.007 0.004 0.006 0.004 
     
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
         1b.Numeracy 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Numeracy 
  
0.103 0.099 0.077 0.071 0.025 0.025 
   
[0.095] [0.096] [0.119] [0.121] [0.126] [0.127] 
         3.Numeracy 
  
0.205* 0.209* 0.15 0.153 0.084 0.093 
   
[0.091] [0.092] [0.115] [0.116] [0.121] [0.123] 
         4.Numeracy 
  
0.311*** 0.308*** 0.236* 0.230* 0.149 0.15 
   
[0.090] [0.091] [0.114] [0.116] [0.121] [0.122] 
         5.Numeracy 
  
0.434*** 0.411*** 0.345** 0.320** 0.252* 0.236 
   
[0.092] [0.093] [0.116] [0.118] [0.123] [0.124] 
         Post-
Secondary 
Education 
  
0.344*** 0.382*** 0.260*** 0.300*** 0.222*** 0.262*** 
   
[0.027] [0.028] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
         1b.Real 
Assets 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.] [.] 
         2.Real Assets 
  
0.199*** 0.216*** 0.198*** 0.218*** 0.187*** 0.208*** 
   
[0.045] [0.045] [0.049] [0.050] [0.050] [0.051] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
3.Real Assets 
  
0.159** 0.187** 0.158* 0.188** 0.137* 0.167** 
   
[0.057] [0.058] [0.062] [0.063] [0.063] [0.064] 
         4.Real Assets 
  
0.347*** 0.370*** 0.302*** 0.325*** 0.272*** 0.297*** 
   
[0.054] [0.054] [0.058] [0.059] [0.059] [0.060] 
         5.Real Assets 
  
0.595*** 0.620*** 0.514*** 0.541*** 0.481*** 0.511*** 
   
[0.053] [0.054] [0.058] [0.058] [0.059] [0.059] 
         IHS of ppp-
adjusted 
household 
income 
  
0.218*** 0.196*** 0.187*** 0.165*** 0.179*** 0.158*** 
   
[0.019] [0.018] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] 
         Home 
ownership 
  
0.110* 0.092* 0.129** 0.109* 0.131** 0.112* 
   
[0.045] [0.046] [0.049] [0.049] [0.050] [0.050] 
         Health (ADL 
limitations) 
  
-0.070*** -0.058** -0.058* -0.041 -0.045 -0.032 
   
[0.021] [0.021] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] 
         Female 
  
-0.067** -0.069** 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
   
[0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] 
         Partner in HH 
  
0.087* 0.084* 0.05 0.047 0.033 0.033 
   
[0.035] [0.035] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.040] 
         Age 
  
-0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
   
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
         HH size 
  
0.005 0.01 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.016 
   
[0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] 
         Number of 
Children 
  
-0.061*** -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
   
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
         Trusting other 
people 
      
0.023*** 0.019** 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
       
[0.006] [0.006] 
         Control 
      
0.029 -0.008 
       
[0.031] [0.031] 
         Life is full of 
opportunities 
      
0.089 0.086 
       
[0.047] [0.047] 
         Future looks 
good 
      
0.127** 0.112* 
       
[0.044] [0.044] 
         Volunteering 
      
0.128*** 0.143*** 
       
[0.031] [0.031] 
         Religious 
organization 
      
0.122** 0.102* 
       
[0.041] [0.041] 
Prayer 
        1b.Never 
      
0 0 
       
[.] [.] 
         2. Sometimes 
      
0.061 0.056 
       
[0.033] [0.034] 
         3. Frequently 
      
-0.114** -0.115** 
       
[0.040] [0.040] 
         AT -0.598*** 
 
-0.533*** 
 
-0.592*** 
 
-0.647*** 
 
 
[0.089] 
 
[0.093] 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.105] 
 
         CH 0.324*** 
 
0.267** 
 
0.230* 
 
0.174 
 
 
[0.089] 
 
[0.095] 
 
[0.105] 
 
[0.107] 
 
         IT_N -0.082 
 
0.029 
 
0.01 
 
0.044 
 
 
[0.103] 
 
[0.111] 
 
[0.123] 
 
[0.125] 
 
         NL -0.403*** 
 
-0.447*** 
 
-0.506*** 
 
-0.578*** 
 
 
[0.091] 
 
[0.096] 
 
[0.107] 
 
[0.109] 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
Count 
_Dum 
Lang* 
Country 
         FR_E 0.17 
 
0.282** 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.027 
 
 
[0.092] 
 
[0.097] 
 
[0.132] 
 
[0.136] 
 
         BE 0.14 
 
0.14 
 
0.116 
 
0.097 
 
 
[0.088] 
 
[0.093] 
 
[0.104] 
 
[0.105] 
 
         l_DE_at 
 
-0.598*** 
 
-0.540*** 
 
-0.601*** 
 
-0.642*** 
  
[0.089] 
 
[0.093] 
 
[0.104] 
 
[0.105] 
         l_DE_ch 
 
0.484*** 
 
0.439*** 
 
0.398*** 
 
0.350** 
  
[0.091] 
 
[0.097] 
 
[0.107] 
 
[0.108] 
         l_IT_it 
 
-0.082 
 
0.022 
 
0.005 
 
0.035 
  
[0.103] 
 
[0.111] 
 
[0.123] 
 
[0.125] 
         l_IT_ch 
 
-0.512** 
 
-0.521** 
 
-0.396* 
 
-0.435* 
  
[0.164] 
 
[0.190] 
 
[0.197] 
 
[0.199] 
         l_FR_fr 
 
0.17 
 
0.277** 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.043 
  
[0.092] 
 
[0.098] 
 
[0.132] 
 
[0.136] 
         l_FR_ch 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.185 
  
[0.099] 
 
[0.105] 
 
[0.116] 
 
[0.118] 
         l_FR_be 
 
-0.082 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.071 
 
-0.084 
  
[0.091] 
 
[0.096] 
 
[0.107] 
 
[0.108] 
         l_Du_nl 
 
-0.403*** 
 
-0.442*** 
 
-0.500*** 
 
-0.566*** 
  
[0.091] 
 
[0.096] 
 
[0.107] 
 
[0.108] 
         l_FL_be 
 
0.372*** 
 
0.317*** 
 
0.307** 
 
0.275* 
  
[0.091] 
 
[0.096] 
 
[0.107] 
 
[0.108] 
         _cons -0.204* -0.204* -2.129*** -1.854*** -1.903*** -1.598*** -2.042*** -1.710*** 
 
[0.086] [0.086] [0.259] [0.257] [0.291] [0.287] [0.294] [0.292] 
N 13871 13871 13639 13639 11260 11260 10923 10923 
r2 0.0582 0.0705 0.1943 0.203 0.2264 0.2357 0.2306 0.2391 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 13. Post-Estimation: Results of the F-Test for Equality of Language Interactions 
Dummies 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3  Model  4 
F- Test P-value P-value P-value P-value 
Pure Stocks-Holding (direct and indirect) 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  0.0000 0.0014 0.0318 0.0511 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  0.9884 0.9606 0.3770 0.5670 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Risky Assets (holding of stocks and bonds and/or mutual funds) 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  0.0026 0.5184 0.7445 0.5614 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  0.0004 0.0004 0.0096 0.0014 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Risky Assets plus IRA 
test (_b[l_FR_fr] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_FR_be])  0.0000 0.0000 0.3984 0.2789 
test (_b[l_IT_it] = _b[l_IT_ch])  0.0045 0.0025 0.0303 0.0118 
test (_b[l_DE_at] = _b[l_DE_ch]=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_Du_nl] = _b[l_FL_be]) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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For all the Kinds of Financial Behavior, in Switzerland all the Linguistic 
Communities behave differently, as well as in Belgium 
 
Table 15. F-Test for Equality of Language Groups in Switzerland and Belgium, Same 
table for all the three Outcomes: holding of Stocks, Risky Assets and Risky Assets plus 
IRA 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3  Model  4 
F- Test P-value P-value P-value P-value 
test (_b[l_DE_ch] = _b[l_FR_ch]=_b[l_IT_ch])  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
test (_b[l_FR_be] = _b[l_FL_be])  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
